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Abstract 
The rapid increase in the number of international investment treaties means the 
significance of investor-state arbitration provisions (ISAPs) has become more and more 
obvious. As the enforcement mechanism of international investment treaties, ISAPs 
furnish a powerful “weapon” for investors to challenge contracting states directly at the 
international level. Investment treaty tribunals establish their jurisdiction and scrutinize 
whether the measures of contracting states are consistent with their treaty obligations on 
the basis of ISAPs. While investment treaty tribunals enjoy a high level of interpretive 
authority delegated by contracting states, they are also accused of expansive rulings on 
jurisdiction, i.e., establishing jurisdiction beyond states’ consent.  
After a comprehensive examination of the practice of investment treaty tribunals on 
jurisdictional issues, this dissertation finds that investment treaty tribunals generally 
adopt an expansive approach towards jurisdiction and that the expansion of jurisdiction 
is still ongoing. There are multiple ways available for investment treaty tribunals to 
break through jurisdictional boundaries. These ways correlate with each other and work 
in harmony. They include expansive interpretations of “covered investors”, “covered 
investment” and “investment disputes”, weakening of preconditions to jurisdiction, 
expansive application of most-favored-nation clauses and “umbrella clauses”, restrictive 
application of “fork-in-the-road clauses”, flexible interpretation of the temporal scope of 
investment treaties, relaxing the burden of proof for investors, and frequent use of obiter 
dictum.  
The creeping jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals is an inevitable result 
attributed to internal and external causes. Aggressive pushing by investors, the 
ambiguity of investment treaty provisions, intense competition in attracting foreign 
investment among host states, and under-estimation of arbitration risks by host states 
are external driving forces. And the inherent capability and inclination of investment 
treaty tribunals in interpreting ISAPs expansively are institutional foundations to 
achieve the creeping jurisdiction. It can manifest in three aspects. Firstly, although being 
ad hoc dispute settlement bodies, investment treaty tribunals have the competence to 
decide their own jurisdiction and enjoy a high level of interpretive authority. Secondly, 
the established techniques of legal reasoning may enhance the credibility of the creeping 
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jurisdiction. The flexible application of treaty interpretation rules and the de facto 
precedent effect are two frequent techniques employed by investment treaty tribunals. 
Thirdly, arbitrators with pro-investor inclinations strongly support the expansion of 
jurisdiction in deciding investor-state disputes. Arbitrators’ personal background, close 
relationship with investors, and commercial legal thinking will strongly influence their 
value preferences for arbitration outcomes.  
This dissertation does not presume that the creeping jurisdiction is illegitimate or 
unjustifiable. Rather, it focuses on the competition and interaction between investment 
treaty tribunals and contracting states in the creeping jurisdiction issue. On one side, 
investment treaty tribunals have the capability and inclination to expand their 
jurisdiction. On the other, contracting states also have the capability to control the depth 
and breadth of the creeping jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals. For a radical 
expansion of jurisdiction that goes far beyond the acceptability of contracting states, 
contracting states may minimize their adverse impact by selecting arbitrators prudently, 
initiating state-state arbitration proceedings, requesting annulment of the award, and 
resisting enforcement of the award. Seeking to revise arbitration rules to strengthen the 
involvement of non-disputing states in investor-state arbitration, improving ex ante and 
ex post controls by contracting states over investment treaty rules, and even exiting 
from international investment treaties and investor-state arbitration mechanisms may 
also remind tribunals to respect the common intentions of contracting states. It is worth 
noting that whether and how to control the creeping jurisdiction of tribunals depends on 
policy priorities and interests weighed among contracting states. However, the 
capability of contracting states to control the creeping jurisdiction of tribunals is limited 
when these counter measures fail to function. The negotiating costs involved in the 
contracting and re-contracting process of investment treaties and the costs of exit from 
investment treaty regime may substantially prevent contracting states from taking action 
against the jurisdictional expansion by investment tribunals. 
 
Key words: Investment Treaty Tribunals; Creeping Jurisdiction; International 
Investment Treaties; Contracting States; Investment Protection 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The subject 
It is not uncommon for disputes to arise between a foreign investor and the host state. 
Traditionally, a foreign investor has no choice but to bring such disputes to the local 
courts of the host state after attempts at amicable negotiation fail. If the end result of 
local remedy disappoints the investor, the investor may seek diplomatic protection by its 
home state. However, granting diplomatic protection is strictly limited under customary 
international law. Even if the national state (the home state) of investors is entitled to 
exercise diplomatic protection, it is the state as the sole judge to decide whether and 
how to exercise this discretionary right. On one hand, local remedy in the host state 
seems unattractive to foreign investors. On the other hand, the effectiveness of 
diplomatic protection is subject to legal constraints of international law and 
unpredictable policy considerations of the national state. The generation of 
investor-state arbitration mechanism, however, aims to avoid such dilemmas. It provides 
legal standing for foreign investors to pursue their own claims against the host state at 
the international level.  
Investor-state arbitration, also generally known as investment treaty arbitration or 
international investment arbitration, is a dispute settlement mechanism resolving 
investment disputes arising between a foreign investor and a contracting state (the host 
state) on the basis of an applicable international investment treaty. A foreign investor 
may submit an investment dispute to arbitration if an alleged breach of substantial 
obligations by the host contracting state under an applicable international investment 
treaty exists. For an investment treaty tribunal to acquire jurisdiction on the arbitration 
claims, the host state must have consented to the arbitration of such investment disputes. 
A valid “consent” of the host state to arbitration is the jurisdictional foundation of an 
investment treaty tribunal. Therefore, how to find and interpret state’s consent to 
arbitration is at the core of the jurisdictional issue of investor-state arbitration.
1
  
                                                             
1 In this dissertation, the terms “jurisdiction” and “competence” are used interchangeable. Distinguishing these two 
terms is of little significance. See Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1960-1989: Part Nine, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 69, 1998, pp. 4-6; Christoph Schreuer, The 
ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2009, p. 532. On the contrary, there 
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The investment arbitration between the foreign investor and the host state may take 
place under various institutional and procedural frameworks such as the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA), Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
 2
 and ad hoc 
tribunals constituted under the arbitration rules adopted by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Of these various institutions 
and arbitration procedural frameworks, ICSID is the only institutional system 
specifically designed under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention or Washington 
Convention) to deal with investment disputes and is the most widely used. According to 
Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any 
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a Contracting State and a 
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the ICSID. The ratification of the ICSID Convention by a contracting state, 
however, shall not constitute the consent required by Article 25(1). Therefore, the 
ICSID tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over an investment dispute only if a 
contracting state (the host state) and a national of another contracting state (the foreign 
investor) “consent in writing” to submit such dispute to arbitration. Besides, under the 
Arbitration Rules of other arbitral institutions (SCC, ICC, LCIA, etc.), the arbitration 
agreement between the parties is also required for the submission to arbitration.  
Unlike interstate arbitration or international commercial arbitration, investor-state 
arbitration is a unique arbitration mechanism designed to settle disputes arising from the 
regulatory, rather than a reciprocal, legal relationship between state and individual. At 
first glance, it seems rather difficult to reach an arbitration agreement between the host 
state and foreign investor. However, the formal requirement of an arbitration agreement 
has been abandoned in the jurisdictional practice of investor-state arbitration. 
Investor-state arbitration provisions (ISAPs) contained in most international investment 
treaties are considered to be “unilateral offers of arbitration” by the contracting states. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
is also an argument that the terms “jurisdiction” and “competence” differ in the reach of dispute settlement 
function. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Questions 
of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 34, 1958, pp. 8-9. 
2 It is notable, however, that these arbitral institutions do not participate in the adjudication of specific cases of 
investor-state arbitration but rather facilitate the constitution and operation of ad hoc arbitral tribunals. 
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Foreign investors may accept such standing offers simply by initiating the investor-state 
arbitration proceeding should a dispute arise. A majority of investor-state arbitration 
cases invoked such unilateral offers embodied in ISAPs as the basis of jurisdiction.  
There are currently more than 3,200 international investment treaties in force, which 
differ in the level of investment protection.
3
 The formulation of ISAPs is also highly 
diverse.
4
 Distinct ISAPs in different investment treaties vary in the preconditions, 
breadth and depth of investor-state arbitration. For instance, some investment treaties 
contain narrow ISAPs restricting the access of investors to investor-state arbitration 
only to those disputes over “the amount of compensation for expropriation”. While 
other investment treaties contain broader ISAPs that authorize investors to submit to 
arbitration for “any legal dispute concerning an investment”. Even if a dispute is clearly 
covered by the language of ISAPs, contracting states are still free to impose 
preconditions limiting the submission to arbitration. Many investment treaties provide 
that before an investor can initiate investor-state arbitration proceedings, he must first 
resort to domestic courts of the host state for a certain period, often 18 months. How to 
construe states’ consent to arbitration from various ISAPs to acquire jurisdiction is the 
primary task of investment treaty tribunals. 
ISAPs are labeled as the “teeth” of investment treaties. They furnish a powerful 
“weapon” for investors to challenge contracting states directly at the international level. 
Investment treaty tribunals establish jurisdiction and scrutinize whether the measures of 
contracting states are consistent with their treaty commitments on the basis of ISAPs. 
The establishment of their jurisdiction is the decisive step leading to the judicial review 
power of tribunals. Unless impenetrable legal barriers exist, tribunals tend to affirm 
their jurisdiction over investors’ claims and to conduct judicial review of lawfulness of 
state measures under applicable investment treaties. Expansive interpretation of ISAPs 
could lead to the strengthening of investment protection regime. Tribunals have 
accordingly played a significant role in interpreting, and thus developing, investment 
treaty law. The broad interpretive authority enjoyed by tribunals makes them an 
important body to enhance the credibility of treaty commitments and to strengthen the 
                                                             
3 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014, United 
Nations Publication, 2014, p. 114. 
4 See Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment 
Agreements: A Large Sample Survey, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2012/3, 2012, pp. 
7-8. 
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binding force of procedural and substantial treaty rules on contracting states.  
The past two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of 
investor-state arbitration cases. More importantly, tribunals tend to favor expansive 
readings of their own jurisdiction. Tribunals increasingly extend their jurisdictional 
reach beyond the boundary of states’ consent through the flexible interpretation of 
ISAPs. As a result, governments are starting to face a greater number of arbitration 
claims by foreign investors. The more claims that are brought to investment treaty 
tribunals, the more these tribunals have opportunities to interpret and even develop 
ISAPs. For example, prior to 1996, only 38 cases had been brought before ICSID 
tribunals. However, since the late 1990s, the number of cases has grown considerably. 
As of May 31, 2015, ICSID has registered 523 cases, of which 328 cases have 
concluded and 195 cases are still pending.
5
 Of the concluded cases decided by tribunals, 
only 25% declined jurisdiction.
6
 
This dissertation will focus on four specific issues: (1) What are the characteristics of 
investor-state arbitration in comparison with other international dispute settlement 
mechanisms? (2) Whether and how do investment treaty tribunals establish jurisdiction 
beyond states’ consent? (3) Why do investment treaty tribunals have the capability and 
inclination to expand their jurisdiction? (4) How do contracting states and investment 
treaty tribunals compete and interact regarding the creeping jurisdiction of tribunals?  
The term “creeping” in this dissertation indicates the gradual and even imperceptible 
process of expanding jurisdiction by investment treaty tribunals. According to the 
Oxford Dictionary, “creeping” is an adjective word meaning “occur or develop 
gradually and almost imperceptibly”. The phrase “creeping jurisdiction” is no stranger 
to academics of international law. It has been applied by a number of publicists to the 
extension of maritime claims by coastal states.
7
 Apart from this, the concept of 
“creeping jurisdiction” has also been used to characterize the process of extending their 
jurisdictional mandate by international dispute settlement bodies, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights.
8
 This dissertation, therefore, similarly applies this concept to 
                                                             
5 See the website of ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx. 
6 ICSID Secretariat, ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2015-1), 2015, p. 14. 
7 See, e.g., Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in a post 9/11 World: Security and Creeping Jurisdiction, in David 
Freestone, Richard Barnes & David M. Ong (eds.), The Law of the Sea : Progress and Prospects, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, pp. 347-364. 
8 See, e.g., Aslan Gunduz, Creeping Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights: the Bankovic Case vs the 
Loizidou Case, available at  http   sam.gov.tr wp-content uploads 2 12    Aslan unduz.pdf .  
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describe the progressive and imperceptible process of jurisdictional expansion by 
investment treaty tribunals. 
1.2 Theoretical approach 
Academics are divided regarding the nature of investor-state arbitration, resulting in 
several competing conceptualizations, including the public international law paradigm, 
the international commercial arbitration paradigm and the public law paradigm. The 
public international law paradigm treats investor-state arbitration as a creature of public 
international law and puts the treaty parties (the host state and the home state of 
investors) in a superior position relative to investors, as the latter are not treaty parties.
9
 
The commercial arbitration paradigm, however, emphasizes “equality of arms” between 
the disputing parties (the claimant investors and the respondent host state).
10
 The public 
law paradigm, by contrast, shifts attention away from both the treaty parties and the 
disputing parties toward the interests of the public at large and views investor-state 
arbitration as a form of internationalized judicial review.
11
  
This dissertation employs the public international law paradigm while being sensitive 
to particular concerns of the commercial arbitration paradigm and the public law 
paradigm. Balancing the interests of treaty parties, disputing parties and the public at 
large is the underlying policy consideration of this dissertation. Take the origin of 
investment tribunals’ powers for instance. The public international law paradigm 
assumes that the treaty parties are the delegating principals of investment tribunals’ 
powers, while the commercial arbitration paradigm believes that tribunals’ authority 
derives from the autonomy of the disputing parties. Following the public law paradigm, 
however, tribunals should be accountable to the interests of public welfare. It is true that 
the mechanism of investor-state arbitration is created and defined by international 
investment treaties. But the assumption that investment tribunals are only agents of 
                                                             
9 See, e.g., Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, British Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 74, 2003, pp. 151-155. 
10 See, e.g., Thomas W. Wälde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration under the Shadow of the Dual Role 
of the State  Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively, the Equality of Arms, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 26, 2010, pp. 3-42. 
11 See, e.g., Gus van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, Oxford University Press, 2007; William 
W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in 
Investor-State Arbitrations, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, 2010, pp. 283-296; Anthea Roberts, Clash 
of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 107, No. 1, 2013, p. 54. 
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treaty parties may not match up with reality. International investment treaties provide 
investors with a high level of substantive rights and more importantly, give them 
procedural rights to enforce those substantive rights. Both the claimant investor and the 
respondent state share the right to appoint arbitrators. Also notably, the interests of 
investment protection in hard cases may compete with public interests, such as the 
protection of health, safety, the environment and labor rights. Therefore, the treaty 
parties have lesser control over the arbitration process compared to inter-state 
mechanisms of arbitration or adjudication. Investment tribunals are unlikely to view 
themselves as pure agents of the treaty parties or the disputing parties.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to comprehensively study the jurisdictional creep 
of investment treaty tribunals. In an effort to achieve this goal, it is necessary at this 
stage to raise the following three theoretical questions.  
Firstly, is there a fine line between expanding jurisdiction beyond the intention of 
treaty parties and exercising jurisdiction within the mandate? Where is the borderline? 
Theoretically, the expansion of jurisdiction may consist of two scenarios. In the first 
scenario, a tribunal is faced with several possible interpretations of the arbitration 
agreement (more specifically, ISAPs) and adopts the most expansive interpretation. In 
the second scenario, the terms of ISAPs are clear and the jurisdictional reach of a 
tribunal is limited in its preconditions, breadth or depth. But the tribunal chooses to 
push the boundary and to expand its jurisdictional reach. However, the distinction of 
these two scenarios is a matter of degree. There is no such universal and clear-cut 
borderline. The claimant investors and the respondent states usually have opposite 
stances in understanding the scope of ISAPs. For instance, with respect to the scope of 
“covered investment”, the claimant investors have no hesitation in contending that every 
kind of asset is covered by investment treaties. The respondent states, however, argue 
that assets not having the characteristics of investment, such as commercial contracts 
and sovereign bonds, are not “covered investment” under investment treaties. 12 
Similarly, in determining the nature of preconditions to arbitration, the claimant 
investors usually believe they are not mandatory and can be avoided, while the 
respondent states would hold that failure to fulfill the requirement of preconditions 
leads to non-existence of jurisdiction.
13
 In investor-state arbitration, tribunals often face 
                                                             
12 See infra chapter 3.1. 
13 See infra chapter 3.4. 
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opposing arguments on the interpretation of ISAPs. It is the task of this dissertation to 
examine how tribunals reach their own judgments while facing disputing parties’ 
opposite interpretations.  
Secondly, how much jurisdiction is legitimate and appropriate? Is the jurisdictional 
creep illegitimate or not? To be clear, jurisdiction is not a value-free label. It is often a 
matter of perspective. This dissertation does not presume that the expansion of 
jurisdiction by investment tribunals is illegitimate or unjustifiable. Academics differ 
greatly in deciding whether there is a legitimate crisis in establishing jurisdiction 
broadly by investment tribunals. Some argue that the tribunals’ broad interpretation of 
ISAPs, such as most-favored-nation clauses and umbrella clauses, goes beyond the 
intention of treaty parties and thus strikes the legitimate basis of investment 
arbitration.
14
 Others, on the contrary, believes that establishing jurisdiction through 
most-favored-nation clauses and umbrella clauses are permissible interpretations since 
the treaty terms are broad themselves.
15
 These two lines of interpretation hold the same 
“all or nothing” philosophy. At one extreme, the broad application of ISAPs is 
considered to be illegitimate. At the opposite extreme, proponents of expansive readings 
of ISAPs claim that it is exactly what treaty parties desire. However, neither the 
simplification nor the exaggeration of legitimacy tells the whole story of investment 
arbitration. A grey zone inevitably exists. ISAPs may be subject to wide or narrow 
interpretations as if they were accordions. The adoption of wide interpretations by 
tribunals is not necessarily a bad or good thing. What this dissertation tries to study is 
why tribunals tend to favor expansive interpretations and how treaty parties 
subsequently react. It is argued in this dissertation that treaty parties’ explicit reception 
or implicit tolerance of the jurisdictional expansion by tribunals may repair its 
legitimacy. 
The issue of jurisdictional creep originates from the lack of compulsory jurisdiction. 
                                                             
14 See, e.g., M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Arbitration, in Karl P. Sauvant 
(ed.), Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 55-61; Chen 
Huiping, The Expansion of Jurisdiction by ICSID Tribunal: Approaches, Reasons and Damages, Journal of World 
Investment & Trade, Vol. 12, 2011, pp. 671-687. 
15 See, e.g., Emmanuel Gaillard, Establishing jurisdiction through a Most-Favored-Nation clause, New York Law 
Journal, Vol. 233, No. 105, 2 June 2005; Emmanuel Gaillard, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction 
Over Contract Claims-The SGS Cases Considered, in Todd Weiler (ed.), International Investment Law and 
Arbitration: Leading Cases From the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, 
Cameroon May, 2005, pp. 325-346. Notably, Emmanuel Gaillard was the counsel for the investor SGS in both 
cases of SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines. For further details, see infra chapter 3.6.2. 
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An international dispute settlement body without mandatory jurisdiction inevitably 
wanders between judicial restraint and judicial activism in the issue of jurisdiction. To 
borrow the words of Judge Pieter Kooijmans: if the result of jurisdictional analysis is 
too restrictive, the international dispute settlement body will undermine its authority, if 
it is too ambitious it will endanger its position, since States may become more reluctant 
to accept its jurisdiction or more inclined to withdraw the acceptance already given.
16
 
Jurisdictional analysis of the international dispute settlement body is not a mechanical 
process without value judgment, but rather a manifestation of how it locates itself. 
International tribunals can be very creative and capable of considerably extending the 
scope and reach of their jurisdiction.
17
 Value preferences of investment tribunals and 
the influence of arbitral decisions on behavior patterns of treaty parties will be the focus 
of this dissertation. 
Thirdly, does the expansion of jurisdiction by investment tribunals in specific cases 
represent an overall trend in expanding jurisdiction? Investment tribunals are one-off or 
ad hoc tribunals created for the resolution of individual disputes. There is no single 
standing tribunal for all investment disputes. Therefore, there is the possibility of 
different ad hoc tribunals giving different interpretations for the same legal issue. Many 
scholars believe that the phenomenon of inconsistent decisions rendered by different 
tribunals is serious enough to pose a legitimate crisis to the system of investor-state 
arbitration. It seems to be largely exaggerated. The reality is that participants in the 
community of investor-state arbitration, including arbitrators, lawyers, treaty parties, 
disputing parties and scholars, rely upon prior arbitral awards. A closer examination of 
arbitral practice reveals that tribunals do in fact follow an informal and de facto system 
of precedent.
18
 Tribunals generally try to avoid openly criticizing prior awards. It is a 
common feature that tribunals cite prior awards to support their judgments and seek to 
contribute to the coherent development of international investment law beyond 
individual cases. Tribunals have an interest in preserving and enhancing the 
international regime of investment protection, especially the system of investor-state 
arbitration. The expansive readings of ISAPs lead to a greater reach of jurisdiction and 
                                                             
16 Pieter Kooijmans, The ICJ in the 21st Century: Judicial Restraint, Judicial Activism, or Proactive Judicial Policy, 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 56, 2007, p. 743. 
17 Fuad Zarbiyev, Judicial Activism in International Law-A Conceptual Framework for Analysis, Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012, pp. 247-248. 
18 See infra chapter 4.3.2. 
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authority for tribunals. Prior awards that accord with such value will be followed and 
refined by later tribunals and will become a strong precedent difficult to overturn.  
1.3 Methodology 
This dissertation is based primarily on normative analysis, empirical study, interest 
analysis and comparative study.  
Normative analysis is utilized throughout this dissertation for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the delegation of international investment treaties is the basis of investment 
treaty arbitration. Although investment treaty tribunals cannot isolate them from policy 
considerations and interest balancing, they do not stray too far from the normative basis. 
Normative basis is the very reason why investment treaty tribunals exist. An award 
without concrete normative reasoning is a tree without roots or water without a source. 
Secondly, normative analysis on international investment treaties may help us judge the 
ordinary meaning of treaty terms as objectively as possible and thus measure the degree 
of jurisdictional expansion by international investment tribunals. Thirdly, a high level of 
legal reasoning may enhance the authority of investment treaty tribunals. Tribunals’ 
underlying policy considerations and interest balancing may only appear in the form of 
legal reasoning. Examining the legal techniques used by investment treaty tribunals may 
give insight into potential strategies for dealing with their expansive rulings on 
jurisdiction.  
The primary body of materials used in the study undertaken for this dissertation is the 
great mass of international investment treaties and investor-state arbitration awards. 
International investment treaties cited in this dissertation can be accessed at the 
UNCTAD Database of International Investment Treaties 
(http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA) and the International Treaty Arbitration 
website (http://italaw.com/). The lists of Chinese bilateral investment treaties and free 
trade agreements are also available at the Ministry of Commerce of China website 
(http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/201111/20111107819474.html) and the 
China FTA Network website (http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml). 
Investor-state arbitration cases can be accessed at the ICSID Database of Cases 
(https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.aspx) and 
the International Treaty Arbitration website (http://italaw.com/). Treaties and cases that 
are not available at these sites will be otherwise noted in this dissertation.  
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This dissertation also comprehensively scrutinizes the legal stances of investment 
treaty tribunals towards jurisdiction based on the method of empirical study. To examine 
whether and to what extent tribunals expand their jurisdiction, focus should be on the 
actual utilized methods of interpretation and legal reasoning by tribunals, but not on 
what tribunals claim to be. Even if a tribunal claims to strictly adhere to the applicable 
investment treaty, its judgment may turn out to be an expansive ruling. What matters is 
what tribunals do, not what they say they are doing.  
For instance, whether and to what extent arbitral decisions have precedential effect in 
investor-state arbitration cannot be answered in the abstract. Empirical study of arbitral 
cases is needed to reach a relatively objective and prudent conclusion. With regard to 
the composition of arbitrators and their preferences, empirical study of arbitrators’ 
nationality, area of expertise, identities other than arbitrators, number of appointments 
and their voting history is helpful. While it is true that empirical analysis may not 
provide decisive evidence on the pro-investor inclination of arbitrators, it at least proves 
the high probability of such inclination.  
A law reflects the demands of certain people. The same is true of international law. 
Interest analysis equally applies in this dissertation. Investor-state arbitration involves 
multiple stakeholders, including the investor, the host state, the home state of the 
investor, and the investment tribunal. This dissertation intends to seek a balanced 
approach in examining the jurisdictional expansion of investor-state arbitration since the 
investor, the host state, the home state and the tribunal may have different interests. 
The expansion of jurisdiction by investment tribunals will change the static interest 
balancing of relevant stakeholders. Aggressive pushing by investors is among the most 
direct driving force for the jurisdictional expansion. The establishment of jurisdiction 
does not necessarily bring a favorable award on merits for investors. However, as a 
popular litigation strategy, the establishment of jurisdiction will be a weighty bargaining 
chip for investors against the host state. For the host state, the expanding jurisdiction of 
investment tribunals increases the risks of losing in investor-state arbitration and being 
pressured into settlement under the table. Further, the greater likelihood of success in 
investor-state arbitration will stimulate other investors to bring more cases. For the 
investment tribunals, the expansion of jurisdiction may increase the size of investment 
arbitration “cake” and strengthen the binding force of procedural and substantial treaty 
rules on contracting states. However, if the tribunals’ rulings on jurisdiction extend far 
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beyond the acceptability of respondent states (the host states), respondent states might 
choose to exit the mechanism of investment arbitration, thus endangering the existence 
of investment arbitration “cake”. For the home state of the investor, the expansion of 
jurisdiction by investment tribunals is a double-edged sword. The home state is likely to 
have an interest in both enhancing the treaty protection of investment abroad and 
reducing the risk of being sued in future investor-state arbitration cases.  
Lastly, this dissertation applies the method of comparative study to examine the 
self-contained characteristics of investor-state arbitration. One of the original intentions 
of the establishment of investor-state arbitration mechanism was to be the 
“depoliticization” of investment disputes, i.e., the removal of disputes from the political 
and diplomatic arena to a judicial forum.
19
 Under the mechanism of investor-state 
arbitration, investors generally do not have to exhaust local remedies and retain control 
of international claims without relying on the political discretion of their home states. 
This dissertation examines the jurisdictional issues of investor-state arbitration against 
the wide backdrop of international dispute settlement and identifies similarities and 
differences with other mechanisms of international dispute settlement, such as 
diplomatic protection, inter-state arbitration and international commercial arbitration. 
The focus is specifically on ad hoc nature of investor-state arbitration and the 
asymmetrical structure in activating the arbitration process would be the focus.  
1.4 Scheme 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Following the introduction, chapter 2 
provides a brief description of the legal foundation of investor-state arbitration. 
Characteristics of disputing parties, both subjective and objective requirements for the 
jurisdiction of investment arbitration are to be elaborated. It will be the starting point for 
the discussion of the jurisdictional creep. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are the main parts of this dissertation showing a progressive logic 
in structure. The arguments put forward in these three chapters are correlated and 
support each other. Chapter 3 answers the fundamental question of whether and how 
investment treaty tribunals establish jurisdiction beyond states’ consent. After a 
comprehensive examination of the practice of investment treaty tribunals on 
                                                             
19 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 
ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1986, p. 1.  
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jurisdictional issues, this dissertation finds that investment treaty tribunals generally 
adopt an expansive approach towards jurisdiction and that the expansion of jurisdiction 
is still ongoing. There are multiple ways available for investment treaty tribunals to 
break through jurisdictional boundaries. These ways are correlated with each other and 
work in harmony. They include expansive interpretations of “covered investors”, 
“covered investment” and “investment disputes”, weakening of preconditions to 
jurisdiction, expansive application of most-favored-nation clauses and “umbrella 
clauses”, restrictive application of “fork-in-the-road clauses”, flexible interpretation of 
the temporal scope of investment treaties, relaxing the burden of proof for investors, and 
frequent use of obiter dictum. 
After the relatively technical analysis of chapter 3, chapter 4 further deals with 
fundamental issues behind the phenomenon of jurisdictional expansion. Specifically, 
why investment treaty tribunals have the capability and inclination to expand their 
jurisdiction? Both external and internal causes are examined in this chapter. Aggressive 
pushing by investors, the ambiguity of investment treaty provisions, intense competition 
in attracting foreign investment among host states, and under-estimation of arbitration 
risks by host states are external driving forces. And the inherent capability and 
inclination of investment treaty tribunals in interpreting ISAPs expansively lies upon the 
following three aspects. Firstly, although being ad hoc dispute settlement bodies, 
investment treaty tribunals have the competence to decide their own jurisdiction and 
enjoy a high level of interpretive authority. Secondly, the established techniques of legal 
reasoning may enhance the credibility of the creeping jurisdiction. The flexible 
application of treaty interpretation rules and the de facto precedent effect are two 
frequent techniques employed by investment treaty tribunals. Thirdly, arbitrators with 
pro-investor inclination strongly support the expansion of jurisdiction in deciding 
investor-state disputes. Arbitrators’ personal background, close relationship with 
investors and commercial legal thinking will strongly influence their value preferences 
for arbitration outcomes. 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, chapter 5 puts forward the counter measures 
available for contracting states to deal with the jurisdictional creep. The concept of 
acceptability is introduced to measure the extent of tolerance contracting states have for 
the jurisdictional creep of investment treaty tribunals. The preciseness of investment 
treaty provisions, the caseload of investor-state arbitration, the quality of legal reasoning, 
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the extent of precedential effect of prior awards, the composition of tribunal members 
and their preferences, and the finality and worldwide enforceability of awards influence 
the acceptability of contracting states for the expansion of jurisdiction by tribunals. For 
a radical expansion of jurisdiction that goes far beyond the acceptability of contracting 
states, contracting states may minimize their adverse impact by selecting arbitrators 
prudently, initiating state-state arbitration proceedings, requesting annulment of the 
award and resisting enforcement of the award. Seeking to revise arbitration rules to 
strengthen the involvement of non-disputing states in investor-state arbitration, 
improving ex ante and ex post controls by contracting states over investment treaty rules, 
and even exiting from international investment treaties and investor-state arbitration 
mechanisms may also remind tribunals to respect the common intentions of contracting 
states. It is worth noting that whether and how to control the creeping jurisdiction of 
tribunals depends on policy priorities and interests weighing among contracting states. 
However, the capability of contracting states to control the creeping jurisdiction of 
tribunals would be limited when these counter measures fail to function and the costs of 
exit from investor-state arbitration mechanisms remain high. 
Finally, chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2: The Legal Basis of Investor-State Arbitration 
2.1 Disputing parties of investor-state arbitration 
International arbitration can be divided into inter-state arbitration, arbitration 
between private parties
20
 and arbitration between state and private party according to 
the varying characteristics of disputing parties. Inter-state arbitration has its origin in 
public international law. It is designed to adjudicate inter-state disputes in accordance 
with public international law. Arbitration between private parties, also known as 
international commercial arbitration, by contrast, deals with private rights and 
obligations of private parties. The procedure and enforcement mechanism of 
commercial arbitration relies heavily on the governing domestic law. Arbitration 
between state and private parties may be further split into two categories according to 
the subject matter of disputes: (1) private arbitration between state and private party, 
and (2) public arbitration between state and private party. The first category arises 
from commercial disputes between an individual (or a company) and a state acting in 
a private capacity, for instance by purchasing or selling commodities. It is therefore 
treated as a subset of international commercial arbitration. In the latter category, 
however, the disputes arise as part of the regulatory, rather than a reciprocal, legal 
relationship between state and private party. It is the latter category that investor-state 
arbitration falls into.  
Investor-state arbitration allows foreign investors to sue the host state before an 
arbitral tribunal if they believe that their treatment standard under the applicable 
investment treaty has been violated. Foreign investors, as private parties, are entitled 
to challenge a wide range of governmental regulatory measures in a final and binding 
arbitral decision. Of course, without the consent of the host state, an arbitral tribunal 
has no power to scrutinize and adjudicate the regulatory measures of the host state 
concerning investment. Since no state can be compelled to accept the jurisdiction of 
an international dispute settlement body. The rapidly increasing number of 
international investment treaties
21
, however, delegates the necessary power to arbitral 
                                                             
20 In this dissertation, private parties include natural persons, legal persons and other private economic 
organizations. 
21  International investment treaties mainly include bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and bilateral and 
multilateral free trade agreements containing investment chapters (FTAs), such as the North American Free 
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tribunals.  
According to the statistics of UNCTAD, as of the end of 2013, there are currently 
3236 international investment treaties in force (2902 BITs and 334 other international 
investment treaties), involving a vast majority of developed countries and developing 
countries.
22
 Many capital-importing states chose to sign investment treaties passively 
or even actively with other capital-exporting states to attract foreign investments and 
stimulate the development of their economies.
23
 Most of these investment treaties 
provide foreign investors with a high standard of substantive legal protection and 
more importantly, entitle foreign investors to submit their investment disputes with 
the host state directly to international arbitration. The direct access of investors to 
international arbitration under investment treaties, as the “teeth” of investment 
treaties,
24
 could have some “bite” on the host state.25 It is noteworthy, however, that 
investment treaties do grant both substantive and procedural rights to investors even 
though investors are not one of the treaty parties. The argument that the right to resort 
to investment arbitration ultimately belongs to the home state but not to the investor 
has not been supported by the theory and state practice.
26
 
In contrast to inter-state arbitration where states may appear both as claimants and 
as respondents, in investor-state arbitration states only appear as respondents. This 
difference lies in the particular form of mutual consent to investor-state arbitration. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ACIA) and the China-New Zealand FTA. 
22 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2014, 
United Nations Publication, 2014, p. 114. 
23 For the policy considerations of capital-importing states in signing investment treaties, see, e.g., Andrew T. 
Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, 1998, pp. 638-688; Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, 
Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Great Bargain, Harvard 
International Law Journal, Vol. 46, 2005, pp. 67-130; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International 
Investment Law, Law and Business Review of the Americas, Vol. 13, 2007, pp. 156-166. 
24  A. C. Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirement in Investment Treaty Arbitration, ICSID 
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2005, p.357.  
25 Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a bit…and they could bite, 
World Bank, DECRG, June 2003. 
26 There was an argument that the investor was asserting the right of his national state by stepping into the shoes 
of the state while submitting the investment disputes to investment arbitration. This argument can be easily 
refuted since many investment treaties contain the provision of subrogation which expressly confirm the treaty 
right of investors. According to this provision, a state is subrogated to the rights of an investor if the state or its 
agency pays political risk insurance to such investor. Also, it can hardly be denied that individuals have the 
capacity to enjoy rights under international law if such rights have been conferred on these individuals by an 
international treaty between states. For a detailed analysis, see Ben Juratowitch, The Relationship between 
Diplomatic Protection and Investment Treaties, ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1, 
2008, pp. 23-26; Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, British Yearbook 
of International Law, Vol. 74, 2003, pp. 160-183. 
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Consent is the cornerstone of arbitration. Investor-state arbitration is no exception. In 
arbitral practice, investor-state arbitration provisions (ISAPs) contained in most 
international investment treaties are considered to be “prior and unilateral offers” of 
arbitration by the contracting states. Foreign investors may accept such standing 
offers contained in an investment treaty at any time simply by initiating the 
investor-state arbitration proceeding should a dispute arise. Once the investor 
completes the acceptance o arbitration, an arbitration agreement is deemed to be 
concluded and the host state shall not revoke its consent to arbitration unilaterally.
27
 
ISAPs, as the consent of the host state, cannot replace the need for consent by the 
foreign investor. However, treaty parties cannot compel any of their nationals to 
consent to investor-state arbitration. Without a prior expression of consent on the part 
of the investor, the host state simply has no right to submit investment disputes to 
investment arbitration. It is thus clear that asymmetry exists between the investor and 
the host state and that only the investor is entitled to activate arbitration process. 
Therefore, foreign investors are able to challenge the regulatory measures of the host 
state by starting the arbitration process while the host state can only passively 
participate in the arbitration process.  
2.2 Subjective requirement for the jurisdiction of investor-state arbitration 
2.2.1 Reaching of mutual consent to arbitration 
The consensual nature is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of 
arbitration. The arbitration agreement is the cornerstone for the jurisdiction of an 
arbitral tribunal.
28
 Unless and until there is consent, there is no jurisdiction. The same 
goes with investor-state arbitration. Consent of the disputing parties (both the investor 
and the state) is an indispensable condition for the jurisdiction of investor-state 
arbitration.
29
 According to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, the ICSID tribunal 
may exercise jurisdiction over an investment dispute only if a contracting state (the 
host state) and a national of another contracting state (the foreign investor) “consent 
in writing” to submit such dispute to arbitration. Further, under the Arbitration Rules 
                                                             
27 See infra chapter 2.2. 
28 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 16-21, 
71-72. 
29 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive Directors of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, 1965, para. 23. 
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of other arbitral institutions (SCC, ICC, LCIA, etc.), the arbitration agreement 
between the parties is also required for the submission to arbitration.  
Traditionally, an arbitration agreement can only be perfected in the form of a 
written contract. Such formality of a contractual relationship, however, is abandoned 
in the practice of investment arbitration. More and more investment tribunals treat the 
advance consent of host states embodied in ISAPs of investment treaties as their 
jurisdictional mandate.
30
  
During the first 30 years after its establishment in 1965, ICSID was a “sleeping 
beauty” with a very limited caseload. Only 38 cases had been brought before ICSID 
tribunals before 1996. The main reason for the inactivity of early ICSID is that 
reaching a direct arbitration agreement between the host state and the foreign investor 
is extremely difficult. The host state lacks incentive to reach arbitration agreement 
with foreign investors except when the foreign investor has weighty bargaining chips. 
Thus the host state would not easily reach an arbitration agreement in the form of a 
contract before or after the occurrence of investment disputes.  
However, the widespread development of international investment treaties has 
awakened the activities of ICSID and has changed the destiny of investment 
arbitration. Figure 2.1 below shows there has been a dramatic rise in the number of 
ICSID cases since the late 1990s. It can be explained by the rapidly increasing 
number of investment treaties giving consent to ICSID arbitration by the treaty parties. 
Beginning with 1990s, the world has witnessed a sharp expansion of international 
investment treaties in encouraging and protecting foreign investment. As an important 
element of encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment, the ISAPs giving 
consent to investor-state arbitration is incorporated into investment treaties. 
Nowadays, an overwhelming majority of investment arbitration cases are based on 
ISAPs rather than direct contracts between the investor and the host state. As of the 
end of 2014, of the 497 cases registered by ICSID, only 18.3% of them invoked 
investment contracts between the investor and the host state as the basis of consent to 
establish ICSID jurisdiction, while 72.3% of ICSID cases invoked international 
investment treaties as the basis of consent to establish jurisdiction. The remaining 
                                                             
30 Besides, there is a possibility of jurisdiction based on forum prorogatum. The doctrine of forum prorogatum 
applies when the host state pleads to the merits without raising an objection to the jurisdiction of a tribunal 
even though the host state does not give its consent to arbitration. In investment arbitration, there is not yet a 
case of jurisdiction forum prorogatum. For further analysis of forum prorogatum, see Chittharanjan 
Amerasinghe, Jurisdiction of Specific International Tribunals, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2009, pp. 94-108. 
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9.4% invoked investment law of the host state as their jurisdictional basis.
31
 
 
In AAPL v. Sri Lanka case
32
, the investment tribunal invoked the ISAP in the 
UK-Sri Lanka BIT as the basis for jurisdiction for the first time.
33
 This practice was 
generally accepted without question by later investment tribunals, including ICSID 
tribunals and other ad hoc investment tribunals.
34
 In the view of investment tribunals, 
the ISAP contained in an international investment treaty or an arbitration provision 
expressed in a domestic law of the host state, can be considered as being a standing 
offer to arbitration in writing. Such standing offers can be subsequently accepted by 
the investor through the filing of a request for arbitration and an arbitration agreement 
is deemed to be concluded between the host state and the investor. Thus, the consent 
by the host state and the consent by the investor can be separable in terms of space 
and time. They need not be simultaneously recorded in a single instrument like the 
traditional way of expressing mutual consent to arbitration.  
                                                             
31 ICSID Secretariat, ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2015-1), 2015, p. 10. 
32 Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 
Final Award, 27 June 1990. 
33 The applicable investment treaty in this case was the UK-Sri Lanka BIT. Article 8(1) of the UK-Sri Lanka BIT 
stipulates that: “Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit to the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter referred to as “the Centre”) for settlement by conciliation or 
arbitration under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States opened for signature at Washington DC on 18 March 1965 any legal dispute arising between that 
Contracting Party and a national or company of the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the 
latter in the territory of the former. ” 
34 Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2009, 
pp. 207, 212-213. 
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While traditional arbitration requires a direct arbitration agreement between the 
parties, investor-state arbitration may be possible without such a contractual 
relationship between the state and the foreign investor. There is no arbitration 
agreement in the traditional sense of investment arbitration. It was therefore treated as 
nothing short of a revolution of classic arbitration theory, which postulates that 
arbitration is the creature of a contract.
35
 This revolution has also been labeled as 
“arbitration without privity” by leading scholars.36 Interestingly, arbitration without 
privity seems to generate no backlash from treaty parties. On the contrary, more and 
more states choose to conclude bilateral or regional investment treaties giving 
unilateral consent to investment arbitration in ISAPs. Naturally, the host state’s 
consent can be conditional. ISAPs containing advance consent may prescribe certain 
conditions, time limits or formalities limiting the acceptance by the investor. Distinct 
ISAPs in different investment treaties vary in the preconditions, breadth and depth of 
treaty parties’ consent. How to construe states’ consent to arbitration from various 
ISAPs to acquire jurisdiction is the primary task of investment treaty tribunals. 
2.2.2 The irrevocability of consent to arbitration 
The irrevocability of consent to arbitration, being one of the key elements of 
arbitration, manifests the maxim pacta sunt servanda. The binding and irrevocable 
nature of consent equally applies to disputing parties’ consent to investment 
arbitration. The last sentence of Article 25(1) of ICSID Convention stipulates that 
“when the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally.” However, the irrevocability of consent operates with the condition that 
mutual consent of disputing parties is perfected. Only after the consent of the host 
state is accepted by the investor can the consent have the nature of irrevocability. The 
host state may withdraw its consent to arbitration embodied in an investment treaty or 
a domestic legislation at any time before the investor accepts the consent.  
Therefore, it is advised by some scholars that investors accept the consent as early 
as possible in avoiding the risk that the consent may be withdrawn by the host state.
37
 
The investor may express its consent at an early stage before instituting arbitration 
                                                             
35 Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 26; Jacques 
Werner, Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on International Arbitration, Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 14, 1997, p. 6. 
36 Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1995, 
pp. 232-257. 
37 Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2009, p. 
213; Andrea Marco Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 207. 
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proceedings or even before the arising of investment disputes. A written statement to 
the host state accepting the consent of the host state embodied in ISAPs is enough to 
constitute an acceptance to arbitration. In a number of cases investors had, in fact, 
formally expressed their consent before submitting their request for investment 
arbitration.
38
 Once the investor accepts the consent of the host state by initiating an 
arbitration proceeding or expressing a written acceptance at an early stage, the host 
state can no longer revoke its consent unilaterally. Even if the investment treaty or the 
investment law containing the consent of the host state is subsequently terminated or 
repealed, the consent will be insulated from the legal effect of the investment treaty or 
the investment law. The jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal established accordingly cannot 
be abolished unilaterally by the host state through terminating the investment treaty or 
repealing the investment law.  
2.3 Objective requirements for the jurisdiction of investor-state 
arbitration 
Treaty parties are free to subject their consent to limitations and conditions. Failure 
to fulfill these requirements would bar the establishment of jurisdiction. Specifically, 
these requirements relate to the subject matter of investment disputes (jurisdiction 
rationae materiae), to the disputing parties (jurisdiction rationae personae) and to the 
timing requirements (jurisdiction rationae temporis). Requirements relating to the 
nature of investment disputes determine the scope of covered “investment” and 
covered “investment disputes” subject to the jurisdiction of investor-state arbitration. 
Requirements in relation to the disputing parties determine the scope of covered 
“investors” entitled to submit investment disputes to investor-state arbitration. And 
the timing requirements refer to the timing of investment and of investment disputes. 
These requirements are objective in nature and are outer limits of the jurisdiction of 
investment arbitration.  
2.3.1 Covered “investment” 
The existence of a covered investment is crucial to the jurisdiction of investment 
                                                             
38 See, e.g., Lanco v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, para. 44; 
Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 2003, para. 56; El 
Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, para. 36; Pan 
American v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 27 July 2006, para. 
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arbitration. Despite the fact that the term “investment” appears in the title as well as 
the text of the ICSID Convention, no definition of “investment” is offered in the 
ICSID Convention. The first draft of the Convention defined “investment” as “any 
contribution of money or other assets of economic value for an indefinite period or, if 
the period be defined, for not less than five years.” This definition led to a broad 
critical discussion and thus was given up by negotiators to leave the choice with each 
treaty party.
39
 It is therefore left to the parties as to what kind of investments they 
wish to consent to ICSID arbitration.  
However, the absence of definition of investment in the ICSID Convention does not 
necessarily support the argument that the scope of investment is boundless and can be 
defined freely. Although having its origin in economic terminology, the term 
“investment” has to be understood as a legal concept in international investment 
law.
40
 The term “investment” in the legal sense has its objective ordinary meaning in 
itself. The scope of investment must not be so broad as to include a one-off trade or 
commercial contract. Investment and trade have generally been considered to be 
different in business practice and in the legal sense. There are certain objective 
characteristics that an investment normally has, including substantial contribution of 
capital or other resources, the expectation of profit, the assumption of risk and a 
certain duration.
41
  
Differing from the deliberate omission of definition in the ICSID Convention, 
various bilateral and regional investment treaties define investment in several ways. 
There are mainly two ways of definitions: asset-based definitions and enterprise-based 
definitions. An enterprise-based definition of investment is more limited in scope than 
an asset-based definition. It limits covered investment to those made to an enterprise. 
The China-Germany BIT, for instance, employs an enterprise-based definition. Ad 
Article 1 of the Protocol to the China- ermany BIT stipulates that “for the avoidance 
of doubt, the Contracting Parties agree that investments as defined in Article 1 are 
those made for the purpose of establishing lasting economic relations in connection 
with an enterprise, especially those which allow to exercise effective influence in its 
                                                             
39 Antonio R. Parra, The History of ICSID, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 70; Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2009, p. 115. 
40 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, Oxford University Press, 
2nd edition, 2012, p. 60. 
41 There is also an argument that a contribution to the development of the host state is also a typical feature of 
investment. But how to measure the contribution to the host state’s development is controversial and might 
depend on a subjective assessment. See Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, 
Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2009, pp. 131-134. 
Chapter 2: The Legal Basis of Investor-State Arbitration 
22 
 
management.” Similarly, Article 1 of the Denmark-Poland BIT requires that the term 
“investment” shall refer to “all investments in companies made for the purpose of 
establishing lasting economic relations between the investor and the company and 
giving the investor the possibility of exercising significant influence on the 
management of the company concerned.” 
An asset-based definition, however, is open-ended and broad in scope. It covers 
“every kind of asset” or “any kind of asset”, usually coupled with a non-exhaustive 
list of assets constituting investment. For example, Article 1 of the China-Sweden BIT 
provides that the term “investment” shall comprise every kind of asset invested by 
investors of one Contracting State in the territory of the other Contracting State in 
accordance with the laws and regulations of that State, and more particularly, though 
not exclusively, (a) movable and immovable property as well as any other rights in 
rem, such as mortgage, lien, pledge, usufruct and similar rights; (b) shares or other 
kinds of interest in companies; (c) title to money or any performance having an 
economic value; (d) copyrights, industrial property rights, technical processes, 
trade-names and good-will; and (e) such business-concessions under public law or 
under contract, including concessions regarding the prospecting for, or the extraction 
or winning of natural resources, as to give to their holder a legal position of some 
duration. Among the list of assets, the third category “title to money or any 
performance having an economic value” has the effect of extending the coverage from 
property rights to contractual rights. The characterization of “claim or title to money” 
might have the possibility of blurring the distinction between an investment and a 
one-off trade transaction. In the light of such broad definitions, there is a risk of 
gradual extension by arbitral tribunals of the types of assets constituting investment. 
Since the inclusion of contractual rights in the definition of investment might bring 
a danger of departing from the ordinary meaning of investment, some investment 
treaties choose to explicitly lay down some objective characteristics for covered 
investment. Assets not having such characteristics will not be considered as covered 
investment. The 2012 US Model BIT, for example, requires that an investment shall 
have “the characteristics of investment, including such characteristics as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk.” For assets in the form of debt, the 2012 US Model BIT clarifies 
that “some forms of debt, such as bonds, debentures, and long-term notes, are more 
likely to have the characteristics of an investment, while other forms of debt, such as 
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claims to payment that are immediately due and result from the sale of goods or 
services, are less likely to have such characteristics.” Likewise, Article 1 of the 
China-Colombia BIT also stipulates that: 
Investment does not include:  
i. public debt operations;  
ii. claims to money arising solely from:  
a. Commercial contracts for the sale of goods and services by a national or 
legal entity in the territory of a Contracting Party to a national or a legal 
entity in the territory of the other Contracting Party; or  
b. Credits granted in relation with a commercial transaction. 
In accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, the minimum characteristics 
of an investment shall be: 
a. The commitment of capital or other resources; 
b. The expectation of gain or profit; 
c. The assumption of risk for the investor. 
Besides clarifying the objective characteristics of investment, a significant number 
of investment treaties also condition the coverage of an asset on compliance with 
local laws while adopting the broad asset-based definition.
42
 Investment is covered 
only if made in accordance with the local laws of the host state. As a typical example, 
the Chile-New Zealand BIT defines “investment” as “any kind of asset or rights 
related to it provided that the investment has been made in accordance with the laws 
and regulations of the Contracting Party receiving it.” Most of the China’s BITs also 
provide that the term “investment” means “every kind of asset invested by investors 
of one Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other 
Contracting Party in the territory of the latter.” This requirement has the potential 
effect of limiting the scope of covered investment under investment treaties.
43
 Assets 
that are not invested in accordance with the laws of the host state will not be 
considered protected investment. 
2.3.2 Covered “investment disputes” 
Investment disputes, disputes arising out of an investment, are the prerequisite for 
                                                             
42 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking, United Nations 
Publication, 2007, p. 9; UNCTAD, Scope and Definition: A Sequel, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II, United Nations publication, 2011, pp. 36-40. 
43 Wen Xiantao, Comments on the Draft of China’s Model BIT (I), Journal of International Economic Law, 
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the establishment of jurisdiction in investment arbitration. The investor may submit its 
request for arbitration only if there exists a legal dispute arising out of an investment 
between the investor and the host state.  
Investment treaties vary as to the scope of investment disputes that States have 
agreed to submit to arbitration. According to the various scopes of investment 
disputes agreed for arbitration, international investment treaties can be roughly 
divided into two categories. The first category can generally be labeled as investment 
treaties with broad ISAPs enabling investors to submit any investment dispute to 
arbitration. Most investment treaties signed by developed countries (such as UK, US, 
Netherlands, Germany) belong to such a category. As illustrated in Appendix I, 
among 105 Chinese BITs currently in force, 33 of them permit investors to submit 
any investment dispute to arbitration. Article 10 of the China-Netherlands BIT, for 
instance, provides that if a dispute, which arises between one of the Contracting 
Parties and an investor of the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of 
that investor in the territory of the former Contracting Party, has not been settled 
amicably within a period of six months, the investor may submit the dispute to the 
ICSID tribunal or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal to be established under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.  
Within this category, some investment treaties add exclusion provisions carving out 
specific types of disputes from the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal while 
adopting the broad ISAPs. Disputes to be excluded may include disputes concerning 
taxation matters, energy measures and financial measures. Article 10(2) of the 
US-Ecuador BIT provides an illustration. It stipulates that the treaty (particularly the 
dispute settlement provisions) does not apply to tax matters in areas other than 
expropriation and transfers.  
The second category may be referred to as investment treaties with narrow ISAPs 
which restrict access of international arbitration to certain types of disputes. Only 
certain types of disputes, such as disputes over the amount of compensation for 
expropriation, can be submitted to arbitration. It is noteworthy that a number of earlier 
treaties concluded by developing countries, particularly China and the former USSR, 
still contain narrow ISAPs that restrict or even deny the access of investors to 
international arbitration. For example, Article 8(3) of the China-Mongolia BIT 
provides that if a dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation 
cannot be settled within six months after resorting to negotiations, it may be submitted 
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to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal.  
As shown in Appendixes II and III, 69 Chinese BITs restrict investors’ access to 
international arbitration only to those disputes over the amount of compensation for 
expropriation and 3 Chinese BITs do not confer access to international arbitration 
upon investors.
44
 It seems that foreign investors could not submit disputes other than 
the disputing amount of compensation for expropriation to international arbitration 
under most Chinese BITs at first glance. A further discussion, however, may show that 
the restrictive investor-state arbitration provisions have the risk of being interpreted 
expansively.
45
 
2.3.3 Covered “investors” 
International investment treaties apply only to covered investment made by 
investors meeting the nationality requirements under such treaties. In order to have 
standing to invoke the protection of an intended investment treaty, a potential 
claimant must meet the treaty’s definition of “investors”, i.e., possess the nationality 
of a contracting state other than the host state.
 46
  
The definition of “investors” in investment treaties generally addresses both natural 
persons (individuals) and juridical persons (companies). In the case of natural persons, 
most treaties require natural persons to have the nationality of a contracting state in 
accordance with the laws of such state, leaving the choice of nationality test with the 
domestic laws of each contracting state.  
Definiing the nationality of juridical persons, however, is more complicated. There 
is no unified test to determine the nationality of corporations and the contracting 
states can freely define the bond of nationality required between a corporation seeking 
protection under the treaty and the contracting state under whose treaty the 
corporation asks for protection.
47
 Investment treaties have usually used one or several 
combined tests, such as the place of incorporation, the seat or siège social, the place 
                                                             
44 They include the China-Thailand BIT, the China-Romania BIT and the China-Turkmenistan BIT. 
45 See infra chapter 3.3. 
46 Rachel Thorn & Jennifer Doucleff, Disregarding the Corporate Veil and Denial of Benefits Clauses: Testing 
Treaty Language and the Concept of “Investor”, in Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire 
Balchin (eds.), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, Kluwer Law 
International, 2010, pp. 5-6. 
47 The nationality tests of corporations for the purpose of diplomatic protection do not apply in the field of 
investment treaties. As Sinclair pointed out, “cultural, economic and political factors will influence which test 
a particular State will prefer to apply…. No question arises as to the validity of these choices, nor is it 
appropriate to identify a general rule in the abstract because different States legitimately take different 
approaches to qualification for protection.” See A. C. Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirement in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2005, p.367.  
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of substantial business activities or the place of control, to determine the link of 
nationality between the corporation investor and the contracting state. Most 
investment treaties typically adopt a liberal incorporation test requiring covered 
investors only to be incorporated in one of the contracting states. Besides the 
incorporation test, the seat test is also frequently used by several civil law countries as 
the criterion in investment treaties to determine nationality of a corporate investor. 
The control test, though found in some recent investment treaties, is rarely used and is 
normally combined with the incorporation test to broaden or narrow the scope of 
covered investors.  
Under the incorporation test, a corporation has the nationality of the state under 
whose law the corporation was incorporated. Article 1(1)(d) of the China-United 
Kingdom BIT, for instance, defines “company” as “corporations, firms or associations 
incorporated or constituted under the law in force” in any part of the contracting states. 
The advantage of using the incorporation test is its clarity and simplicity of 
application, as it is not difficult to identify the state under whose law a corporation is 
incorporated. But the incorporation test may appear to be unfavorable to the 
contracting state as well if an incorporated company has no substantial business 
activities in such state.
 48
 Any company incorporated in the contracting state may 
satisfy the nationality requirement and can be recognized as covered investor in an 
investment treaty regardless of whether the company is controlled by foreign 
nationals and/or whether the company has substantial business activities in the 
contracting state. 
The seat test, bestowing nationality to a company having its seat in the contracting 
state, also carries the disadvantage of ambiguity of the term “seat” leading to potential 
abuses by investors. For example, the term “investor” in Article 1(2) of the 
China-Germany BIT means any juridical person as well as any commercial or other 
company or association with or without legal personality having its seat in the 
territory of Germany, or economic entities, including companies, corporations, 
associations, partnerships and other organizations, incorporated and constituted under 
the laws and regulations of and with their seats in China. While adopting different 
tests of nationality for China and Germany, the China-Germany BIT has not further 
defined the exact meaning of seat. The term “seat” could mean the seat of main 
business or the seat of management, but also could mean just the registered place 
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II, United Nations publication, 2011, p. 82. 
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which generally overlaps with the incorporation test.
 49
 It is quite common that a 
company can be established in the territory of state A, have its seat of management in 
state B and run its main business in state C in the world of commerce.
 50
 
To address the potential abuses by corporate investors under the incorporation test 
and the seat test, a number of investment treaties additionally require that a covered 
corporation need to have substantial business activities and/or have the seat of 
management in the contracting state. Article 4(1) of the United Kingdom-Philippines 
BIT, for instance, defines the term “company” of a Contracting Party as a corporation, 
partnership or other association, incorporated or constituted and actually doing 
business under the laws in force in any part of the territory of that Contracting Party 
wherein a place of effective management is situated.  
Also, it was only recently that the control test or a combined test of control and 
incorporation was used in some investment treaties. The control test can be used for 
two opposite purposes. Firstly, it can be used to expand the scope of covered investors 
in investment treaties. An example can be found in the Netherlands-Bulgaria BIT 
using the control test to cover a juridical person constituted in a third state. The 
“nationals” of this BIT covers both legal persons constituted under the law of one of 
the Contracting Parties and legal persons not constituted under the law of that 
Contracting Party but controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of that Contracting 
Party. Secondly, it is also possible to restrict the scope of covered investors using the 
control test in investment treaties. The term “enterprise of the other Party” in Article 
72(h) of the Japan-Singapore FTA means any enterprise duly constituted or otherwise 
organized under applicable law of the other Party, except an enterprise owned or 
controlled by persons of non-Parties and not engaging in substantive business 
operations in the territory of the other Party. This article expressly excludes 
enterprises owned or controlled by third state nationals and thus provides a rather 
limited definition of investor. There is thus no room for a shell company controlled by 
nationals of non-contracting states to take advantage of the benefits of the 
Japan-Singapore FTA. 
It follows that investment treaty practice in respect of the test of nationality of 
corporations is quite divergent. There exists no international obligation for a state to 
                                                             
49 International Law Association German Branch, The Determination of Nationality of Investors under Investment 
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provide treaty protection for a particular investor and thus the contracting states may 
choose any single test or combined test of nationality in determining the scope of 
covered investors for treaty protection. However, a vast majority of investment 
treaties prefer a liberal test of incorporation, which leaves open the possibility of 
treaty shopping by investors of non-contracting states or even of the host state through 
the commonly used technique of nationality planning.
 51
 
2.3.4 Temporal coverage 
Investment treaties usually impose time requirements on the establishment of 
investment and the arising of investment disputes while providing both substantive 
and procedural protection to covered investment. In other words, the jurisdiction of an 
investment tribunal only extends to covered investment and covered investment 
disputes within the time limits laid down by the applicable investment treaty.  
Investment treaties vary as to the temporal coverage of investment. Some treaties 
cover investment made both before and after their entry into force, while other treaties 
only cover investment after their entry into force or after a certain date. For example, 
Article 2 of the China-Norway BIT stipulates that the BIT shall apply to investments 
“prior to as well as after the entry into force of this Agreement”. Whereas Article 11 
of the China-Russia BIT provides that the BIT shall “apply to all investments made by 
investors of one of the Contracting Parties in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party beginning from January 1st 1985, but shall not apply to the disputes that arose 
before the entry into force of this Agreement.”  
In the case of investment disputes, most investment treaties limit their coverage to 
disputes arising after their entry into force. Article 10(2) of the China-Argentina BIT, 
for instance, provides that the BIT shall not apply to any dispute, claim or difference 
which arose before its entry into force. However, there are recently some investment 
treaties that are starting to relax the temporal limits on the coverage of investment 
disputes. Article 13(2) of the China-Netherlands BIT provides an example. It 
stipulates that the BIT shall apply to all investments made “before or after the entry 
into force of this Agreement”, but shall not apply to “any dispute or any claim 
concerning an investment which was already under judicial or arbitral process before 
its entry into force.” Thus, the China-Netherlands BIT also applies to investment 
disputes arising before its entry into force so long as they are not under any judicial or 
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Chapter 3: Approaches to Achieve the Creeping Jurisdiction 
in the Practice of Investor-State Arbitration 
This chapter will show that investment treaty tribunals tend to follow an approach 
that leads to an expansion of the contracting states’ consent to arbitrate. A variety of 
techniques have been utilized to expand the scope of states’ consent. They include 
expansive interpretations of “covered investors”, “covered investment” and 
“investment disputes”, weakening of preconditions to jurisdiction, expansive 
application of most-favored-nation clauses and “umbrella clauses”, restrictive 
application of “fork-in-the-road clauses”, flexible interpretation of the temporal scope 
of investment treaties. Besides, tribunals tend to relax the burden of proof for 
investors while exercising their discretionary power to control the arbitral process. 
Frequent use of obiter dictum in arbitral awards also shows arbitrators’ attempt to 
break the jurisdictional boundary. 
3.1 Expansive interpretation of covered “investment” 
Undeniably, the contracting states have played an important role in allowing the 
expansion of the notion of investment. Due to the evolvement from the 
enterprise-based definition to the asset-based definition, the scope of covered 
investment expands greatly.
52
 However, no matter how broad the definition of 
investment is, the term “investment” in the legal sense has its intrinsic ordinary 
meaning that differs from other legal terms, for instance, the terms “trade” and 
“finance”. Investment, trade and finance have generally been considered to be 
different both in business practice and in the legal sense. The scope of investment 
must not be so broad as to include a one-off trade or a bank loan.  
Investment tribunals, however, have broken through this borderline by extending 
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the notion of investment from the field of international investment to the field of 
international trade and finance. In arbitral practice, “investment” has been equated 
with “any kind of asset”, irrespective of whether such asset has the objective 
characteristics of investment. Thus, the characterization of “investment” would be 
reduced to a mechanical operation of labeling. As long as the claim relates to a kind of 
asset, there would exist an “investment” for the purpose of investment arbitration. If 
so, any economic activity could be labeled as “investment”, and the notion of 
“investment” would become a drifting concept in danger of losing its soul.53 
3.1.1 Commercial contracts 
Investment and trade are different economic activities in nature. For example, as to 
the assumption of risk, any economic activity bears a certain level of risk. However, 
an investment is exposed to higher risk than a commercial contract. A commercial 
contract generally faces a credit risk or default risk, meaning a risk that a contract 
party may fail to perform the contract. This kind of risk is pure commercial, 
counterparty risk. While an international investment involves large sunk costs and the 
resources sunk into the investment project usually cannot be used for another purpose. 
Therefore, the investor cannot predict the outcome of his investment and will 
normally bear a high market risk that an investment project faces an uncertainty of 
market prospect. Also importantly, investment and trade differ in the element of 
duration. Although without a fixed division in the time duration, a commercial 
contract generally refers to a one-off deal while an investment requires certain 
duration. The exact division between investment and commercial contract, therefore, 
needs to be answered on a case-by-case basis after comprehensively assessing each 
element.  
There are three avenues for investment tribunals to affirm the investment nature of 
commercial contracts: (1) denying the existence of any requirement on the 
characteristics of investment; (2) interpreting the characteristics of investment in a 
flexible way; or alternatively (3) treating several commercial transactions as a whole 
to constitute investment. 
Firstly, denying the existence of any requirement on the characteristics of 
investment and regarding any claim to money as investment. Following this approach, 
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ordinary one-off sales and services contracts involve claims to money and thus would 
be recognized as investment.
54
 In Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic, the claimant 
Petrobart and the respondent state Kyrgyz Republic disputed on the performance of a 
contract for the sale of gas condensate. According to the contract, Petrobart should 
deliver 200,000 tons of gas condensate over a period of twelve months. Although 
noting that the sales contract did not involve any transfer of money or property as 
capital in a business in the Kyrgyz Republic but only concerned the sale of goods at 
an agreed price, the arbitral tribunal still found that the contract did constitute a 
foreign investment under the applicable investment treaty ECT. The reasoning of the 
tribunal can be summarized as follows: Article 1(6) of the ECT included claims to 
money and claims to performance pursuant to contract and any right conferred by law 
or contract as covered asset, and Petrobart’s right under the gas contract to payment 
for gas delivered was an asset and thus constituted an investment according to the 
ECT.
55
 However, the ECT explicitly includes two mandatory requirements for 
“claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to contract” to be an asset 
under the ECT, i.e., “having an economic value” and “being associated with an 
investment”. The tribunal chose to be blind to these requirements. 56  
Besides contracts for the sale of goods, contracts for the supply of services are also 
considered to be covered investment in arbitral practice. In the case of MHS v. 
Malaysia, the dispute arose from a contract for the location and salvage of historical 
relics from an ancient shipwreck. The sole arbitrator from Singapore was appointed to 
constitute the tribunal. In his award on jurisdiction, the sole arbitrator found that the 
service contract took almost four years to complete and involved commitments in 
money, in kind and in industry, and that a certain commercial risk would be assumed 
by the claimant. However, the contract did not make any significant contributions to 
Malaysia’s economic development because the benefits that the contract offered to 
Malaysia were not lasting and were no different from the benefits flowing from any 
normal commercial service contract. Therefore, the tribunal concluded that the service 
contract, similar to other commercial contracts, was not an “investment” for the 
purpose of the ICSID arbitration.
57
 The award, however, was annulled by an ad hoc 
                                                             
54 UNCTAD, Scope and Definition: A Sequel, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
II, United Nations Publication, 2011, p. 31. 
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56 See OECD, International Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations, OECD 
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annulment committee on the ground that the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers 
by failing to exercise a jurisdiction over the dispute. In the view of the annulment 
committee, the term “investment” was unqualified under both the ICSID Convention 
and the UK-Malaysia BIT. No requirement of objective characteristics was added to 
the term “investment”. Since the contract at issue was one of a kind of asset 
constituting a claim to money and to performance in accordance with the 
UK-Malaysia BIT, there was an investment within the meaning of the UK-Malaysia 
BIT.
58
 Likewise, contracts for the supply of pre-shipment inspections and 
verifications were also considered to be “investment”. 59 
Secondly, interpreting the characteristics of investment in a flexible way and 
holding that commercial contracts have the characteristics of investment. Following 
this approach, tribunals usually favor the existence of a requirement on investment 
characteristics. However, tribunals retain the discretion on how many objective 
elements are required and on how much weight each element carries.  
In the case of Salini v. Morocco, a contract for the construction of a highway 
between an Italian company Salini and Morocco was in dispute. The tribunal noted 
that the term “investment” had an objective meaning and that an investment inferred 
“contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in 
the risks of the transaction”, and “the contribution to the economic development of the 
host State.” These various elements may be interdependent. In evaluating these 
elements, the tribunal considered that the Italian company invested necessary 
equipment, qualified personnel and know-how, obtained bank loans, and the duration 
of the contract was extend to 36 months. With regard to the risks, the risks of contract 
change or termination, labor costs, accident, and unforeseeable incident were 
observed. And the construction of the highway served the public interest and 
contributed to the economic development of Morocco. Consequently, the tribunal 
concluded that the contract was an “investment” pursuant to the Italy-Morocco BIT 
and the ICSID Convention.
 60 
It can be seen that tribunals show a high flexibility in assessing the characteristics 
of investment. These characteristics of investment are treated as typical but not strict 
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features and can be easily satisfied. Any ordinary commercial contract can be easily 
understood as satisfying these characteristics following such a flexible approach. This 
kind of flexible approach has become known as the “Salini test”, which has been 
generally followed by most subsequent tribunals. Although the number of the 
characteristics and the importance of each characteristic are applied with variation at 
the tribunal’s discretion, most tribunals, however, share the view that commercial 
contracts can be treated as covered “investment”. 61 
Thirdly, even if a single commercial transaction cannot qualify as investment, 
several commercial transactions can be treated as a whole to constitute investment. 
For example, in the case of CSOB v. Slovakia, the tribunal explained that an 
investment was “frequently a rather complex operation, composed of various 
interrelated transactions, each element of which, standing alone, might not in all cases 
qualify as an investment.” Hence, according to the tribunal, it had jurisdiction on the 
dispute even when such dispute was “based on a transaction which, standing alone, 
would not qualify as an investment under the Convention, provided that the particular 
transaction forms an integral part of an overall operation that qualifies as an 
investment.”62 Following this logic, several interrelated one-off commercial contracts 
as a whole can be regarded as investment even if each one-off contract cannot be 
qualified as investment. However, the question remains why a single commercial 
contract and several commercial contracts as a whole are different in nature. The 
tribunal did not explain it.  
Besides ordinary commercial contracts, it is notable that some tribunals are more 
radical to consider court judgments or arbitral awards in favor of the claimant as 
“claims to money” and thus treat them as part of an investment or even a separate 
investment. In Saipem v. Bangladesh, for instance, the tribunal did not accept the 
objection of Bangladesh that a commercial award itself could not constitute an 
investment. In the tribunal’s view, an award itself could possibly constitute an 
investment since the words “credit for sums of money” under the Italy-Bangladesh 
BIT also covered rights under an award ordering a party to pay an amount of money: 
the prevailing party undoubtedly had a credit for a sum of money in the amount of the 
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award. But the tribunal did not make a final ruling on this possibility because the 
original contract was sufficient enough to constitute an investment and the ICC Award 
at issue crystallized the parties’ rights and obligations under the original contract.63  
Similarly, in Frontier v. Czech, the claimant obtained a final award in its favor 
against two Czech companies in the Stockholm arbitration but the Czech courts 
refused to recognize and enforce the award. The claimant asserted that its investment 
was mistreated as a result of failure of the Czech courts to enforce such an award. The 
tribunal was quite straightforward in concluding that, by refusing to recognize and 
enforce the final award in its entirety, Czech “could be said to have affected the 
management, use, enjoyment, or disposal by Claimant of what remained of its original 
investment.” 64 In the case of White Industries v. India, the tribunal also considered 
that the award in favor of White Industries represented “a continuation or 
transformation of the original investment”. Rights under the arbitral award, according 
to the tribunal, constituted part of White Industries’ original investment and, as such, 
were subject to protection afforded by the Australia-India BIT.
 65
  
3.1.2 Financial securities 
The area of international finance is another important area in expanding the scope 
of international investment. Financial instruments such as promissory notes, loans or 
the purchase of bonds may be considered as covered “investment” under investment 
treaties in arbitral practice. Not only do tribunals apply the investment characteristics 
such as the commitment of resources, the expectation of profit, the assumption of risk 
and a certain duration in a flexible way, tribunals also lower the explicit requirement 
of territoriality under most investment treaties, i.e., the requirement of making an 
investment “in the territory of the host state”.  
In Fedax v. Venezuela case, certain promissory notes issued by Venezuela were 
transferred from a Venezuelan company to Fedax, a Dutch company, by way of 
endorsement. Venezuela argued that the purchase of promissory notes did not qualify 
as an investment under the ICSID Convention. The tribunal, however, did not share 
the view with Venezuela. Citing scholarly opinions, the tribunal held that loans and 
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the purchase of bonds qualified as investment within the jurisdiction of ICSID 
arbitration. Since promissory notes were evidence of a loan and a rather typical 
financial and credit instrument, there was nothing, in the view of the tribunal, to 
prevent their purchase from qualifying as an investment under the ICSID Convention. 
Moreover, the tribunal tried to distinguish promissory notes from an ordinary 
commercial transaction or a short-term financial arrangement. The tribunal believed 
that promissory notes at issue, differing from “volatile capital”, met the basic features 
of an investment such as a certain duration, a certain regularity of profit and return, 
assumption of risk, a substantial commitment and a significance for the host State’s 
development. The tribunal took an extremely broad interpretation of risk. In the words 
of the tribunal, “the very existence of a dispute as to the payment of the principal and 
interest evidences the risk that the holder of the notes has taken.”66  
Venezuela further objected that promissory notes purchased by Fedax were not 
investments made “in the territory” of Venezuela. The tribunal did not accept such 
objection and explained that it was a standard feature of many international financial 
transactions that the funds involved were not physically transferred to the territory of 
the beneficiary, but put at its disposal elsewhere. Therefore, the important question 
was “whether the funds made available are utilized by the beneficiary of the credit so 
as to finance its various governmental needs.” 67  The tribunal substituted the 
territorial requirement with the much broader “utilized by the beneficiary of the 
credit.” It follows that the tribunal did not believe that a physical presence in the 
territory of the host state is needed for financial instruments to constitute investment. 
Similarly, in CSOB v. Slovakia case, the tribunal asserted undisguisedly that 
“investment as a concept should be interpreted broadly because the drafters of the 
Convention did not impose any restrictions on its meaning.” In the tribunal’s view, it 
cannot be argued that a commercial transaction was not an investment merely because 
it was a loan. A loan that contributes substantially to a state’s economic development 
should be considered as investment. The loan granted by CSOB to the Slovak 
Collection Company involved a commitment of capital resources and a significant 
contribution to the economic development of Slovakia. Therefore, it must be deemed 
to meet the requirements of an investment under the ICSID Convention and the 
Czech-Slovakia BIT.
68
 Slovakia contended further that the loan did not involve any 
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transfer of resources “in the territory of the Slovak Republic.” Agreeing with the 
position of the tribunal in the case of Fedax v. Venezuela, the tribunal also held that a 
transaction could qualify as an investment even in the absence of a physical transfer 
of funds. While it was “undisputed that CSOB’s loan did not cause any funds to be 
moved or transferred from CSOB to the Slovak Collection Company in the territory 
of the Slovak Republic”, it did not change the investment nature of the CSOB loan. 69 
Besides promissory notes and loans, sovereign bonds are also deemed to be 
investment. In the cases of Abaclat v. Argentina
70
 and Ambiente v. Argentina
71
, the 
two tribunals recognized sovereign bonds as investment and affirmed their subject 
matter jurisdiction on sovereign bond disputes. These two tribunals are in line with 
the Fedax tribunal and the CSOB tribunal with respect to the flexible evaluation of the 
investment characteristics and the territoriality requirement.  
Sovereign bonds are presumed to display the typical characteristics of an 
investment. A bond holder needs to commitment money to purchase sovereign bonds 
with the purpose of profit and return. And a sovereign bond usually has a long-term 
original maturity and involves a risk of non-performance by the sovereign debtor. 
These features may further be considered to imply a contribution to the economic 
development of the sovereign debtor. In Abaclat v. Argentina case, the tribunal found 
that the purchase of Argentine sovereign bonds by Italian claimants constituted an 
investment both under the ICSID Convention and the Italy-Argentina BIT. In denying 
the applicability of the Salini test, the tribunal held that the Salini test indicating the 
characteristics of investment were contradictory to the ICSID Convention’s aim 
because these criteria were never included in the ICSID Convention. Thus, these 
criteria, in the tribunal’s view, should not serve to create a limit on the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction and did not need to be examined on whether sovereign bonds satisfy these 
criteria. However, the tribunal did make some evaluations on several criteria in 
verifying that claimants made contributions leading to the creation of the value that is 
protected under the ICSID Convention and the Italy-Argentina BIT. The contributions 
the tribunal observed were the paying of money in exchange of the security 
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entitlements in the bonds.
72
 Contrary to the Abaclat tribunal, the tribunal in the case 
of Ambiente v. Argentina explicitly endorsed the Salini test. But it did not prevent the 
Ambiente tribunal from affirming the investment character of sovereign bonds and 
came to the same result with the Abaclat tribunal. Not surprisingly, the Ambiente 
tribunal found that sovereign bonds fulfill the characteristics of a substantial 
contribution, a minimum duration, assumption of risk, a regularity of profits and 
returns and a contribution to the development of the host country.
 73
 
As to the question whether sovereign bonds fulfill the territorial requirement, 
Argentina contended that sovereign bonds could not be considered “made in the 
territory of Argentina”. In rejecting this contention, the Abaclat tribunal reasoned that: 
The determination of the place of the investment firstly depends on the nature 
of such investment. With regard to an investment of a purely financial nature, 
the relevant criteria cannot be the same as those applying to an investment 
consisting of business operations and/or involving manpower and property. 
With regard to investments of a purely financial nature, the relevant criteria 
should be where and/or for the benefit of whom the funds are ultimately used, 
and not the place where the funds were paid out or transferred. Thus, the 
relevant question is where the invested funds ultimately made available to the 
Host State and did they support the latter’s economic development? 
The question was answered in the affirmative by the tribunal. The tribunal was of 
the opinion that the issuance of bonds to underwriters by Argentina in the primary 
market and the distribution of security entitlements to individual purchasers by 
underwriters in the secondary market were “part of one and the same economic 
operation and they make only sense together”. The lump sum payment paid by the 
underwriters to Argentina was no different than the payment of the purchase price by 
the individual holders to the underwriters. Thus, the payment of the purchase price by 
the individual holders would be “ultimately made available to Argentina, and served 
to finance Argentina‘s economic development.” 74 Likewise, the Ambiente tribunal 
addressed the territoriality requirement in a rather flexible way. It also considered that 
investment under the Italy-Argentina BIT did not have to be physically located in the 
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host state. Since the funds generated by the purchase of security entitlements were 
destined to contribute to Argentina’s development, the bonds/security entitlements 
should be regarded as investment made “in the territory of Argentina”. 75 
It follows that investment tribunals have liberally treated financial instruments as 
investment and have accepted jurisdiction over financial instrument disputes. 
Tribunals usually do not find it difficult to confirm the investment character of 
financial instruments since they are much flexible in interpreting the investment 
characteristics. The interpretation of the territorial requirement is also highly elastic. A 
physical presence in or a transfer of funds into the host state is not required in the eyes 
of most tribunals. Any link between an economic transaction and the host state can be 
assumed as satisfying the requirement of making investment “in the territory of the 
host state.” It is even suggested that in cases involving financial instruments the locus 
of the investment can be determined merely by reference to the location of the debtor.
 
76
 In this way financial instruments issued by the host state meet the territoriality 
requirement irrespective of whether such financial instruments have any other 
territorial link with the host state. The requirement of making investment “in the 
territory of the host state” is simply not a jurisdictional bar in the eyes of tribunals.77 
3.1.3 “In accordance with the host state law” requirement 
It is commonplace for investment treaties to require compliance with the host state 
law in their definitions of the term “investment”. Only investments made in 
accordance with the host state law can be protected under an investment treaty. Thus, 
the legality of the investment with respect to the host state law is shown to be a 
jurisdictional prerequisite. In order to qualify for the protection of an investment 
treaty, including substantive treatment and access to investment arbitration, an 
investment has to be in accordance with the host state law.
 78
 Through the legality 
requirement, the host state law plays an important role in limiting the scope of 
investment to be covered by investment treaties. A failure to comply with the host 
state law in making investment would deprive it of treaty protection. However, the 
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requirement of “in accordance with the host state law” has been weakened in arbitral 
practice in the following two ways.  
First and foremost, to reject the role of the host state law in limiting the scope of 
covered investment. In the case of Salini v. Morocco, Morocco alleged that Article 1(1) 
of the Italy-Morocco BIT defining the scope of investment referred to the laws and 
regulations of the host state. Thus, the notion of investment was limited by reference 
to the laws of Morocco, according to which the claimant’s transaction in question 
should be characterized as a contract for services and not as an investment contract. In 
rejecting the argument advanced by the respondent, the tribunal reasoned that the “in 
accordance with the host state law” requirement contained in the Italy-Morocco BIT 
referred to “the validity of the investment and not to its definition”.79 In several other 
cases, subsequent tribunals also followed the same approach holding that the “in 
accordance with the host state law” requirement did not limit the definition of 
investment but solely concerned the legality of investment and thus did not affect the 
jurisdiction of tribunals.
80
 
Secondly, to raise the threshold of illegality. Most tribunals not only denied the 
importance of the host state law in limiting the scope of covered investment, but also 
restricted the effect of the host state law in reviewing the illegality of investment. For 
example, in Tokios v. Ukraine case, the tribunal distinguished minor errors from 
substantial breach of the host state law and held that errors in registration and errors in 
documents related to asset procurement and transfer did not lead to illegality in breach 
of the “in accordance with the host state law” requirement.81 It can be seen that 
tribunals have set a high standard of review regarding the illegality of investment and 
thus the effect of the host state law has been practically constrained. Some arbitrators 
even went further to assert that the purpose of the “in accordance with the host state 
law” provision was “not to condition the right to arbitrate on the minute compliance 
by the investor”. The illegality of the investor’s conduct was seen as a merits issue 
rather than a jurisdictional issue and therefore did not deprive the tribunal of 
jurisdiction.
 82
 These claims will simply leave the “in accordance with the host state 
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law” requirement practically unfunctional and meaningless.83 
3.2 Expansive interpretation of covered “investors” 
3.2.1 Shareholder claims and multiple recoveries 
It is not unusual that an international investment involves several corporate layers 
in the same chain of control including the locally incorporated corporation and the 
investor as shareholders. As a precondition to the admission of foreign investment, 
many host states require foreign investment to be channeled through locally 
incorporated companies. And thus the investment of foreign investors usually takes 
the form of direct or indirect shareholding in locally incorporated companies. In 
practice, a foreign investor may not be the immediate shareholder of the local 
companies. Instead, it may control the local companies indirectly through its 
intermediate corporations
84
 incorporated in the host state, its home state or even a 
third state. In arbitral practice, any company in the same corporate chain, including 
the holding company, the ultimate controlling investor and even the locally 
incorporated company, are easily treated as covered investors under applicable 
investment treaties by arbitral tribunals. 
Firstly, the locally incorporated company generally does not qualify as a protected 
foreign investor under an international investment treaty since it has the nationality of 
the host state.
85
 However, Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention allows locally 
incorporated companies that are under foreign control to be treated as having the 
nationality of the controlling shareholder’s home State if the parties to the dispute so 
agree. Not a few host states agree to treat locally incorporated companies controlled 
by foreign shareholders as protected foreign investors through international 
investment treaties, the host state legislations or investment agreements with foreign 
investors. The Netherlands-Argentina BIT, for example, provides in Article 10(6) that 
a legal person which is incorporated or constituted under the law in force in the 
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territory of one Contracting Party and which, before a dispute arises, is controlled by 
nationals of the other Contracting Party shall, in accordance with Article 25(2)(b) of 
the ICSID Convention be treated for the purposes of the Convention as a national of 
the other Contracting Party. In the case of TSA v. Argentina, the claimant TSA, as a 
local incorporated company of the host state Argentina, instituted an investment 
arbitration proceeding against Argentina arguing that it could be treated as a Dutch 
national according to Article 10(6) of the Netherlands-Argentina BIT.
 86
  
Secondly, foreign shareholders of the locally incorporated company are the typical 
protected investors under international investment treaties. The investment that 
shareholders have made in the host state manifests as shareholding in local companies 
incorporated in the host state. And an overwhelming majority of modern investment 
treaties cover shareholding or participation in companies as a typical form of 
investment. For instance, the term “investment” under Article 1(1)(b) of the 
China-Netherlands BIT includes shares, debentures, stock and any other kind of 
participation in companies. Many investment treaties define investment in identical or 
similar terms. Therefore, a shareholder with the nationality of a contracting state other 
than the host state has the right to seek treaty protection as protected investor since 
shares or stock are protected investment under applicable investment treaties.  
The legal standing of shareholders to submit arbitration claims against the host state 
is also widely recognized by arbitral tribunals. In arbitral practice, the sole 
shareholder, majority shareholders and minority shareholders are all recognized as 
qualified investors under investment treaties, and each shareholder has his own claim 
independent of each other. The percentage of shareholding does not affect the legal 
standing of shareholders to resort to investment arbitration. The decisions of Camuzzi 
v. Argentina case
87
 and Sempra v. Argentina case
88
 illustrated this point well. 
Camuzzi, a Luxembourgish corporation, held the majority shareholdings of two local 
companies incorporated in Argentina, while Sempra, a U.S. corporation, owned the 
remaining minority shares in these two local companies. Both Camuzzi and Sempra 
initiated their own claims for investment arbitration. And the tribunal held that it had 
jurisdiction on both claims. Similarly, the tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina case 
concluded quite definitely that the decisions of arbitral tribunals had been consistent 
in deciding in favor of the right of shareholders to bring a claim before an arbitral 
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tribunal.
 89
 
Thirdly, for those investors structuring investments through the intermediate 
corporations, the case law also acknowledges that investors and their indirect 
shareholdings are covered investors and covered investments under applicable 
investment treaties. In the absence of any explicit exclusion in an investment treaty, 
tribunals will generally consider indirect shareholdings to be a protected form of 
investment regardless of the actual nationality of the intermediate corporations.
 90 
In 
the case of Waste Management v. Mexico, the local company incorporated in Mexico 
was controlled indirectly by the claimant Waste Management Inc. (a U.S. corporation) 
through an intermediate corporation incorporated in Cayman Islands (United 
Kingdom). The tribunal considered the U.S. claimant to be a covered investor under 
NAFTA notwithstanding the British nationality of the intermediate corporation, and 
held that: 
Where a treaty spells out in detail and with precision the requirements for 
maintaining a claim, there is no room for implying into the treaty additional 
requirements, whether based on alleged requirements of general international 
law in the field of diplomatic protection or otherwise. If the NAFTA Parties 
had wished to limit their obligations of conduct to enterprises or investments 
having the nationality of one of the other Parties they could have done so. 
Similarly they could have restricted claims of loss or damage by reference to 
the nationality of the corporation which itself suffered direct injury. No such 
restrictions appear in the text.
 91
 
The tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina also considered that indirect shareholdings as 
indirect investment were covered by most investment treaties and that such treaties 
did not require that there be no interposed companies between the investment and the 
ultimate owner of the company.
 92
 Although the tribunal in Enron v. Argentina felt it 
necessary to establish a cut-off point beyond which claims would not be permissible 
as they would have only a remote connection to the affected company, it still admitted 
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that the answer lied in establishing the extent of the consent to arbitration of the host 
State.
 93
 An indirect foreign shareholder of the local company will be easily qualified 
as a protected investor so long as the applicable investment treaty does not exclude 
indirect investment from the definition of covered investment. 
Furthermore, the intermediate corporation itself also has independent standing to 
submit investment arbitration claims. Although the intermediate corporation usually 
has no substantial economic relationships with the national state in which it is 
incorporated, arbitral tribunals have still recognized it to be a covered investor under 
the applicable investment treaty. In the case of Saluka v. Czech, the claimant Saluka 
was a Dutch corporation wholly controlled by Nomura Europe in United Kingdom, 
which in turn was controlled by Nomura Group in Japan.
 94
 The Respondent 
contended that Saluka was nothing more than a shell used by Nomura and that Saluka 
was not a bona fide “investor” under the Netherlands-Czech BIT. However, the 
tribunal rejected this objection and concluded that the definition of investor under the 
Netherlands-Czech BIT was wide enough to cover the claimant since the 
Netherlands-Czech BIT expressly gave any legal person constituted in the 
Netherlands – such as the claimant in this case – the right to invoke the protection of 
this BIT.
 95
  
While affirming the legal standing of shareholders in investment arbitration, 
tribunals also held that shareholders’ protection extended not only to ownership in the 
shareholdings but also to the assets of the company in investment arbitration. For 
those governmental measures in breach of investment treaties which aims at the 
company, shareholders of the company may resort to investment arbitration whenever 
those measures cause damage to the assets of the company or reduce the value of 
shares.
96
 In arbitral practice, the respondent host states frequently maintained the 
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96 See Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, Oxford University Press, 
2008, p. 59; Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of 
ICSID Tribunals  Shareholders as “Investors” and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis, Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. 4, 2  5, p. 45; Dolores Bentolila, Shareholders’ Action to Claim for 
Indirect Damages in ICSID Arbitration, Trade, Law and Development, Vol. 2, 2010, pp. 96-99. 
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distinction between injuries to the direct rights of shareholders and injuries to the 
company as described in Barcelona Traction case
97
 and thus objected the access of 
shareholders to investment arbitration for injuries to the company. But this objection 
could hardly get approval by investment tribunals. 
In the case of GAMI v. Mexico, the U.S. claimant GAMI held 14.18% of shares in a 
locally incorporated company GAM in Mexico. The government of Mexico 
expropriated five mills belonging to the local company GAM but the shares of the 
U.S. claimant GAMI was never expropriated. GAMI contended that Mexico's conduct 
impaired the value of its shareholding to such an extent that it must be deemed 
tantamount to expropriation. In its decision, the tribunal found that GAMI’s shares in 
 AM was an “investment” and that  AMI was an “investor of a Party” under Article 
1139 of NAFTA. As to the debate whether governmental acts or omissions that 
adversely affect GAM may be pleaded as breaches of NAFTA because they had the 
result of reducing the value of  AMI’s stake in GAM, the tribunal concluded that: 
The fact that a host state does not explicitly interfere with share ownership is 
not decisive. The issue is rather whether a breach of NAFTA leads with 
sufficient directness to loss or damage in respect of a given investment. 
Whether GAM can establish such a prejudice is a matter to be examined on 
the merits. Uncertainty in this regard is not an obstacle to jurisdiction.
 98
 
This conclusion was further supported by the Annulment Committee in the case of 
Azurix v. Argentina, where the U.S. claimant Azurix invested in the Argentine 
companies through several intermediate corporations. Argentina argued that Azurix, 
being only a shareholder of the local company, lacked legal standing to bring “indirect 
claims” or “derivative claims” relating to the company’s rights before an investment 
tribunal. Noting that Azurix’s shares in the Argentine company and the company itself 
constituted protected “investment” of Azurix under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, the 
Committee further considered that: 
[E]ven where a foreign investor is not the actual legal owner of the assets 
constituting an investment, or not an actual party to the contract giving rise to 
                                                             
97 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the landmark Barcelona Traction case held that “[T]he mere fact 
that damage is sustained by both company and shareholder does not imply that both are entitled to claim 
compensation.…In such cases, no doubt, the interests of the aggrieved are affected, but not their rights. Thus 
whenever a shareholder’s interests are harmed by an act done to the company, it is to the latter that he must 
look to institute appropriate action; for although two separate entities may have suffered from the same wrong, 
it is only one entity whose rights have been infringed.” See Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 ICJ Rep. 3, para. 44. 
98 GAMI Investments, Inc. v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 15 November 2004, paras. 27-33. 
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the contractual rights constituting an investment, that foreign investor may 
nonetheless have a financial or other commercial interest in that 
investment….The Committee sees no reason in principle why an investment 
protection treaty cannot protect such an interest of a foreign investor, and 
enable the foreign investor to bring arbitration proceedings in respect of 
alleged violations of the treaty with respect to that interest.
 99
 
It reveals that the distinction between shareholders’ direct rights and their indirect 
interests in the assets of the local company has not being sustained by arbitral practice. 
Shareholders’ shares in the company and the assets of the company are identified as 
protected “investment” of shareholders under applicable investment treaties. And thus 
shareholders have direct access to investment arbitration for damages done to the 
local company which indirectly cause injuries to shareholders. 
This would inevitably bring an inherent risk of multiple claims and double recovery. 
The treatment of shares and shareholders as covered investment and covered investors 
under investment treaties expands the scope of treaty protection. This expansion 
allows the local company and its shareholders of different layers in the same chain of 
control to claim separately for the same set of facts and regarding almost the “same” 
investment.
100
 And thus the host state may be exposed to multiple claims for the same 
disputed measures. Multiple claims will apparently increase the legal risks and costs 
for the host state and will possibly lead to double recovery for investors.  
This was exactly the situation faced by the respondent state Czech in the cases of 
Lauder v. Czech
101
 and CME v. Czech
102
. The U.S. claimant Lauder in the former case 
was the ultimate controller of a local company incorporated in Czech through his 
holding company CME incorporated in the Netherlands. After the local company 
suffered damages from the measures of Czech, Lauder pursued his claim under the 
U.S.-Czech BIT while CME sought its own claim under the Netherlands-Czech BIT. 
Both tribunals affirmed their jurisdiction but one tribunal awarded the compensation 
while the other tribunal rejected the claims. Although Lauder and CME did not end up 
with double recovery, the possibility of double recovery remains in a similar situation 
supposing that both tribunals accept their separate claims in the merits. 
                                                             
99 Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic, 1 September 2009, paras. 57, 94, 108-109. 
100 See Dolores Bentolila, Shareholders’ Action to Claim for Indirect Damages in ICSID Arbitration, Trade, Law 
and Development, Vol. 2, 2010, p. 127. 
101 CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 13 
September 2001. 
102 Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 September 2001. 
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The Annulment Committee in the case of Azurix v. Argentina actually noted that 
“there may be unresolved problems in relation to the possibility of multiple 
proceedings, double recovery and the extent to which minority shareholders should be 
compensated if the local company remains a going concern.” But the Committee did 
not see such possibility of multiple claims and double recovery as an absurd or 
unreasonable issue. In its decision, the Committee held that:  
Although more than one person may be able to claim in different fora in 
respect of the same damage to the same assets, each may ultimately only be 
entitled to be compensated to the extent of its own loss.
 103
 
This conclusion, however, did not offer a satisfactory solution since the loss of 
shareholders of different layers could overlap and the ultimate beneficiaries of 
compensation awarded to different shareholders may also overlap. It appears that the 
respondent state could end up paying compensation more than once for the same 
injury to the local company as long as shareholders at different layers of the corporate 
chain can pursue their own claims separately before different tribunals. Also, it would 
be the tribunal who may decide at its own discretion whether to allow multiple claims 
of different shareholders and how to calculate the actual loss of different shareholders. 
3.2.2 Tolerating “treaty shopping” of investors 
The key feature of treaty shopping lies in the fact that an investor may easily 
structure its investment to meet the nationality requirement under the target 
investment treaty but nevertheless does not have a sufficient connection to the 
contracting state on whose nationality it relies. A qualified nationality of the 
contracting state will be obtained through the incorporation of a holding company in 
such state that has favorable treaty terms with the host state. And the holding 
company will be used as a corporate vehicle to channel the investment from the 
ultimate controlling investor to the intended host state. This technique in obtaining 
target nationality
104
 is also known by various expressions such as nationality planning, 
nationality structuring, nationality hunting or nationality chasing.
 105
 
                                                             
103 Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic, 1 September 2009, paras. 109, 114. 
104 Note that there will be no need for an investor to obtain a target nationality if the investor can directly “shop 
for” a third investment treaty relying on the most-favored-nation clause in the applicable investment treaty. 
The applicability of the most-favored-nation clause to investor-state arbitration provisions will be dealt with 
in chapter 3.5. 
105 See Mattew Skinner, Cameron A. Miles & Sam Luttrell, Access and Advantage in Investor-state Arbitration: 
The Law and Practice of Treaty Shopping, Journal of World Energy Law & Business, Vol. 3, 2010, pp. 
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An investor may practically shop for a favorable investment treaty through 
nationality planning in three possible scenarios. Firstly, where there is no effective 
investment treaty between the home state of the investor and the host state, the 
investor may seek treaty protection for its investment by structuring its investment 
through a third state that has a favorable investment treaty with the target host state. 
Secondly, where there indeed exists an applicable investment treaty between the 
investor’s home state and the host state but the investor’s access to international 
arbitration is denied or severely limited, the investor may structure its investment 
through a third state to take advantage of a more favorable investment treaty entitling 
the investor to submit any dispute with the host state to international arbitration. As 
shown in Figure 3.1, the investor A from State X establishes a subsidiary company B 
in a third State Y and company B in turn invests in the local company C in the host 
state Z. If there is no BIT between State X and State Z or such BIT turns out to be 
unfavorable to the investor A, company B will seek treaty protection under the 
favorable BIT between State Y and State Z. Thirdly, an investor investing in its home 
state may also seek to evade the jurisdiction of local authorities and acquire treaty 
protection by incorporating an intermediate company in a foreign state that has 
favorable treaty terms with its home state. The process of investment structuring in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
260-285; Engela C. Schlemmer, Investment, Investor, Nationality and Shareholders, in Peter Muchlinski, 
Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 49-88; Peter Muchlinski, Corporations and the Uses of Law: International 
Investment Arbitration as a 'Multilateral Legal Order', Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2011, pp. 
1-25. 
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Figure 3.1 Investments via a Third State 
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this scenario is also labeled round-trip investments as illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
 
However, treaty shopping of investors is tolerated by tribunals in the following 
three aspects: (1) avoiding the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate 
veil; (2) good faith presumption of treaty shopping; and (3) restrictive application of 
denial of benefits clauses.
 106
  
Firstly, tribunals tend to avoid the application of the doctrine of piercing the 
corporate veil. Piercing the corporate veil essentially means disregarding the 
separateness of the corporation and holding the controlling shareholder liable for the 
corporation’s action as if it were the shareholder’s own. 107 The applicability of 
piercing the corporate veil in international law is also admitted by international 
tribunals. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for instance, found the process of 
‘lifting the corporate veil’ or ‘disregarding the legal entity’ in municipal law equally 
admissible to play a similar role in international law in the leading case of Barcelona 
Traction.
108
 However, the function of piercing the corporate veil in international law 
differs from that of municipal law. The main purpose of piercing the corporate veil in 
international law is to take into account the controlling shareholder’s nationality for 
                                                             
106 For a detailed analysis, see Xu Shu, Who is Entitled to Claim under an International Investment Treaty? 
Setting Limits on Treaty Shopping in Investor-State Arbitration, Tohoku Law Review, No. 42, 2013, pp. 1-46. 
107 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 76, 
1991, p. 1036; David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited 
Liability, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 56, 2007, p. 1310. 
108 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 ICJ 
Rep. 3, paras. 56-58. 
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the determination of the nationality of a corporation.
 109
  
International investment usually involves several corporate layers of owners. When 
a company in the corporate chain claims international protection under the investment 
treaty between the host state and the national state of the claimant company, one 
needs to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil of such company to search the 
ultimate controller of the investment. If the answer is yes, such company may not 
qualify as a protected investor under the investment treaty between the host state and 
the home state of such company since it may not be treated as a national of its home 
state for the purpose of investment treaty protection. However, the applicability of 
piercing the corporate veil is denied in arbitral practice in both scenarios of indirect 
investment via a third state and round-trip investment. Tribunals have held that treaty 
shopping itself is not a basis for piercing the corporate veil. 
110
 
(i) First scenario: indirect investment structured through an intermediate 
corporation in a third State. In Saluka v. Czech, Czech invited the tribunal to pierce 
the corporate veil of Saluka arguing that the corporate form of Saluka, as a shell used 
by the Japanese company Nomura, had been utilized to perpetrate fraud or other 
malfeasance. While showing “some sympathy” for the argument that the use of a shell 
company may lead to treaty shopping and abuses of the arbitral procedure, the 
tribunal stated that the predominant factor which must guide it is the terms in which 
the parties to the Treaty now in question have agreed. With regard to the definition of 
investor under the Netherlands-Czech BIT, the tribunal held that: 
The parties to the Treaty could have included in their agreed definition of 
“investor” some words which would have served, for example, to exclude 
wholly-owned subsidiaries of companies constituted under the laws of third 
States, but they did not do so. The parties having agreed that any legal person 
constituted under their laws is entitled to invoke the protection of the Treaty, 
and having so agreed without reference to any question of their relationship 
to some other third State corporation, it is beyond the powers of this Tribunal 
to import into the definition of “investor” some requirement relating to such a 
relationship having the effect of excluding from the Treaty’s protection a 
company which the language agreed by the parties included within it.
 111
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Although the tribunal also considered it permissible in some circumstances to look 
behind the corporate structures of companies involved, no alleged fraud or 
malfeasance was found in the present case. The claimant and its controllers, according 
to the tribunal, had simply acted in a manner which was commonplace in the world of 
commerce.
112
  
The unwillingness of the tribunal to pierce the corporate veil was also illustrated in 
the case of ADC v. Hungary. In this case, Canadian investors incorporated two 
holding companies in Cyprus through which an investment was made in the host state 
Hungary. After the occurrence of an investment dispute, the two Cypriot intermediate 
companies brought arbitration claims against Hungary on the basis of the 
Cyprus-Hungary BIT.
 113
 With regard to Hungary’s argument that the corporate veil 
of the claimants should be pierced, the tribunal found it inapplicable in this case. For 
the tribunal, the origin of capital and the ultimate controller “are irrelevant”, the 
principle of piercing the corporate veil was inapplicable since “Hungary was fully 
aware of the use of Cypriot entities and manifestly approved it.” 114 
(ii) Second scenario: round-trip investment. Contrary to treaty shopping in the form 
of investment via a third state, the legitimacy of treaty shopping in the form of 
round-trip investment receives more skepticism. Supporters of round-trip treaty 
shopping are of the view that an investor has the right to invoke the protection of an 
applicable investment treaty as long as it satisfies the treaty definition of investor 
irrespective of whether it is possibly controlled by nationals of the host state. The 
opposite approach taken by opponents, however, questions the legitimacy of 
round-trip treaty shopping on the ground that the real purpose of investors engaging in 
such shopping activities is to turn an original domestic investment into a disguised 
international investment and to evade the jurisdiction of domestic courts. The 
opponents, therefore, believe that it is necessary to pierce the corporate veil of the 
off-shore company to identify the real “domestic investor” behind the corporate 
structure. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
para. 229. 
112 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006, 
paras. 230-241. 
113 The reason that the arbitration claims were submitted by Cypriot intermediate companies but not Canadian 
companies was because the Cyprus-Hungary BIT was more favorable than the Canada-Hungary BIT. Canada 
was not treaty party to the ICSID Convention, but Cyprus and Hungary were treaty parties to the ICSID 
Convention. Therefore, only the Cypriot intermediate companies had the standing to submit claims to ICSID 
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114 ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC & ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 
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A good illustration of this controversy is the case of Tokios v. Ukraine. This case 
involved an arbitration claim under the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT brought by Tokios. 
Tokios was incorporated in Lithuania, but 99% of its shareholders were nationals of 
Ukraine. Tokios alleged that it had legal standing to seek protection according to 
Article 1(2)(b) of the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, which defines the term “investor,” with 
respect to Lithuania, as “any entity established in the territory of the Republic of 
Lithuania in conformity with its laws and regulations.” The respondent state Ukraine, 
on the contrary, contended that the Claimant was not a “genuine entity” of Lithuania 
but a Ukrainian investor in Lithuania because it was owned and controlled 
predominantly by Ukrainian nationals. In support of its contention, Ukraine asked the 
tribunal to “pierce the corporate veil,” that was, “to disregard the Claimant’s state of 
incorporation and determine its nationality according to the nationality of its 
predominant shareholders and managers.”115 
The majority of the tribunal, however, was not convinced by Ukraine. After a 
comprehensive analysis of the treaty terms, the context and the object and purpose of 
the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, the tribunal held that the state of incorporation, not the 
nationality of the controlling shareholders defined “investors” of Lithuania under 
Article 1(2)(b) of the BIT.
116
 Therefore, the claimant, as a company incorporated in 
Lithuania, fell within the treaty definition of an investor of Lithuania. The tribunal 
further explained that the contracting parties could have excluded from the scope of 
the BIT “entities of the other party that are controlled by nationals of third countries 
or by nationals of the host country.” The Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, by contrast, includes 
no such “denial of benefits” provision with respect to entities controlled by 
third-country nationals or by nationals of the denying party.
117
 
As to the respondent’s request of veil piercing, the tribunal found that the 
respondent had not demonstrated that the Claimant engaged in fraud or malfeasance 
since the enterprise was founded six years before the BIT between Ukraine and 
Lithuania entered into force and thus declined to look beyond the Claimant to its 
shareholders.
118
 
The president of the tribunal, Professor Prosper Weil, strongly dissented. In his 
view, the claimant, although incorporated in Lithuania, was actually a Ukrainian 
                                                             
115 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004, para. 22.  
116 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004, para. 30.  
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investor under the control of Ukrainian nationals.
119
 The corporate form of the 
claimant should be disregarded to reach the real origin of capital. In denying 
round-trip investment the character of “foreign” investment, he famously concluded 
that: 
The ICSID mechanism and remedy are not meant for, and are not to be 
construed as, allowing—and even less encouraging—nationals of a State 
party to the ICSID Convention to use a foreign corporation, whether 
preexistent or created for that purpose, as a means of evading the jurisdiction 
of their domestic courts and the application of their national law. It is meant 
to protect—and thus encourage—international investment.120 
Likewise, the tribunal in Rompetrol v. Romania was faced with a similar situation 
in which the claimant Rompetrol was incorporated in the Netherlands but ultimately 
controlled by a Romanian national. Citing Professor Weil’s dissenting opinion in 
Tokios v. Ukraine, the Romanian government contested that the claimant was merely a 
“shell company” of a Romanian national,121 and that the claimant’s request for 
arbitration was “in reality based on a domestic (Romanian) investment seeking to 
clothe itself as a foreign (Dutch) investment in order to come within the protection of 
the Netherlands-Romania BIT.”122  
The tribunal did not share the contention of Romania. It felt bound to apply the 
incorporation test clearly expressed in the wording of the Netherlands-Romania BIT. 
According to the tribunal, the Netherlands-Romania BIT only chose incorporation as 
a formal criterion of nationality without requiring in addition an examination of 
ownership and control, and the claimant met such formal requirement.
123
 As to the 
allegation of “real and effective nationality”, the tribunal denied the existence of such 
general rule and held that there was no need to look through the claimant to examine 
the nationality of its controlling shareholder. 
Secondly, treaty shopping is presumed by tribunals to be conducted in good faith. 
Whether the conduct of treaty shopping itself could amount to fraud or abuse of the 
                                                             
119 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion of Prosper Weil, 29 April 2004, 
para. 23.  
120 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion of Prosper Weil, 29 April 2004, 
para. 30.  
121 The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 18 April 2008, 
para. 50. 
122 The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 18 April 2008, 
para. 71. 
123 The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 18 April 2008, 
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corporate form is an issue of good faith analysis and depends upon the circumstances 
of each case. In this regard, tribunals take a cautious approach in examining the 
alleged “bad faith” conduct of investment structuring on the presumption that treaty 
shopping as such does not constitute a wrongdoing unless the existence of fraud or 
abuse of the corporate form is otherwise proved.
124
  
The “timing” of the conduct of investment structuring is the decisive factor in 
determining the legitimacy of treaty shopping. The tribunals in the cases of Phoenix v. 
Czech and Mobil v. Venezuela, for instance, denied the legitimacy of treaty shopping 
by the claimants on the ground of abusive corporate structuring. In Phoenix v. Czech, 
a Czech national (Mr. Beno) incorporated an Israeli company, Phoenix, to buy two 
Czech companies that had been owned by Mr. Beno’s family members. The Israeli 
company Phoenix submitted arbitration claims against Czech soon afterwards for the 
disputes that had already existed between the two Czech companies and Czech under 
the Israel-Czech BIT. Noting that “the timing of the investment is a first factor to be 
taken into account to establish whether or not the Claimant’s engaged in an abusive 
attempt to get access to ICSID,”125 the tribunal found that the alleged investment of 
the claimant appeared “as a mere redistribution of assets within the Beno family.” 126 
In the view of the tribunal,  
[T]he claimant made an “investment” not for the purpose of engaging in 
economic activity, but for the sole purpose of bringing international litigation 
against the Czech Republic….The unique goal of the “investment” was to 
transform a pre-existing domestic dispute into an international dispute 
subject to ICSID arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty. This kind of 
transaction is not a bona fide transaction and cannot be a protected 
investment under the ICSID system.
127
 
Therefore, the purchase of the host state companies through a foreign shell 
company for the sole purpose of bringing international arbitration against the host 
state, according to the tribunal, was not a good faith investment structuring and thus 
constituted an abuse of arbitration mechanism.
128
 The president of the tribunal, 
                                                             
124 For recent analysis of good faith principle in the context of investment treaty protection, see Eric De 
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Professor Brigitte Stern, explicitly concluded in a later article that treaty shopping 
after the events, ex post, in order to obtain a claim on the international level could not 
be considered as being done in good faith.
129
  
The tribunal in the case of Mobil v. Venezuela took a similar approach. In this case, 
Mobil (a U.S. company) originally controlled two local Venezuelan companies 
through two intermediate companies incorporated in U.S and Bahamas. In 2005, 
Mobil decided to restructure its investment in Venezuelan companies through the 
creation of a new holding company in the Netherlands, which subsequently acquired 
indirect control over the two Venezuelan companies. The newly incorporated Dutch 
company filed an arbitration proceeding against Venezuela under the 
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT. 
130
 In its objection, Venezuela contended that Mobil’s 
investment restructuring constituted abuse of the corporate form and thus had no legal 
standing to seek treaty protection.
131
  
Consistent with the decision in Phoenix v. Czech, the tribunal in this case 
considered the timing of investment structuring to be determinative in examining the 
legitimacy of treaty shopping. Disputes arose prior to Mobil’s corporate restructuring 
and disputes arose after Mobil’s corporate restructuring were distinguished. As far as 
it concerned “future disputes”, in the view of the tribunal, the restructuring of their 
investments in Venezuela through a Dutch holding to gain access to ICSID arbitration 
“was a perfectly legitimate goal as far as it concerned future disputes.”132 The 
situation was different, however, with respect to pre-existing disputes. Quoting the 
decision of the Phoenix tribunal, the tribunal concluded that to restructure investments 
only in order to gain jurisdiction under a BIT for pre-existing disputes would 
constitute an abusive manipulation of the system of international investment 
protection under the ICSID Convention and the BITs.
133
 Accordingly, the tribunal 
confirmed its jurisdiction only over disputes arose after Mobil’s corporate 
restructuring.  
The determination of abuse of process or bad faith structuring is further developed 
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in the case of Pac Rim Cayman v. El Salvador in which the tribunal considered that: 
[T]he dividing line occurs when the relevant party can see an actual dispute 
or can foresee a specific future dispute as a very high probability and not 
merely as a possible controversy. In the Tribunal’s view, before that 
dividing-line is reached, there will be ordinarily no abuse of process; but 
after that dividing-line is passed, there ordinarily will be….as a matter of 
practical reality, this dividing-line will rarely be a thin red line, but will 
include a significant grey area.
134
 
The tribunal, nevertheless, came to the conclusion that the claimant did not foresee 
a specific dispute with El Salvador when it changed its place of incorporation from 
Cayman Islands to America. Therefore, the nationality structuring of the claimant was 
not held to be a bad faith conduct.
 135
  
Therefore, it would be an abuse of process for an investor to structure its 
investment through a shell company in a third state to acquire the benefits of a 
favorable BIT when the relevant investment dispute has already occurred or can be 
reasonably foreseen by the investor. In other words, treaty shopping ex post after the 
occurrence of investment disputes cannot be considered to be acting in good faith. 
Even so, treaty shopping ex ante without being probably aware of a specific future 
dispute, being the most frequently used investment technique, is still permissible 
under a broadly defined investment treaty.  
In a word, the conduct of treaty shopping as such does not constitute the basis for 
piercing the corporate veil. Under the incorporation test for the corporate nationality, 
the corporate form can only be disregarded to reach the controlling shareholders 
where there exists abusive corporate structuring. Corporate structuring after the 
occurrence of a specific investment dispute, for instance, is the typical circumstance 
of abuse and bad faith structuring identified by arbitral tribunals. The principle of 
abuse of rights, being an “underdeveloped analytical tool for judging genuine 
corporate nationality,”136 should not be seen as a satisfactory universal solution to the 
issue of treaty shopping since it may only be applied in exceptional cases. And the 
application of such principle depends on the interpretive stance of specific tribunals 
                                                             
134 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 1 June 2 12, paras. 2.  . 
135 The applicable investment treaty in this case is the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR). 
America and El Salvador are contracting parties to CAFTA-DR, but UK and Canada are not. The claimant 
was controlled by a Canadian company and was registered in Cayman Islands before its restructuring.  
136 See Robin F. Hansen, The Systemic Challenge of Investor Nationality in An Era of Multinational Enterprises, 
Journal of Arbitration and Mediation, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2010, pp. 81-116. 
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considering circumstances of treaty texts and facts on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, 
it seems that the surest means lies in the explicit formulation of nationality 
requirements in individual investment treaties to set out clear limitations on the 
conduct of treaty shopping.
137
 
Thirdly, tribunals tend to restrict the application of denial of benefits clauses.
 
A 
typical example of such clause can be found in Article 17(2) of the 2012 U.S. Model 
BIT which provides that: 
A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the other Party 
that is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments of that investor if 
the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of the 
other Party and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or 
control the enterprise. (emphasis added) 
Under such a clause, the party reserves the right to deny the treaty benefits to a 
company that has no economic connection with the state where it is incorporated. 
Such economic connection includes control by nationals of the state where the 
company is incorporated and having substantial business activities in that state. A 
denial of benefits clause gives the host state the ability to effectively “carve out from 
the definitions of investor shell companies owned by nationals of a third-country or 
the host state.”138 
The inclusion of denial of benefits clause in investment treaties is gaining 
popularity in recent years. Many bilateral investment treaties concluded by countries 
like U.S., Canada, Singapore, Japan and China
139
 incorporate denial of benefits 
clauses. There are also several multilateral investment treaties containing denial of 
benefits clauses, such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) and ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). 
However, it must be noted that denial of benefits clauses in different investment 
treaties are distinct from one another. NAFTA and not a few BITs concluded by U.S., 
for instance, stipulate that a Party may deny the treaty benefits to an investor of the 
other Party controlled by nationals of a non-Party or of the denying Party in their 
denial of benefits clauses. Contrary to this formulation, there are also some 
                                                             
137  International Law Association German Branch, The Determination of Nationality of Investors under 
Investment Protection Treaties, 2011, p. 51. 
138 Barton Legum, Defining Investment and Investor: Who is Entitled to Claim? Arbitration International, Vol. 
22, No. 4, 2010, p. 525. 
139 Investment treaties containing denial of benefits clauses entered into by China include the China-Uzbekistan 
BIT, the China-Mexico BIT, the China-ASEAN Investment Agreement, the China-New Zealand FTA, the 
China-Peru FTA and the China-Canada BIT.  
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investment treaties, such as ECT and the China-Mexico BIT,
140
 referring to owners 
and controllers only from a non-Party but not from the denying Party (the host State). 
Interestingly, tribunals have repeatedly imposed additional requirements on the 
invocation of denial of benefits clauses in arbitral practice and the host state’s request 
for denial of benefits have rarely been accepted. According to these tribunals, the 
respondent state is required to bear the evidentiary burden to prove that the criteria of 
control and substantial business activities have been met and to notice its intent to 
deny treaty benefits in advance. And such intent of denial could not apply 
prospectively. In the landmark case of Plama v. Bulgaria, the host state Bulgaria 
requested to deny treaty benefits to Plama relying on Article 17(1) of the ECT.
141
 The 
tribunal, however, held that “the existence of a right is distinct from the exercise of 
that right” and that it was “not unreasonable or impractical to interpret Article 17(1) 
as requiring that a Contracting State must exercise its right before applying it to an 
investor and be seen to have done so.”142 In the tribunal’s view, a general declaration 
or a statutory provision or even an exchange of letters with a particular investor or 
class of investors could suffice as an exercising of the right. Furthermore, the host 
state’s notice to deny treaty benefits to certain investors, according to the tribunal, 
“should not have retrospective effect.”143 
Likewise, Ukraine tried to invoke Article 17(1) of the ECT to deny treaty benefits 
to Ukraine in the case of AMTO v. Ukraine. Article 17(1) of the ECT was considered 
by the tribunal to be a denial of benefits clause referring to a class of corporate 
investors that “satisfy the nationality requirement by reason of incorporation but are 
owned or controlled by nationals of a third state in a manner potentially unacceptable 
to the host State.”144 The tribunal viewed that the host state had the burden of proof to 
prove the factual requisites of such provision on which it relied,
145
 and that Ukraine 
failed to prove the claimant to be an investor that could be denied treaty benefits in 
                                                             
140 Article 32 of the China-Mexico BIT reads that “the Contracting Parties may decide jointly in consultation to 
deny the benefits of this Agreement to an enterprise of the other Contracting Party and to its investments, if a 
natural person or enterprise of a non-Contracting Party owns or controls such enterprise.” (emphasis added) 
141 Article 17(1) of the ECT provides that “each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of 
this Part to: (1) a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own or control such entity and if that entity 
has no substantial business activities in the Area of the Contracting Party in which it is organized.”  
142 Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 
February 2005, paras. 155-157. 
143 Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 
February 2005, para. 162. 
144 Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Award, 26 March 2008, para. 61. 
145 Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Award, 26 March 2008, para. 65. 
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the present case.
146
 Imposing of the burden of proof on the host state was further 
confirmed by the tribunal in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine. In this case, the tribunal 
found that Ukraine failed to provide sufficient evidence with regard to “third country 
control” over the claimant and thus had no right to deny treaty benefits to the claimant 
relying on the denial of benefits clause.
147
 The tribunal in Yukos v. Russia also 
followed the previous tribunals in requiring the respondent state to bear the 
evidentiary burden and to notice its intent to deny treaty benefits in advance for the 
triggering of the denial of benefits clause.
148
 
The approach adopted by these tribunals has been criticized that it would 
“undermine the utility” of denial of benefits clauses,149 or even have the potential to 
render these clauses “virtually meaningless”.150 Whether such approach reflects the 
intentions of contracting states and be accepted by international community remains 
to be seen. Contrary to such an approach, Pac Rim Cayman v. El Salvador case could 
be counted as the only case which recently approved the invocation of denial of 
benefits clause contained in the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).
151
 The tribunal in this case found that “there was 
no express time-limit in CAFTA for the election by a CAFTA Party to deny benefits 
under CAFTA Article 10.12.2,”152 and that the claimant had no substantial activities 
in the U.S. and was controlled by persons of a non-Party.
153
 
3.3 Expansive interpretation of “investment disputes” 
                                                             
146 Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No. 080/2005, Award, 26 March 2008, para. 69. 
147 Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, 16 September 2003, para. 15.9. 
148 Yukos Universal Ltd.(Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009, paras. 441-443, 456-459. 
149 Mark Feldman, Setting Limits on Corporate Nationality Planning in Investment Treaty Arbitration, ICSID 
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2012, p. 296; UNCTAD, Scope and Definition: A 
Sequel, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, United Nations publication, 
2011, p. 98. 
150 Rachel Thorn & Jennifer Doucleff, Disregarding the Corporate Veil and Denial of Benefits Clauses: Testing 
Treaty Language and the Concept of “Investor”, in Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & 
Claire Balchin (eds.), The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, Kluwer Law 
International, 2010, pp. 5-6. 
151 Article 10.12.2 of the CAFTA, titled as “denial of benefits”, permits a CAFTA Party to “deny the benefits of 
this Chapter to an investor of another Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments of that 
investor if the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of any Party, other than the 
denying Party and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise.” 
152 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 1 June 2 12, para. 4.83. 
153 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 1 June 2 12, paras. 4.78, 4.82. 
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As stated above in this dissertation, the scope of investment disputes that states 
have agreed to submit to arbitration varies and can be divided into two categories. 
Generally, broad ISAPs enable investors to submit any investment dispute to 
arbitration, while narrow ISAPs restrict access of international arbitration to certain 
types of disputes.
 154
 Notably, even broad ISAPs are subject to limitation. For 
example, an investor is required to first settle the dispute with the host state amicably 
through negotiation. If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiation, the investor 
may submit the dispute to investment arbitration only after a waiting period or the 
exhaustion of local administrative remedy. Sometimes, the investor is also required to 
make a final choice between submitting disputes to local courts and to international 
arbitration. These requirements, however, have been weakened and even avoided by 
tribunals in practice.
155
 
Most narrow ISAPs restrict investors’ access to international arbitration only for 
those disputes over the amount of compensation for expropriation. This kind of 
narrow ISAPs is subject to different interpretations and will inevitably trigger fierce 
controversies. The existence of expropriation in the first place is the prerequisite for 
the determination of the compensation amount for expropriation. The major 
controversy arising from such provisions is whether disputes concerning the amount 
of compensation for expropriation include disputes over the existence of expropriation. 
If one considers them to be included, the arbitral tribunal would have jurisdiction to 
decide whether an expropriation has occurred and subsequently the amount of 
compensation under such provisions. However, if such provisions could be read to 
exclude disputes over the occurrence of expropriation, foreign investors would have 
little chance of access to international arbitration since the host state could simply 
deny the occurrence of an expropriation.  
European Media Ventures SA v. Czech
156
 could be counted as the first case 
explicitly supporting an expansive reading of narrow arbitration provision. The 
tribunal in this case held that it had jurisdiction to determine whether an expropriation 
had occurred on the basis of Article 8 of the Belgium-Luxembourg-Czechoslovakia 
BIT, which was worded in a less restrictive fashion that provided for international 
arbitration of disputes “concerning compensation due by virtue of Article 3 
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Paragraphs (1) and (3)”. Contending that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction on whether 
an expropriation had taken place, Czech applied to set aside the award before the 
English High Court. In his judgment of Czech v. European Media Ventures SA, Justice 
Simon found himself unable to accept that the phrase “concerning compensation due” 
must be read as meaning “relating to the amount of compensation” as a matter of its 
ordinary meaning. He held that: 
The use of the word ‘compensation’ limits the scope of the arbitration….The 
word ‘concerning’, however, is broad. The word is not linked to any 
particular aspect of ‘compensation’. ‘Concerning’ is similar to other common 
expressions in arbitration clauses, for example ‘relating to’ and ‘arising out 
of’. Its ordinary meaning is to include every aspect of its subject  in this case 
‘compensation due by virtue of Paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article3’. As a 
matter of ordinary meaning this covers issues of entitlement as well as 
quantification.
 
 
So far as precondition (c) is concerned, ‘due by virtue of’, this connects 
entitlement to compensation to events specified in Articles 3(1) and (3)…In 
determining any claim ‘concerning compensation’, the tribunal must 
necessarily consider whether the events in Articles 3(1) and (3) have 
occurred, and their precise nature.
 157
 (Emphasis in original) 
The tribunal in the case of Renta 4 v. Russia adopted a similarly broad approach in 
interpreting Article 10 of the Spain-USSR BIT providing international arbitration for 
“any dispute between one Party and an investor of the other Party relating to the 
amount or method of payment of the compensation due”. In its award, the tribunal 
was severely critical of the Berschader award and held that the proposition of the 
Berschader tribunal was “no more than a restatement of the problem” and “a simple 
affirmation”. 158 For the purpose of interpreting the scope of Article 10, the tribunal 
heavily relied on the word “due” and considered that it permitted the tribunal to 
determine whether compensation was “due”. This consideration led the tribunal to 
conclude that the word “due” in fact disfavored Russia since there was a dispute 
between the claimants and Russia as to whether compensation is “due”. The tribunal 
also noticed that the English high court relied upon the word “due” in Czech v. 
European Media Ventures SA and confirmed that the word “due” bestowed the power 
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to determine whether there had been a compensable event in the first place.
 159
  
It seems that the word “due” included in the restrictive arbitration provision 
constituted the major premise of the arguments held by the English court in Czech v. 
European Media Ventures SA and the tribunal in Renta 4 v. Russia. The applicable 
restrictive arbitration provisions in both cases are quite unique in that they contain the 
word “due”. If the word wasn’t included, the tribunals would possibly adopt a 
contrary interpretation. The seemingly conflicting approaches in interpreting the 
restrictive arbitration provisions can thus be attributed to the textual variations of such 
provisions in the degree of restriction. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal in the case of Tza Yap Shum v. Peru went further to assert 
“the broadest interpretation” of restrictive arbitration provision notwithstanding the 
absence of the word “due” in such a provision. The Tza Yap Shum case involved a 
Chinese claimant from Hong Kong bringing an arbitration claim against Peru under 
the China-Peru BIT. Article 8(3) of the China-Peru BIT provides arbitration consent 
of contracting states for “a dispute involving the amount of compensation for 
expropriation”. The respondent stressed the words “amount of compensation” and 
suggested a restrictive reading that such provisions merely covered “disputes related 
to the determination of the value of the investment” but excluded “such questions as 
whether expropriation has taken place or whether any compensation must be paid”. 
The claimant, on the contrary, focused on the context and purpose of the China-Peru 
BIT and maintained that the tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the actual 
occurrence of expropriation in the first place in addition to the amount of the 
compensation for expropriation.
160
  
While acknowledging that the phrase “involving the amount of compensation for 
expropriation” may have “a great variety of possible meanings”, the tribunal 
ultimately decided that “the broadest interpretation” requested by the claimant 
happened to be “the most appropriate”. 161 The primary emphasis was given to the 
word “involving”. In search of the ordinary meaning of the word “involving”, the 
tribunal referred to the Oxford Dictionary, which defines such a word to mean “to 
enfold, envelope, entangle, include”. Following this definition, the tribunal considered 
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that: 
[T]he only requirement established in the BIT is that the dispute must 
“include” the determination of the amount of a compensation, and not that 
the dispute must be restricted thereto. Obviously, other wording was 
available, such as “limited to” or “exclusively”, but the wording used in this 
provision reads “involving”.162 
Therefore, in the view of the tribunal, 
[T]he words “involving the amount of compensation for expropriation” 
includes not only the mere determination of the amount but also any other 
issues normally inherent to an expropriation, including whether the property 
was actually expropriated in accordance with the BIT provisions and 
requirements, as well as the determination of the amount of compensation 
due, if any.
163
 
In support of its interpretation, the tribunal also sought guidance from the context 
of such restrictive arbitration provision and the object and purpose of the China-Peru 
BIT. After reading the first two sentences of Article 8(3) together with Article 8(2)
164
 
and the last sentence of Article 8(3)
165
, the tribunal was convinced that the restrictive 
reading of the respondent would lead to “an incoherent conclusion that the investor 
would never have access to arbitration”. 166 The last sentence of Article 8(3), also 
known as fork-in-the-road clause
167, requires an investor to make an “irrevocable 
either-or choice” between submitting its dispute to the local courts of the host state or 
to international arbitration. In the tribunal’s view, the restrictive reading of the 
respondent, maintaining that the only disputes that may be submitted to arbitration are 
those involving the amount of compensation after a domestic court decision on the 
occurrence of expropriation, would be “directly contrary to the last sentence of Article 
8(3)”. 168 The reason was that the investor would never have access to arbitration 
                                                             
162 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, 19 
June 2009, para. 151. 
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once he had submitted a dispute involving the amount of compensation for 
expropriation to the domestic court by virtue of the last sentence of Article 8(3). 
Therefore, the expansive interpretation that the tribunal has jurisdiction to determine 
all issues inherent to an expropriation was considered to be “the most appropriate”.  
Furthermore, the tribunal was satisfied that “the purpose of including the 
entitlement to submit certain disputes to ICSID arbitration is that of conferring certain 
benefits to promote investments”. 169 The said purpose, according to the tribunal, did 
not support a restrictive reading to restrict the access to international arbitration.  
The Tza Yap Shum case has displayed a “broadest” approach in interpreting the 
restrictive phrase “involving the amount of compensation for expropriation”. Rather 
than relying upon the word “due” contained in applicable restrictive arbitration 
provisions in the cases of European Media Ventures and Renta 4, the Tza Yap Shum 
tribunal tried justifying its broad interpretation by emphasizing the broadness of the 
word “involving”. This approach, if followed by future international tribunals, will 
provide a wider access to international arbitration and make the old generation 
Chinese BITs more powerful since most restrictive arbitration provisions of these 
BITs contain the word “involving” or a similar wording.170 
In addition to the above three cases, there were several other cases examining the 
question whether an expropriation had taken place without discussing whether such 
questions fell under the jurisdiction of the tribunals. These cases, including 
Sedelmayer v. Russia, Telenor v. Hungary and Saipem v. Bangladesh, showed the 
willingness of international tribunals to hear claims concerning both the existence of 
an expropriation and the amount of compensation for expropriation whenever the 
respondent states failed to raise objections that the dispute over the existence of an 
expropriation fell outside the jurisdiction of the tribunals. 
The jurisdictional basis in the case of Sedelmayer v. Russia was Article 10 of the 
Germany-USSR BIT providing that a dispute “relating to the amount of compensation 
and the method of its payment” can be referred to an international arbitral tribunal. 
Russia did not object to the tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether an 
expropriation had occurred, but rather simply denied the existence of an expropriation. 
However, the tribunal did not accept the Russia’s objection that there had been no 
                                                                                                                                                                              
June 2009, para. 159. 
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expropriation of the claimant’s investment and found that “measures of expropriation 
or similar measures” had taken place.171 
The Norway-Hungary BIT involved in Telenor v. Hungary has a similar arbitration 
provision with Article 8 of the UK-USSR BIT which was hotly debated in RosInvest. 
The issue whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the existence of an 
expropriation under such provision was not raised by Hungary. Hungary chose to 
contest the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the ground that the claimant had failed to 
show a prima facie case of expropriation and the tribunal accepted this objection.
172
 
It appears that the tribunal implicitly supported the expansive interpretation that it had 
jurisdiction to ascertain whether an expropriation had occurred. Likewise, the 
respondent state in Saipem v. Bangladesh also did not object the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
on whether there was an expropriation under the applicable arbitration provision.
 173
 
The tribunal consequently found that the applicable BIT provided for ICSID 
jurisdiction “in case of expropriation” and that the facts alleged by the claimant could 
“be capable of constituting an expropriation”.174 
Compared with the tribunals supporting the expansive readings of narrow ISAPs, 
tribunals denying the expansive readings are rare. In Berschader v. Russia, the 
claimants contended that the issue of whether expropriation had occurred was also to 
be arbitrable under Article 10 of the Belgium-Luxembourg-USSR BIT, which 
provides that a dispute “concerning the amount or mode of compensation to be paid” 
may be submitted to international arbitration at the request of the investor. The 
tribunal, however, was of the view that the ordinary meaning of the provision 
excluded “disputes concerning whether or not an act of expropriation actually 
occurred”. 175 In the case of RosInvest v. Russia, the relevant ISAP was Article 8 of 
the UK-USSR BIT stipulating that “any legal disputes…either concerning the amount 
or payment of compensation…or concerning any other matter consequential upon an 
act of expropriation” can be referred to international arbitration. The tribunal 
concluded that not every aspect of expropriation fell under its jurisdiction and thus it 
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had no jurisdiction as to the occurrence and validity of an expropriation on the basis 
of such provision.
 176
 The tribunal in Austrian Airlines v. Slovakia equally adopted a 
narrow reading of restrictive arbitration provision in Austria-Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic BIT entitling the investor to submit any disputes “concerning the 
amount or the conditions of payment of a compensation pursuant to Article 4 of this 
Agreement” to an arbitral tribunal. The tribunal considered that the words used in the 
provision were clear by themselves and that the scope of such provision was limited 
to disputes about the amount of compensation.
 177
 
The tendency of tribunals in affirming the jurisdiction on the occurrence and 
validity of an expropriation is closely correlated with the hidden nature of 
expropriation today. States rarely engage in expropriation in an overt way but rather in 
a disguised manner. A direct expropriation is usually obvious. While an indirect or 
disguised expropriation, also called regulatory expropriation, may cause controversy 
on the existence of an expropriation. If the occurrence of an expropriation is excluded 
from the jurisdiction of a tribunal, foreign investors would have little chance to have 
the amount of expropriation decided by the tribunal since the host state could simply 
deny the occurrence of an expropriation.
 178
 While paying lip service and trying to be 
faithful to the treaty text, the decision of a tribunal is always result-oriented. The 
necessity to decide the occurrence of an expropriation before the amount of 
compensation drives the tribunal to expansively interpret the narrow scope of 
investment disputes under narrow ISAPs. 
Besides narrow ISAPs discussed above, broad ISAPs are also subject to expansive 
readings by investment tribunals. Some broad ISAPs provide a state’s consent in 
general terms to allow an international tribunal to hear any dispute between an 
investor of a treaty party and the other treaty party “concerning”, “relating to”, “with 
respect to” or “arising out of” an investment. These formulations are subject to 
expansive interpretation to include disputes not involving an alleged violation of the 
investment treaty.
 179
 Tribunals have decided that these broad ISAPs did not restrict a 
tribunal’s jurisdiction to disputes involving the breach of the investment treaty itself. 
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These broad ISAPs would also cover disputes that arise from a contract in relation to 
the investment not violating a substantive standard of the investment treaty.
 180
 
Investors would have the right to bring to arbitration mere contract claims which go 
beyond breaches of treaty provisions under such broad ISAPs.
 181
 
182
  
In the case of Salini v. Morocco, the applicable investment treaty contained a broad 
ISAP covering “all disputes or differences concerning an investment”. The tribunal 
held that the terms of this provision were very general and included not only a claim 
for violation of the BIT but also a claim based on a contract.
 183
 The tribunal in SGS v. 
Philippines adopted a similar reasoning finding that a broad ISAP could provide a 
tribunal jurisdiction to hear pure or mere contract claims. It held that the phrase 
“disputes with respect to investment” contained in the ISAP of the 
Switzerland-Philippines BIT allowed for the submission of contractual disputes.
184
 
3.4 Weakening of preconditions to arbitration 
Under public international law, States are free to decide whether or not to agree to 
submit to international adjudication.
 185
 Even if States consent to international 
arbitration, they still have freedom to qualify the extent of consent and impose the 
preconditions to arbitration. Only if the host state gives its consent to arbitration and 
the limitations and preconditions to arbitration are satisfied, can the investor submit 
investment disputes to an investment tribunal.  
Among others, preconditions to arbitration mainly include an amicable settlement 
requirement, a certain waiting period, the exhaustion of local administrative or 
judicial remedy and “fork-in-the-road clauses”186. For example, Article 10 of the 
Spain-Argentina BIT stipulates that: 
1. Disputes which arise within the terms of this Agreement concerning an 
investment between an investor of one Contracting Party and the other 
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Contracting Party shall, if possible, be settled amicably by the parties to the 
dispute. 
2. If the dispute cannot thus be settled within six months following the date 
on which the dispute has been raised by either party, it shall be submitted to 
the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the 
investment was made. 
3. The dispute may be submitted to international arbitration in any of the 
following circumstances: 
a) at the request of one of the parties to the dispute, if no decision has been 
rendered on the merits of the claim after the expiration of a period of 
eighteen months from the date on which the proceedings referred to in 
paragraph 2 of this Article have been initiated, or if such decision has been 
rendered, but the dispute between the parties continues; 
b) if both parties to the dispute agree thereto. (emphasis added) 
The requirements of six-month’s amicable settlement and eighteen-month’s local 
judicial remedy are preconditions to be satisfied before the submission of investment 
disputes to international arbitration. According to the mandatory language of the 
treaty text, the so-called waiting period or cooling-off period must elapse before the 
arbitration procedure can start. 
However, these requirements have been weakened in arbitral practice. It could be 
achieved by categorizing the issues of procedural preconditions to arbitration as 
relating to admissibility or merits rather than going to jurisdiction.
 187
 If an issue 
originally belonging to jurisdiction is categorized as going to admissibility or merits, 
such categorization would diminish the effect of such jurisdictional requirements.
 188
 
The periods of amicable settlement and local judicial remedy provided in investment 
treaties are mandatory in nature and shall be deemed to be jurisdictional requirements. 
By the time of the institution of arbitration proceeding, these requirements have to be 
complied with. Therefore, if the request for arbitration is submitted before the expiry 
of the mandatory period, a tribunal would have to decline jurisdiction.  
Not a few tribunals have dealt with situations where the investors had not complied 
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with preconditions to arbitration, such as waiting periods and periods for mandatory 
pursuit of local remedies. Among them, most tribunals considered preconditions to 
arbitration to be the issue of admissibility rather than of jurisdiction. Not complying 
with preconditions would not negate the tribunals’ jurisdiction in the opinion of most 
tribunals. Three techniques have been utilized by tribunals to bypass the jurisdictional 
nature of preconditions to arbitration: (1) questioning the rationale for setting waiting 
periods as a precondition to arbitration; (2) excusing the non-compliance of 
preconditions for reasons of futility; and (3) contending the incompatibility of strict 
textual readings of preconditions with the object and purpose of investment treaties. 
Firstly, the rationale for imposing preconditions to arbitration has been questioned 
in arbitral practice. In the case of Hochtief v. Argentina, the applicable investment 
treaty is the Germany-Argentina BIT. Article 10 of the Germany-Argentina BIT 
provides that the dispute may be submitted to an international arbitral tribunal “where, 
after a period of 18 months has elapsed from the moment when the judicial process 
provided for by paragraph 2 of this article was initiated, no final decision has been 
given or where a decision has been made but the Parties are still in dispute.” The 
tribunal, however, found it “difficult to see the rationale for imposing a duty to spend 
a period of 18 months with the dispute listed on the docket of domestic courts as a 
precondition for the reference to arbitration.” In the view of the tribunal, “to oblige 
the parties to spend 18 months in litigation, where one or other (or both) of them 
might have decided in advance to reject any decision that might emerge from the 
courts, appears pointless.” Therefore, the 18-month period was regarded as going to 
the admissibility of the claim rather than the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
189
 Similarly, 
the tribunal in Lauder v. Czech also believed that to insist that the arbitration 
proceedings could only be commenced after a six-month waiting period “would 
amount to an unnecessary, overly formalistic approach which would not serve to 
protect any legitimate interests of the Parties.” 190 
Secondly, the investors’ failure to comply with preconditions to arbitration has been 
excused for reasons of futility. The applicable investment treaty in the case of Teinver 
v. Argentina is the Spain-Argentina BIT. Article 10 of the Spain-Argentina BIT 
stipulates a six-month’s amicable settlement and an eighteen-month’s local judicial 
remedy as stated above. For the six-month requirement of amicable settlement, the 
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tribunal found that the claimant’s failure to comply with this obligation should be 
excused for reasons of futility. Requiring the claimant to engage in any further 
settlement attempts would serve no further purpose in the view of the tribunal, 
although the claimant had not attempted to amicably settle the dispute. For the 
eighteen-month local court requirement, the tribunal similarly did not blame the 
claimant’s non-compliance and held that “while Claimants concede that the 18-month 
local court period had not lapsed at the time they filed their Request for Arbitration, 
they are correct to note that 18 months have subsequently passed, and the local suit 
remains pending.” Therefore, the tribunal believed that the core objective of the 
18-month local court requirement, to give local courts the opportunity to consider the 
disputed measures, had been met. For further explanation, it reasoned that to require 
the claimant to start over and re-file this arbitration now that their 18 months had been 
met would be a waste of time and resources.
 191
 
Thirdly, tribunals have contended that the strict textual readings of preconditions to 
arbitration were incompatible with the object and purpose of investment treaties. 
Comparing with the two above approaches, this approach is more radical in justifying 
its contention based upon interest balancing and objective analysis rather than treaty 
text. In the case of Abaclat v. Argentina, the applicable investment treaty 
Italy-Argentina BIT contained an 18-month local court period requiring the investor 
to pursue the local court remedy for a period of 18-month before the submission of 
disputes to international arbitration. The Tribunal was of the opinion that Claimants’ 
disregard of the 18 months litigation requirement was in itself not yet sufficient to 
preclude Claimants from resorting to arbitration. For the tribunal, the real question 
was whether this disregard, based on its circumstances, could be considered 
compatible with the object and purpose of the system put in place by Article 8, or 
whether it went against it. In the opinion of the tribunal, the object and purpose of the 
18-month litigation requirement was “merely to provide the Host State with an 
opportunity to address the issue before resorting to international arbitration.” 192 
Therefore, as long as the claimants’ disregard of the 18-month litigation requirement 
did not unduly deprive Argentina of a fair opportunity to address the dispute, the 
claimants’ disregard of such requirement would be permissible. Moreover, the tribunal 
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further reasoned that it would be unfair to deprive the investor of its right to resort to 
arbitration based on the mere disregard of the 18 months litigation requirement 
because such disregard would not have caused any real harm to the Host State. While 
in contrast, the deprivation of the investor‘s right to resort to arbitration would, in 
effect, deprive him of an important and efficient dispute settlement mean. Therefore, 
after a weighting of the interests of the parties, the tribunal came to the conclusion 
that the mere disregard of the 18 months litigation requirement did not deprive the 
claimants of their interests of being able to submit disputes to arbitration.
 193
 
According to this expansive reading, the 18 months litigation requirement would 
cease to exist except in name and can be denied willfully by tribunals.  
It is clear that tribunals tend to break through the formalistic requirement of 
preconditions to arbitration and weaken the mandatory feature of preconditions to 
realize the substantial justice of investor protection. However, the categorization of 
preconditions to arbitration as the issue of admissibility rather than of jurisdiction 
cannot justify itself in the terms of treaty text. The investor-state arbitration provisions 
in investment treaties do not distinguish the so-called procedural requirements from 
the jurisdictional requirements. Any precondition stated in the investment treaty, 
reflecting the common intention of treaty parties, is condition to treaty parties’ 
consent to international arbitration. Just as the conditions of nationality for example 
must be fulfilled before an investor can have access to investment arbitration, the 
“procedural” preconditions shaping the State’s consent to arbitration must also be 
satisfied before a right to arbitration can arise. There is no reason to treat some of 
them as jurisdictional requirements while regarding others as issue of admissibility. 
Otherwise the conditions limiting the State’s consent to arbitration contained in the 
investment treaties would be meaningless since any condition could be disregarded by 
simply categorizing it as non-mandatory procedural requirements.  
It may be simple in theory to distinguish between admissibility and jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction is the adjudicatory power of the tribunal to hear the case; admissibility is 
whether it is appropriate for the tribunal to exercise the jurisdiction already 
established and to rule upon the specific claim.
 194
 A tribunal must be satisfied that it 
has jurisdiction before it examines question of admissibility. If there is no title of 
jurisdiction, then the tribunal cannot go further at all. However, it is difficult to draw a 
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clear borderline between jurisdiction and admissibility in practice. The vagueness of 
the notion admissibility causes its scope to be quite elusive. Nevertheless, the 
coverage of admissibility issues accepted in the practice of the International Court of 
Justice is limited, including the issues of exhaustion of local remedy and continuous 
nationality
195
, concurrent jurisdiction of different dispute settlement bodies, lack of 
sufficient substantiation, delay in bringing a claim, abuse of process, waiver, and so 
on. 
196
  
Preconditions of state consent to international adjudication have been dealt with as 
jurisdictional issues in several cases of the ICJ. In the case of Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo, for instance, the ICJ observed that the mere fact that rights 
and obligations erga omnes might be at issue in a dispute would not give the Court 
jurisdiction to entertain that dispute. In the view of the ICJ, 
[I]ts jurisdiction is based on the consent of the parties and is confined to the 
extent accepted by them. When that consent is expressed in a compromissory 
clause in an international agreement, any conditions to which such consent is 
subject must be regarded as constituting the limits thereon. The Court 
accordingly considers that the examination of such conditions relates to its 
jurisdiction and not to the admissibility of the application.
 197
 
Similarly, in the Case concerning Application of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the ICJ found that the terms of 
Article 22 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), namely “any dispute…which is not settled by negotiation or 
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by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention”, established 
preconditions to be fulfilled before the seisin of the court. According to the ICJ, the 
claimant failed to comply with the precondition of negotiation prior to submitting the 
case to the court and thus the Court’s jurisdiction could not be found.198  
Therefore, the preconditions to arbitration imposed by contracting states in 
investment treaties are mandatory in nature, non-fulfillment of which will negate the 
title of jurisdiction. Even if the preconditions to arbitration are classified as matters of 
admissibility, the tribunal is still bound to rule the claim inadmissible. The investor 
may then comply with the preconditions and present a new request for arbitration. 
Although the claim remains the same, the case or the proceedings are different since 
the title of jurisdiction relied on in the original proceedings may have expired or been 
withdrawn and the respondent state may also present new objections to jurisdiction.
 
199
 
3.5 Expansive application of most-favored-nation clauses 
The inclusion of most-favored-nation clauses (MFN clauses) in international 
investment treaties, following its use in the context of international trade, is meant to 
require the host state to accord to investors of another treaty party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords to investors of a third country. MFN clauses oblige the 
host state to ensure that investors from different countries can enjoy the same 
investment treatment in the same host state.  
The operation of MFN clauses in international investment law presupposes a 
comparability of two treaties: a basic treaty with an MFN clause between the host 
state and the national state of investors, and a third-party treaty between the host state 
and a third country. An investor covered by a basic BIT with an MFN clause can, 
therefore, invoke a more favorable treatment granted to third-party investors by a 
third-party BIT of the host State. The more favorable treatment granted by a 
third-party BIT can thus be directly imported into the basic BIT with an MFN clause. 
Consequently, the bilateral treaty commitments can be “multilateralized”200 or can be 
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turned to de facto multilateral commitments through the operation of MFN clauses.
 
201
 MFN clauses thus harmonize differences in the standard of investment protection 
offered by varying bilateral investment treaties.  
For a long time, MFN clauses have been “sleeping beauties” and have rarely been 
invoked by investors since substantive standards of investment protection offered by 
various investment treaties shows little difference. Recently, however, several 
tribunals started to expand the application of MFN clauses to procedural matters and 
thus to import broader investor-state arbitration provisions from third-party treaties by 
invoking MFN clauses contained in basic treaties. Assuming that MFN clauses can be 
used to expand access to investor-state arbitration, the restrictive investor-state 
arbitration provisions would turn out to be pointless since any investor may import a 
broader arbitration provision in a third-party treaty relying on the MFN clause. The 
proper interpretation of MFN clauses will essentially affect the functioning of such 
restrictive arbitration provisions. For most tribunals, the presumptive application of 
MFN clauses to the dispute settlement mechanism has been accepted as long as the 
basic treaty does not exclude such applicability.
 202
 MFN clauses have been utilized 
to overcome the restrictive investor-state arbitration provisions in two circumstances 
in arbitral practice, including overriding procedural preconditions to arbitration and 
broadening the coverage of investment disputes subject to arbitration.  
3.5.1 Avoiding preconditions to arbitration 
Most investment treaties impose procedural preconditions limiting the submission 
of investment disputes to arbitration while allowing for the submission to arbitration. 
Among others, preconditions to arbitration mainly include amicable settlement 
requirement, a certain waiting period, the exhaustion of local administrative or 
judicial remedy and “fork-in-the-road clauses”. MFN clauses have been utilized as 
tools to avoid these procedural obstacles to arbitration by tribunals. 
A first case was Maffezini v. Spain. The application of the MFN treatment to 
procedural matters was not even contemplated in the negotiation or implementation of 
investment treaties until the Argentinean claimant first presented this argument in 
2000. The basic treaty in this case was the Argentina-Spain BIT, Article 10 of which 
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stipulated that “the dispute may be submitted to international arbitration…if no 
decision has been rendered on the merits of the claim after the expiration of a period 
of eighteen months from the date on which the proceedings referred to in paragraph 2 
of this Article have been initiated, or if such decision has been rendered, but the 
dispute between the parties continues.” The claimant did not first submit his dispute 
with Spain to the competent Spanish courts as required by Article 10 of the 
Argentina-Spain BIT, but rather requested for ICSID arbitration directly. It was 
argued that the 18-month local litigation requirement could be overridden by invoking 
the MFN clause in the basic treaty, i.e., Article 4 of the Argentina-Spain BIT. The 
claimant contended that the Chile-Spain BIT, as a third-party treaty, did not impose 
the requirement of the 18-month local litigation prior to the submission to 
international arbitration, and thus that “Chilean investors in Spain are treated more 
favorably than Argentine investors in Spain”. Consequently, the claimant argued that 
the more favorable treatment in the Chile-Spain BIT, which gave direct access to 
international arbitration without the requirement of the 18-month local litigation, 
could be imported into the Argentina-Spain BIT relying on the MFN clause of the 
Argentina-Spain BIT.
 203
  
In addressing the claimant’s arguments, the tribunal first considered that the 
claimant failed to fulfill the requirement of local litigation prior to the submission of 
international arbitration as required by Article 10 of the Argentina-Spain BIT and thus 
the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
 204
 However, the tribunal supported 
the claimant’s alternative argument on the applicability of the MFN clause to matters 
with respect to dispute settlement and accordingly established its jurisdiction. The 
tribunal rejected Spain’s argument that the MFN clause applied to substantive matters 
or material aspects of the treatment granted to investors and not to procedural or 
jurisdictional questions. In the view of the tribunal, the MFN clause in the 
Argentina-Spain BIT, although not referring expressly to dispute settlement, contained 
the phrase “in all matters”, and thus could be presumed to include dispute settlement. 
Therefore, the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT should be applied to give the 
Argentine claimant the “more favorable treatment” of the Chile-Spain BIT’s easier 
access to international arbitration. Nevertheless, the tribunal, while affirming the 
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applicability of the MFN clause to dispute settlement, did not allow the MFN clause 
to “override public policy considerations that the contracting parties might have 
envisaged as fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in 
question”. An illustration of such “public policy considerations” was given without 
further explanation by the tribunal, including the exhaustion of local remedies, the 
so-called fork in the road requirement, agreement to a particular arbitration forum and 
agreement to a highly institutionalized system of arbitration.
205
 
Following the Maffezini v. Spain case, not a few tribunals have confirmed that 
MFN clauses could be used to override or modify conditions on access to 
international arbitration established in the basic treaty. In Siemens v. Argentina, the 
claimant attempted to use the MFN clause contained in the Germany-Argentina BIT 
to bypass a procedural requirement as required by Article 10 of the 
Germany-Argentina BIT that all disputes be submitted to local courts for 18 months 
before going to international arbitration. The tribunal considered that the term 
“treatment” and the phrase “activities related to the investments” in the MFN clause 
were sufficiently wide to include settlement of investment disputes. Therefore, the 
German claimant was entitled to import the better clause on the access to international 
arbitration in the Chile-Argentina BIT relying on the MFN clause contained in the 
Germany-Argentina BIT. In addition, the tribunal rejected the proposition that the 
claimant was obliged to import both the advantages and disadvantages of the 
third-party treaty as a whole and thus allowed the claimant to pick and choose just the 
benefits. Therefore, the tribunal used the MFN clause to import the benefit of direct 
access to international arbitration but not the fork in the road requirement in the 
third-party treaty. 
206
 
The tribunal in Gas Natural v. Argentina reiterated the above approach, holding that 
assurance of independent international arbitration was an important – perhaps the 
most important – element in investor protection and that MFN clauses should be 
understood to be applicable to dispute settlement unless the treaty parties clearly 
settled on a different method for resolution of disputes that may arise.
 207
 Therefore, 
the claimant could invoke the more favorable treatment of submitting the dispute to 
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international arbitration directly despite the basic treaty’s requirement of 18 months’ 
local litigation. The tribunal in Suez v. Argentina took a similar approach in stressing 
the importance of dispute settlement mechanism to investor protection. In the 
tribunal’s view, dispute settlement was as important as other matters governed by the 
BIT and was an integral part of the investment protection regime and that therefore 
the claimants might take advantage of the more favorable treatment provided to 
investors in the third-party treaty with respect to dispute settlement. 
208
 Similarly, the 
tribunal in National Grid v. Argentina also permitted a UK investor to avoid the 18 
months’ local litigation requirement under the basic treaty (the UK-Argentina BIT) on 
the basis of the MFN clause contained in the same treaty. The US-Argentina BIT was 
relied on, which did not contain the requirement that disputes be submitted to local 
courts for a period of 18 months prior to commencing arbitration. According to the 
Gas Natural Tribunal, “the MFN clause is an important element to ensure that foreign 
investors are treated on a basis of parity with other foreign investors and with national 
investors when they invest abroad.” It therefore concluded that “treatment” under the 
MFN clause of the UK-Argentina BIT made it possible for UK investors in Argentina 
to resort to arbitration without first resorting to Argentine courts, as was permitted 
under the US-Argentina BIT. 
209
 The avoidance of the 18 months’ local litigation 
requirement in the basic BIT by invoking the MFN clause in the same treaty was also 
permitted by the tribunals in Camuzzi v. Argentina
210
 and Telefonica v. Argentina.
 211
 
The expansive approach has been accepted as case law and further developed by 
later tribunals. In the case of Impregilo v. Argentina, the basic treaty was the 
Italy-Argentina BIT, Article 10 of which required the investor to submit the disputes 
to local courts for a period of 18 months prior to the submission to international 
arbitration. The claimant attempted to use the MFN clause in the same treaty to 
bypass this requirement by importing the ISAP of the US-Argentina BIT, which 
provided that the investor may either submit to domestic courts or to international 
arbitration. Following the case law, the tribunal was of the opinion that the MFN 
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clause was wide enough to cover the dispute settlement matters. Moreover, the 
tribunal considered that a choice between domestic proceedings and international 
arbitration, as in the Argentina-US BIT, was more favorable to the investor than 
compulsory domestic proceedings before access was opened to arbitration since “a 
system that gives a choice is more favorable to the investor than a system that gives no 
choice”.212  
Similarly, in the case of Hochtief v. Argentina, the majority of the tribunal also 
confirmed the applicability of the MFN clause to dispute settlement. The basic treaty 
in issue was the Argentina-Germany BIT requiring the investor to spend a period of 
18 months in the local courts before submission to international arbitration. After 
questioning the rationale of the 18-month local litigation requirement and treating 
such procedural requirement as matters of admissibility,
 213
 the tribunal further 
decided on the argument of the MFN clause. The claimant argued that the MFN 
clause in the Argentina-Germany BIT entitled it to benefit from the more liberal 
provisions on dispute settlement in the Argentina-Chile BIT, while the respondent 
considered that the MFN clause applied only to substantive rights. The tribunal felt 
satisfied that the MFN clause was “in principle applicable to the pursuit of dispute 
settlement procedures”. However, differing from the Siemens tribunal, the Hochtief 
tribunal considered that the MFN clause did not “permit the selective picking of 
components from each set of conditions, so as to manufacture a synthetic set of 
conditions to which no State’s nationals would be entitled.” Therefore, the claimant 
could import the lack of an 18-month litigation period in the Argentina-Chile BIT but 
also the fork in the road requirement in the same treaty. This whole packaging, 
however, did not affect the comparability of treatment since “it is always more 
favourable to have the choice as to which to employ than it is not to have that 
choice.”214 The tribunal in Teinver v. Argentina equally applied the MFN clause to 
allow the investor to take advantage of the more liberal investor-state arbitration 
provision available in a third-party treaty. 
215
 
The applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement, nevertheless, did not go 
unchallenged. The tribunal in Wintershall v. Argentina famously denied the 
                                                             
212 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award of 21 June 2011, paras. 90-109. 
213 See supra chapter 3.4. 
214 Hochtief AG v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 October 
2011, paras. 51-54, 66-100. 
215 Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 December 2012, paras. 159-186. 
Chapter 3: Approaches to Achieve the Creeping Jurisdiction in the Practice of Investor-State 
Arbitration 
79 
 
applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement. The basic treaty was the 
Germany-Argentina BIT including the 18-month local litigation requirement prior to 
the submission to international arbitration.
 216
 Contrary to the Siemens tribunal and 
the Hochtief tribunal, the Wintershall tribunal held that the MFN clause did not extend 
to the dispute settlement provisions and thus the German claimant was unable to take 
advantage of the less restrictive ISAP in the Argentina-Chile BIT. In the view of the 
Wintershall tribunal, the 18-month local court requirement was “part and parcel of 
Argentina’s integrated ‘‘offer’’ for ICSID arbitration”, and this ‘‘offer’’ must be 
accepted by the investor on the same terms. The tribunal further reasoned that 
international courts and tribunals could only exercise jurisdiction over a State with 
consent, and that a merely presumed consent was not sufficient to establish the 
jurisdiction because any restriction upon the independence of a State cannot be 
presumed by courts. The interpretation of the Siemens tribunal was severely criticized 
and was characterized as an interpretation that “tends to create meaning rather than to 
discover it.” Thus, the tribunal concluded that the MFN clause of a treaty did not 
apply to dispute settlement provisions, unless the MFN clause of the treaty otherwise 
clearly agreed. 
217
  
The strict approach was followed by the tribunals in cases of ICS v. Argentina and 
Daimler v. Argentina.
218
 In the case of ICS v. Argentina, the tribunal found that the 
MFN clause in the UK-Argentina BIT did not apply to dispute settlement matters and, 
therefore, did not enable investors to import less restrictive arbitration clauses from 
other Argentine BITs, which did not require a dispute be litigated in the local courts 
for 18 months before it could be submitted to international arbitration. In the view of 
the ICS tribunal, the duty of the tribunal was not to create but to discover meaning, 
and a State’s consent to arbitration shall not be presumed in the face of ambiguity. The 
term “treatment” in the MFN clause, in the absence of any contrary stipulation in the 
treaty itself, only encompassed substantive treatment in the territory of the host state. 
The settlement of disputes remained an entirely distinct issue, covered by a separate 
and specific treaty provision. The terms of the MFN clause should not be interpreted 
in a way that deprived the dispute settlement provision of any meaning without a clear 
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intention to achieve the result. Moreover, the dispute settlement provisions in two 
treaties must be compared as a whole, and not part-by-part, to determine whether the 
treatment accorded by the comparator treaty was indeed more favorable. The 
fork-in-the-road provision with one choice in the comparator treaty, however, could 
not be proved to be more favorable than the dispute settlement provision with two 
choices in the basic treaty.
 219
 The tribunal in Daimler v. Argentina reached a similar 
conclusion.
220
 
3.5.2 Broadening the coverage of matters subject to arbitration 
While it is true that more and more ISAPs in investment treaties contain an offer to 
arbitration for any investment dispute, it should not be overlooked that a number of 
earlier treaties concluded by developing countries, particularly China and the former 
USSR, still contain narrow ISAPs that restrict investors’ access to international 
arbitration only to those disputes over the amount of compensation for expropriation. 
It is highly controversial whether MFN clauses may be relied upon to broaden the 
coverage of disputes subject to arbitration under the basic treaty and therefore to 
establish a tribunal’s jurisdiction. A number of cases suggest, however, that MFN 
clauses could be invoked to broaden the coverage of matters subject to arbitration.  
In RosInvest v. Russia, the tribunal held that it could rely on an MFN clause to 
establish jurisdiction that would not exist otherwise. The basic treaty in this case was 
the UK-USSR BIT, Article 8 of which provided that “any legal disputes…either 
concerning the amount or payment of compensation…or concerning any other matter 
consequential upon an act of expropriation” can be referred to international arbitration. 
The tribunal concluded that not every aspect of expropriation fell under its jurisdiction 
and thus it had no jurisdiction as to the occurrence and validity of an expropriation on 
the basis of such provision.
 221
 However, the tribunal then determined that it had 
jurisdiction on the aspects not covered by Article 8 by application of the MFN clause 
in Article 3 of the UK-USSR BIT. The tribunal reasoned that  
[…] it is difficult to doubt that an expropriation interferes with the investor’s 
use and enjoyment of the investment, and that the submission to arbitration 
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forms a highly relevant part of the corresponding protection for the investor 
by granting him, in case of interference with his “use” and “enjoyment”, 
procedural options of obvious and great significance compared to the sole 
option of challenging such interference before the domestic courts of the host 
state. 
The tribunal thus found that the MFN clause should apply to procedural protection 
beyond substantive protection. The claimant was allowed to import the broad wording 
of Article 8 of the Denmark-Russia BIT providing that “any dispute…in connection 
with an investment” could be submitted to arbitration. In view of these considerations, 
the Tribunal concluded that, on the basis of the MFN Clause in the UK-USSR BIT 
taken together with Article 8 of the Denmark-Russia BIT, it had jurisdiction beyond 
that granted by Article 8 of the UK-USSR BIT and which extended to the issues 
whether Respondent’s actions have to be considered as expropriations and were valid. 
222
 
This approach was not shared by several tribunals. The tribunal in the case of 
Plama v. Bulgaria rejected the argument that its jurisdiction could be established by 
invoking an MFN clause. In this case, the claimant tried to avoid a narrow 
investor-state arbitration provision in the basic treaty, the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT, 
providing offer to arbitration only for disputes over the amount of compensation for 
expropriation. The claimant argued that the MFN clause of the basic treaty applied 
also to dispute settlement provisions and thus could be relied upon to import a less 
restrictive ISAP from the Finland-Bulgaria BIT. The tribunal, however, concluded that 
the MFN clause could not be interpreted as providing consent to arbitration. The 
tribunal held it was an established principle, both in domestic and international law, 
that an agreement of the parties to arbitrate should be “clear and unambiguous” and 
could not be presumed. The intention to apply an MFN clause to dispute settlement 
matters must be “clearly and unambiguously expressed”. The expression “with 
respect to all matters” as appearing in MFN clauses did not provide a clear and 
unambiguous consent to arbitration. Moreover, the tribunal found it difficult to apply 
an objective test to the issue of which dispute settlement provision was more 
favorable and the application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement would bring the 
risk of illegitimate treaty shopping.  
In the tribunal’s view, “when concluding an investment treaty with specific dispute 
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settlement provisions, states cannot be expected to leave those provisions to future 
(partial) replacement by different dispute settlement provisions through the operation 
of an MFN clause, unless the States have explicitly agreed thereto.” Therefore, the 
tribunal generally denied the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement 
provisions.
 223
 Similarly, the tribunals in cases of Telenor v. Hungary
224
, Bershader v. 
Russia
225
 and Salini v. Jordan
226
 held that MFN clause should not be construed as 
broadening the coverage of investment disputes subject to arbitration.  
3.5.3 Logic barriers to the expansive approach 
The expansive application of MFN clauses to dispute settlement issues has received 
both acceptance and skepticism. No matter how tribunals tried to justify the 
application of MFN clauses to avoid procedural preconditions to arbitration and to 
widen the coverage of investment disputes subject to arbitration, inherent logic 
barriers to such approaches remain.  
Firstly, emphasis on the investor protection purpose of MFN clauses carries a 
significant risk of overinterpretation. The “assumed” purpose of a MFN clause risks 
overriding the operation of the MFN clause itself.
 227
 The main reason the Maffezini 
tribunal affirmed the applicability of the MFN clause to dispute settlement matters 
was that dispute settlement arrangements were assumed to be an inextricable part to 
realize the purpose of protecting foreign investors. Therefore, denying the 
applicability of the MFN clause to dispute settlement matters would be contrary to the 
purpose of investor protection in the view of the Maffezini tribunal.  
Such a purpose-oriented approach would inevitably lead to a favorable 
interpretation for investment protection. Undeniably, broad and direct access to 
international arbitration is important and even may be more important than substantial 
treatment for the protection of covered investment and covered investors today. 
However, the fact that most investment treaties provide foreign investors with access 
to international arbitration does not necessarily represent an emerging customary right 
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of investors.
228
 There is no obligation to give investors direct access to international 
arbitration under customary international law. Whether an investor has direct access 
to international arbitration depends on the specific words of applicable investment 
treaty. Treaty parties are free to restrict or even deny the direct access of investors to 
international arbitration. The MFN clause cannot be interpreted as providing state 
consent for investors’ direct access to arbitration unless otherwise clearly expressed. 
Moreover, the phrase “encouragement and protection of investments” itself does 
not necessarily indicate that direct access to international arbitration is an inextricable 
part of investment protection. As a matter of fact, the promotion and protection of 
investments is not the only “purpose” of investment treaties, the importance of 
stimulating the flow of private capital and the economic development or prosperity of 
the host state is also mentioned in the preamble of most investment treaties. Therefore, 
investment treaties not only aim to protect investment, but also seek to promote the 
economic development or prosperity of the host state in the sense of teleology or 
treaty purpose. Overemphasis on any aspect would break the overall balance of rights 
and obligations in international investment between investors and the host countries.  
Secondly, the context of a MFN clause might be overlooked if the expansive 
approach is adopted. A treaty shall be interpreted “in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context” according to Article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. A MFN clause shall be 
interpreted by reference to its context in a specific treaty. The Maffezini tribunal, 
however, interpreted the term “in all matters” contained in the MFN clause in 
isolation from its context and simply presumed that “all matters” included dispute 
settlement matters. This isolated interpretation might not match up with the context of 
the MFN clause. The MFN treatment does not apply to matters with respect to the 
scope of treaty application provisions, including personal scope (ratione personae), 
material scope (ratione materiae), and temporal dimension (ratione personae) of the 
treaty application. Even scholars favoring the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute 
settlement issues admit that there are implied limitations to the operation of MFN 
clauses.
 229
  
For example, the definitions of investors and investment and temporal limitations 
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are exempt from MFN coverage by their nature. An MFN clause cannot be applied to 
expand the scope of covered investors or covered investment not contemplated in the 
basic treaty or to change the temporal application of the basic treaty.
 230
 Therefore, an 
investor will not be able to extend the meaning of “investor” or “investment” by 
invoking the MFN clause in the basic treaty, even if the third-party treaty has a wider 
definition of “investor” or “investment” than the basic treaty. Put differently, the MFN 
clause in principle cannot extend the scope of application of the basic treaty. The basic 
treaty’s scope of application provision prevents the operation of the MFN clause to 
extend the basic treaty’s application.  
Therefore, the term “all matters” in an MFN clause does not necessarily refer to 
“all provisions” of an investment treaty. The term “all matters” shall be interpreted in 
its context and be confined by its context. The argument that the isolated terms “all 
matters” or “activities in relation to an investment” themselves allow the applicability 
of MFN clauses to dispute settlement matters is unconvincing.  
Thirdly, assuming that MFN clauses apply to dispute settlement, difficult questions 
will arise with respect to what constitutes less favorable treatment or the most 
“favored” treatment. The application of MFN clauses involves a comparison between 
the treatment accorded to the foreign investor from one state and the investor of third 
states, i.e., the determination of “less favorable treatment”. The comparison between 
two alleged different treatments must be conducted on an objective basis. After 
holding that MFN clauses applies to dispute settlement issues, tribunals have to 
examine which dispute settlement provision is more favorable or less favorable either 
in law or in fact. If the treatment under the dispute settlement provision of the basic 
treaty cannot be compared in terms of favorability with the treatment under the 
dispute settlement provision of the third-party treaty, the MFN clause will simply not 
apply. Matters that cannot be compared are not more or less favorable and thus cannot 
be subject to MFN treatment. 
There exists, however, no objective standard to decide whichever is more or less 
favorable between the treatment in international arbitration and the treatment in 
domestic litigation. An international dispute settlement mechanism is not necessarily 
better or more favorable than a domestic dispute settlement mechanism in nature. 
However, tribunals that favored the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement 
mechanisms presumed, without further explanation, that submission to local courts 
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was in fact less favorable treatment than direct access to international investment 
arbitration. Investors’ subjective judgment that international arbitration would be 
better than local litigation was relied upon by tribunals to confirm the comparability 
of different dispute settlement mechanisms. It would place the meaning of the MFN 
clause at the hands of the investor and effectively turn the MFN clause into a 
self-judging clause in the investor’s favor. 231 Such an approach in itself reflects the 
tribunals’ implicit belief in the superiority of international arbitration.  
It is also impossible to compare different types or forums of investment arbitration. 
As pointed out by the Plama tribunal, it is very difficult to apply an objective test to 
determine that arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is more or less 
favorable than arbitration under the ICSID Arbitration Rules.
232
 The argument that 
the ability of an investor to be able to choose between international arbitration and 
domestic litigation is more favorable than not having that choice is unconvincing 
since different dispute settlement mechanisms are simply different in structure and in 
procedure. A contrary view may argue that a provision providing access to 
international arbitration after 18 months’ local litigation is more favorable than a 
fork-in-the-road provision requiring the investor to make a final choice between local 
litigation and international arbitration since the former provides double remedies 
while the latter entitles only one remedy.  
Fourthly, the Maffezini approach brings the dangers of disruptive treaty shopping. 
Tribunals supporting the applicability of MFN clause to dispute settlement matters are 
not consistent in how to import a presumed more favorable dispute settlement 
provision. Most of them permit partial importation of a third dispute settlement 
provision, still a few insist on entire importation of both advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, regarding a fork-in-the-road provision in the third-party 
treaty, the former tribunals only import the part of international arbitration while the 
latter tribunals import the whole provision requiring the investor to make a final 
choice between international arbitration and domestic litigation. The use of MFN 
clauses to selectively import the less restrictive parts of dispute settlement provisions 
from third-party treaties will, inevitably, lead to treaty shopping or cherry picking.
 233
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Allowing investors to put together various dispute settlement provisions from 
different third-party treaties may result in a treaty that no state concluded. States will 
have to be bound by dispute settlement provisions to which they have never actually 
consented.
 234
 Therefore, the partial importation approach opens the door to a 
potentially infinite variety of dispute resolution “permutations and combinations” that 
different investors might rely upon so as best to meet their individual circumstances.
 
235
 Subsequently, any procedural obstacle to international arbitration in the basic 
treaty can be avoided by way of partial importation from various third-party treaties. 
If that were true, the operation of MFN clauses would not bring harmonization of 
investment treatment but quite the opposite, a chaotic situation that the MFN 
treatment might be completely different depending on the strategy of “permutations 
and combinations”. For example, according to the partial importation approach, an 
investor under a basic treaty may import the international arbitration part from a 
third-party treaty without having to be bound by the fork-in-the-road requirement. 
Meanwhile, investors under the third-party treaty are still bound to make a final 
choice between international arbitration and domestic litigation. This causes a 
paradox: the third-party treaty is imported because it is presumed to be more 
favorable than the basic treaty, but the operation of MFN clauses makes the resulting 
treatment more favorable than the third-party treaty. 
3.6 Expansive application of “umbrella clauses” 
It is usual that most investment treaties incorporate the so-called “umbrella clauses”, 
providing that the host state will observe its commitments or obligations it have 
entered into with regard to foreign investors’ investment. The wording “umbrella”, 
also referred to as “mirror effect” or “elevator effect”, literally means placing 
investment contract between the host state and the foreign investor and other 
commitments under the protective umbrella of investment treaty. Article 7 of the 
Germany-Pakistan BIT, for instance, provides that either Party shall observe any other 
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments by nationals or 
companies of the other Party. The host state is bound to respect its contractual 
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commitments under the investment contract between the host state and the foreign 
investor. The effect of umbrella clauses has not been broadly discussed until recent 
investment tribunals held that umbrella clauses could elevate contract claims into 
treaty claims.  
3.6.1 Distinction between contract claims and treaty claims 
The procedural protection provided to investors under investment treaties lies in the 
investor-state arbitration provision. A covered investor is entitled to submit its 
investment disputes with the host state directly to international arbitration. However, 
the scope of investment disputes subject to international arbitration is restricted to 
disputes arising from a breach of the host state’s obligation under the investment 
treaty. In other words, investment disputes submitted to international arbitration must 
be treaty claims not contract claims beyond the scope of treaty obligations. A violation 
of an investment contract entered into by a State with a foreign investor is not, by 
itself, a violation of an investment treaty.  
In the case of Vivendi v. Argentina, the Annulment Committee examined the 
relationship between breach of contract and breach of treaty. The Committee stressed 
that “a state may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and vice versa, and this 
is certainly true of these provisions of the BIT.” 236 Whether there has been a breach 
of the BIT (a treaty claim) and whether there has been a breach of contract (a contract 
claim) are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined by reference to 
its own proper or applicable law - in the case of the BIT, by international law; in the 
case of the investment contract, by the proper law of the contract. Contract claims 
based on the contractual rights and obligations can only be submitted to the 
contractual forum according to the agreement under the dispute settlement provision 
of the contract. The investor may submit a treaty claim to the treaty forum, i.e., 
investment arbitration, if the alleged state measure constitutes a breach of the same 
treaty.  
3.6.2 Elevating contract claims to treaty claims 
Contract claims are not subject to investment arbitration in principle except that a 
breach of contract simultaneously leads to a breach of investment treaty. This 
principle, however, has been disregarded by recent tribunals because of the expansive 
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application of umbrella clauses. Most commentators are also of the view that umbrella 
clauses can elevate contractual obligations to treaty obligations and thus contract 
claims can be elevated to treaty claims by applying umbrella clauses.
 237
 Therefore, if 
umbrella clauses are interpreted aggressively as in recent arbitral practice, they could 
expand the jurisdiction of tribunals over contractual claims that would not otherwise 
fall under the jurisdictional reach of tribunals. 
It is controversial with respect to the question of whether an investment tribunal 
may rely on umbrella clauses to assert jurisdiction over claims for breach of contract. 
There are at least four types of reading to the concrete meaning and effect of umbrella 
clauses. They are: (1) umbrella clauses have no elevating effect unless the investment 
treaty specifically states otherwise; (2) umbrella clauses can elevate a State’s breach 
of contract to a breach of treaty; (3) umbrella clauses can elevate a State’s sovereign 
breach (but not commercial breach) of contract to a breach of treaty; and (4) umbrella 
clauses can elevate a State’s breach of contract to a breach of treaty, but contractual 
forum goes first.  
The tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan was one of the few tribunals to reject the elevating 
effect of umbrella clauses. The claimant argued that Article 11 of the Swiss-Pakistan 
BIT was an “elevator” or “mirror effect” clause elevating breaches of contract under 
municipal law immediately to the level of a breach of an international treaty. The 
tribunal, however, did not find the argument convincing. The tribunal held that 
umbrella clauses could not transform purely contract claims into BIT claims except 
that there was clear and convincing evidence that such was indeed the shared intent of 
the Contracting Parties to the Swiss-Pakistan BIT in incorporating the umbrella clause. 
The tribunal also found the consequences of accepting the elevating effect of umbrella 
clauses quite unattractive. In the words of the tribunal, the claimant’s view of 
umbrella clauses would “amount to incorporating by reference an unlimited number 
of State contracts” the violation of which “would be treated as a breach of the BIT”. 
Moreover, such interpretation would “supersede and render largely redundant the 
substantive obligations provided for in Articles 3 to 7”. There would be “no real need 
to demonstrate a violation of those substantive treaty standards if a simple breach of 
contract, or of municipal statute or regulation, by itself, would suffice to constitute a 
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treaty violation on the part of a Contracting Party and engage the international 
responsibility of the Party.”238 
Conversely, most tribunals held that umbrella clauses had the effect of making a 
contractual obligation a “treaty” obligation subject to investor-state arbitration under 
the investment treaty. A breach of contractual obligation would be elevated to a breach 
of treaty obligation because of the operation of umbrella clauses. And thus the tribunal 
could assert jurisdiction over a contract claim based on the umbrella clause. In Noble 
v. Romania, the tribunal held that the wording, the object and purpose of Article 
2(2)(c) of the US-Romania BIT, also referred to as an umbrella clause, supported the 
interpretation that it could transform contractual obligations into treaty obligations. 
Through the application of the umbrella clause, the breach of contract could thus be 
“internationalized”, i.e. assimilated to a breach of the treaty. The tribunal therefore 
could assert jurisdiction on the claimant’s claims of breach of contract “on the basis 
that any such breach constitutes a breach of the BIT”.239  
In SGS v. Paraguay, the applicable investment treaty was the Switzerland-Paraguay 
BIT, Article 11 of which provided that “either Contracting Party shall constantly 
guarantee observance of the commitments it has entered into with respect to the 
investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party.” The tribunal had no 
hesitation in concluding that a violation of a contractual commitment was covered by 
the umbrella clause and should be subject to the BIT’s dispute settlement provision, 
i.e., the investor-state arbitration. Thus the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction over 
the claimant’s contract claims under Article 11 that Paraguay failed to observe 
commitments it had made to the claimant.
 240
 The respondent state further defended 
that the tribunal should not hear contract claims of the claimant because the parties to 
the contract included a forum selection clause exclusively directing disputes under it 
to Paraguayan domestic courts. The tribunal rejected such defense. In the tribunal’s 
view, the existence of an exclusive contractual forum selection clause did not 
constitute an investor’s waiver of the treaty right to invoke investment arbitration and 
thus did not exclude the jurisdiction of the investment tribunal to review the investor’s 
contract claims. Otherwise, in the words of the tribunal, it would place the tribunal “at 
risk of failing to carry out its mandate under the Treaty and the ICSID Convention”. 
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241
 Tribunals in a number of other cases similarly adopt an expansive interpretation of 
umbrella clauses in ruling that tribunals could assert jurisdiction over contract claims 
by virtue of umbrella clauses.
242
 
As a compromise to the above two approaches, several tribunals introduced a 
distinction between the state as a commercial merchant and the state as a sovereign 
and imposed limitation on the effect of umbrella clauses based on that distinction. 
Accordingly, umbrella clauses will only apply if a state uses its sovereign authority to 
breach a contract with an investor. In other words, umbrella clauses can only elevate a 
State’s sovereign breach (but not commercial breach) of contract to a breach of treaty. 
In El Paso v. Argentina, the tribunal thought it necessary to distinguish the state as a 
merchant from the state as a sovereign. In the tribunal’s opinion, it was essentially 
from the state as a sovereign that the foreign investors had to be protected through the 
availability of international arbitration. The umbrella clause in the US-Argentina BIT 
would not extend the treaty protection to breaches of ordinary commercial contract 
entered into by the host state, but would cover contractual commitments agreed by the 
host state as a sovereign. Therefore, “an umbrella clause cannot transform any 
contract claim into a treaty claim, as this would necessarily imply that any 
commitments of the State in respect to investments, even the most minor ones, would 
be transformed into treaty claims.” Moreover, these far-reaching consequences of a 
broad interpretation of the so-called umbrella clauses were “quite destructive of the 
distinction between national legal orders and the international legal order.” The 
tribunal thus concluded that the umbrella clause did not extend to any contract claims 
when such claims did not rely on a violation of the standards of protection of the BIT, 
such as national treatment, MFN treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full 
protection and security, protection against expropriation. However, if the State 
interferes with contractual rights by a unilateral act, the tribunal would have 
jurisdiction over all the claims of the foreign investor, including the claims arising 
from a violation of its contractual rights.
243
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The tribunals in Pan American v. Argentina
244
 and BP v. Argentina
245
 both took 
the same approach.
 246
 It was also confirmed by several scholars in limiting the 
elevating effect of umbrella clauses to a State’s sovereign breach of contract. 247 The 
logical problem inherent in this approach, however, is that it is simple to distinguish a 
sovereign breach from a commercial breach in theory, but quite difficult in practice 
since an objective standard to distinguish does not exist. It would solely depend on a 
tribunal’s discretion to determine whether a State’s breach is sovereign or not in 
nature. Even if a specific standard is applied, it would hardly find support in the treaty 
text.  
In a series of other cases, tribunals found that umbrella clauses had the effect of 
elevating contract claims into treaty claims, but treaty forum could not override 
contractual forum. Umbrella clauses would provide residual protection if the 
contractual dispute settlement forum proved to be inadequate. SGS v. Philippines was 
the first case to adopt such an approach. The tribunal criticized the SGS v. Pakistan 
decision for unconvincing reasons given and for failing to provide any clear meaning 
to the umbrella clause. Therefore, Article X(2) of the Switzerland-Philippines BIT, 
referred to as the umbrella clause, could transform a breach of contract into a breach 
of the BIT itself and thus could confer jurisdiction on an international tribunal 
regarding a claim of contract breach. Nevertheless, the tribunal believed that an 
umbrella clause could not “convert questions of contract law into questions of treaty 
law.” The umbrella clause “addresses not the scope of the commitments entered into 
with regard to specific investments but the performance of these obligations, once 
they are ascertained.” The issue of the extent or content of contractual obligations (in 
the present case, how much money the Philippines was obliged to pay) was still 
governed by the contract, not by the BIT. 
248
 
Even though the tribunal found jurisdiction over S S’s contractual claims, the 
tribunal ultimately declined to exercise such jurisdiction. In the tribunal’s view, the 
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contract in issue contained an exclusive forum selection clause designating Philippine 
courts as the exclusive forum and such exclusive forum choice could not be 
overridden by the Switzerland-Philippines BIT. The tribunal supported the 
respondent’s allegation that “the general provisions of BITs should not, unless clearly 
expressed to do so, override specific and exclusive dispute settlement arrangements 
made in the investment contract itself.” The tribunal felt compulsory to give effect to 
the exclusive forum selection clause in the contract even though the umbrella clause 
also conferred jurisdiction on the tribunal. The tribunal summarized that it “should not 
exercise its jurisdiction over a contractual claim when the parties have already agreed 
on how such a claim is to be resolved, and have done so exclusively.” This led the 
tribunal to stay arbitration proceedings pending determination of the amount payable 
by the Philippines to SGS in accordance with the Philippine court proceedings as 
required by the contract’s exclusive forum selection clause. 249 For the same reason, 
while concluding that the umbrella clause gave the tribunal jurisdiction over contract 
claims, the tribunal in BIVAC v. Paraguay at the same time refused to exercise its 
jurisdiction since the parties had clearly agreed on an exclusive domestic forum for 
the settlement of contractual disputes that might fall within the terms of the umbrella 
clause.
 250
  
So far, the second of the four approaches to the practice of umbrella clauses is the 
most dominant in both practice and theory. 
251
 Therefore, there is a visible trend in 
arbitral practice that tribunals tend to establish jurisdiction over contract claims based 
on expansive application of umbrella clauses. Umbrella clauses are and will be a 
major tool of tribunals to elevate contract claims to treaty claims unless treaty parties 
otherwise clearly specify.  
3.6.3 Interplay between expansive application of “umbrella clauses” and other 
expansive approaches 
Tribunals cannot rely merely on umbrella clauses to establish jurisdiction over 
contract claims. The alleged elevating effect of umbrella clauses is closely correlated 
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to the notion of “investment” and the scope of “investment disputes”. The expansive 
application of umbrella clauses is usually based on the premise of broad interpretation 
of “investment” and “investment disputes”. Even if there is no umbrella clause in the 
applicable investment treaty, tribunals may still “borrow” an umbrella clause from a 
third-party treaty by invoking the MFN clause.  
Firstly, to achieve the elevating effect of umbrella clauses, commercial contracts 
must be, in the first place, treated as covered investment under the applicable 
investment treaty. According to most tribunals, umbrella clauses can transform a 
contract claim originally governed by domestic courts into a treaty claim under the 
jurisdiction of investment tribunals. If the contract itself cannot be regarded as 
covered investment under the investment treaty, then the alleged elevating effect of 
umbrella clauses would simply not function. Most tribunals, as we can imagine, 
indeed treat commercial contracts as covered investment under investment treaties.
 252
 
Tribunals supporting the elevating effect of umbrella clauses did find commercial 
contracts as covered investment with no hesitation. 
Secondly, a broadly drafted investor-state arbitration provision would complement 
the umbrella clause. The ultimate purpose in giving the elevating effect to umbrella 
clauses is to confer jurisdiction on investment tribunals over contract claims. 
Therefore, even if contractual obligations are elevated into treaty obligations under 
the investment treaty, the investor still cannot submit contract claims to an investment 
tribunal if the investment treaty, without incorporating the investor-state arbitration 
provision, does not permit the submission of any claim of investors to international 
arbitration. It is because the undertaking of international responsibility and consent to 
international dispute settlement are two different things. A State’s breach of 
investment treaty (by way of elevating a breach of contract into a breach of treaty) 
itself does not oblige the State to consent to the jurisdiction of an international dispute 
settlement body. Thus, umbrella clauses can confer jurisdiction on investment 
tribunals only if there exists an investor-state arbitration provision capable of 
expansive interpretation. How a tribunal construes the scope of covered investment 
disputes in the investor-state arbitration provision is critical to the functioning of 
umbrella clauses. In arbitral practice, most tribunals would treat contract claims as 
covered investment disputes and thus find jurisdiction over such contract claims. The 
SGS v. Philippines tribunal, for instance, held that the investor-state arbitration 
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provision of the Switzerland-Philippines BIT allowed for submission of all investment 
disputes (naturally including contractual disputes) by the investor to international 
arbitration and thus did not preclude the tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over 
contract claims.
 253
  
Thirdly, the interplay between umbrella clauses and MFN clauses will open the 
floodgates to an uncontrollable number of contract claims being submitted to 
investment tribunals. Not every investment treaty contains an umbrella clause. Under 
a treaty without an umbrella clause, tribunals normally would not elevate contract 
claims into treaty claims. The problem is whether the MFN treatment applies to the 
umbrella clause. If a basic treaty contains no umbrella clause, can an investor 
“borrow” or import an umbrella clause from a third-party treaty based on a MFN 
clause in the basic treaty? If yes, then tribunals can turn contract claims to treaty 
claims and thus establish jurisdiction over such contract claims by invoking the 
umbrella clause imported from a third-party treaty.  
In EDF v. Argentina, the tribunal for the first time permitted the incorporation of 
umbrella clauses of third-party treaties by virtue of the MFN clause. The basic treaty 
in this case was the France-Argentina BIT containing no umbrella clause. Thus, the 
tribunal would have had to reject the request to hear the claimant’s contract claims for 
the lack of jurisdiction due to the non-existence of an umbrella clause. However, the 
tribunal found another way to establish jurisdiction over contract claims by 
concluding that the MFN Clause in Article 4 of the Argentina-France BIT permitted 
the claimant to incorporate the umbrella clauses from the Argentina-Luxembourg BIT 
or the Argentina-Germany BIT.
 254
 Similarly, the tribunal in Arif v. Moldova did not 
find an umbrella clause in the basic treaty, namely the France-Moldova BIT. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal agreed with the claimant that the MFN clause of the 
France-Moldova BIT could import an umbrella clause, from either the UK-Moldova 
BIT or the US-Moldova BIT. The tribunal therefore found jurisdiction over the 
claimant’s contract claims via the MFN clause of the basic treaty. 255 As can be seen 
from the above cases, the MFN incorporation of umbrella clauses from third-party 
treaties, if permitted and generalized by tribunals, would bring the danger of 
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unprecedented expansion of jurisdiction over contract claims going beyond the reach 
of the treaty language.  
3.7 Restrictive application of “fork-in-the-road clauses”  
As regards to the relationship between international arbitration and domestic 
litigation, there is no uniform practice among various investment treaties. Investment 
treaties requiring exhaustion of local remedies before access to international 
arbitration are extremely rare today. Many investment treaties merely require that 
investors first resort to local remedies of the host state for a certain period of time, 
often 12 or 18 months, before the submission of claims to international arbitration. An 
investor is free to submit claims to international arbitration once the time has elapsed.  
Contrary to both the requirement to exhaust local remedies and the requirement of a 
certain period of local litigation, other investment treaties incorporate the so-called 
“fork-in-the-road clauses” requiring the investor to make a final and irreversible 
choice between international arbitration and local litigation.
 256
 A typical example of 
a “fork-in-the-road clause” is contained in Article  (7) of the China-Colombia BIT: 
“Once the investor has submitted the dispute to the competent domestic court of the 
Contracting party concerned or to the ICSID or any of the arbitration mechanisms 
stated above, the choice of one of the two procedures shall be final”. According to 
such a clause, the investor would have to make a choice between submitting the 
investment dispute to local courts and international tribunals. Once made, the choice 
is final and irreversible. Therefore, a literal reading of “fork-in-the-road clauses” 
would suggest that once the investor chooses to submit the disputes to local courts, it 
will lose the option to resort to international arbitration, and vice versa.  
Nevertheless, in arbitral practice, tribunals have set certain additional conditions for 
the application of “fork-in-the-road clauses”. Numerous tribunals have put forward 
and further refined three conditions for the application of fork-in-the-road clauses. 
Fork-in-the-road clauses will only apply if the same dispute between the same parties 
has been submitted to the local courts of the host state before the submission of 
disputes to international arbitration according to most tribunals. In other words, the 
triggering of fork-in-the-road clauses requires the following three conditions to be 
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present. Firstly, the parties in the local court proceedings must be identical to the 
parties in the international arbitration proceedings. The claimant and the respondent in 
the domestic proceedings must be the same with the claimant and the respondent in 
the international proceedings. Secondly, the dispute before domestic courts must be 
identical to the dispute before international tribunals. In deciding whether the disputes 
before domestic courts and international tribunals are identical or not, tribunals 
heavily rely on the labeling of the claimants. Usually, the dispute before domestic 
courts would be labeled as contract claims or domestic law claims concerning a 
breach of contract or domestic laws, while the dispute before international tribunals 
would be labeled as treaty claims concerning a breach of investment treaty. Thirdly, 
the dispute must have been submitted to domestic courts before the submission to 
international arbitration. These three conditions are cumulative. As long as one of 
them does not satisfy, the fork-in-the-road clause will not be triggered and the investor 
will not be deprived of right to submit disputes to international arbitration.  
The three conditions attached to fork-in-the-road clauses have actually prevented 
respondent states before international tribunals from using fork-in-the-road clauses as 
a basis to raise objections to arbitral jurisdiction. In Genin v. Estonia, the tribunal was 
faced with the question whether the claimant was precluded from access to 
international arbitration by the operation of the fork-in-the-road clause in the 
Estonia-United States BIT. The claimant Genin was an American investor. It held a 
majority share in EIB, a financial bank incorporated under the laws of Estonia. The 
claim arose from the purchase by EIB of another bank and from the revocation of 
EIB’s license by the Estonian authorities. EIB filed lawsuits before the Estonian 
courts. And Genin, the major shareholder of EIB, subsequently instituted an 
international arbitration proceeding against Estonia. Estonia argued that “by choosing 
to litigate their disputes with Estonia in the Estonian courts…Claimants have 
exhausted their right to choose another forum to relitigate those same disputes.” The 
tribunal, however, was of the view that the identity of the parties and of the disputes 
was not met and thus the domestic litigation instituted in Estonia should not be an 
obstacle to international arbitration. The tribunal reasoned that lawsuits undertaken by 
EIB in Estonia were “not identical to Claimants’ cause of action in the “investment 
dispute” that they seek to arbitrate in the present proceedings.” The effort by EIB 
before the Estonian courts “was in effect undertaken on behalf of all the Bank’s 
shareholders (including minority shareholders), as well as on behalf of its depositors, 
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borrowers and employees”, while the “investment dispute” submitted to ICSID 
arbitration, on the other hand, related to “the losses allegedly suffered by the 
Claimants alone, arising from what they claim were breaches of the BIT.” The 
tribunal thus concluded that “although certain aspects of the facts that gave rise to this 
dispute were also at issue in the Estonian litigation, the “investment dispute” itself 
was not, and the Claimants should not therefore be barred from using the ICSID 
arbitration mechanism.” 257 The tribunal in Lauder v. Czech echoed that conclusion in 
holding that the Czech court proceedings and the present arbitration proceedings 
involved “different parties”, and dealt with “different disputes”. Therefore, the Lauder 
tribunal rejected the respondent’s contention that the fork-in-the-road clause contained 
in the Czech-United States BIT would preclude the tribunal from having 
jurisdiction.
258
 Several other tribunals also took this stance.
 259
 
Even if the parties to the domestic proceedings and to the international arbitration 
proceedings are identical, tribunals would still refuse the application of 
fork-in-the-road clauses unless the causes of action in two different proceedings are 
identical. In Middle East Cement v. Egypt, for instance, the claimant’s ship had been 
seized and auctioned by the Egyptian government. The claimant first filed lawsuits 
before the Egyptian court challenging the legality of the auction. And subsequently 
the claimant submitted its claims to international arbitration based on the 
Egypt-Greece BIT. Egypt argued that the claimant had chosen the domestic remedy 
and thus had been prevented from submission to international arbitration under the 
fork-in-the-road clause in the Egypt-Greece BIT. The tribunal rejected this argument 
in holding that the claims before the Egyptian court and the tribunal were different. 
The tribunal reasoned that: 
Art. 10.2 of the BIT provides that the investor may submit the investment 
dispute “either to the competent court of the Contracting Party, or to an 
international arbitration tribunal.” However, this refers to “such disputes” as 
are specified in paragraph 1 of Art. 1 , i.e., disputes “between an investor of 
a Contracting Party and the Other Contracting Party concerning an obligation 
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of the latter under this Agreement.” The case brought by the Claimant before 
the Egyptian Courts regarding the alleged nullity of the auction, was not and 
could not be “concerning” Egypt’s obligations under the BIT, but could only 
be concerning the validity of the auction under national Egyptian law. 
Therefore, Art. 10.2 of the BIT does not exclude the admissibility of 
Claimant’s objections to the auction of the ship.260 
In its decision of CMS v. Argentina case, the tribunal similarly distinguished treaty 
claims with contract claims held that even if there had been or there currently was a 
recourse to the local courts for breach of contract, this would not have prevented 
submission of the treaty claims to arbitration.
261
  
The above jurisprudence indicates the high threshold that tribunals have set for the 
triggering of the fork-in-the-road clause. Tribunals have tended to differentiate 
between those claims based on the investment treaties (treaty claims) and those 
having their origin in contracts (contract claims). Even if the underlying facts, 
including the underlying host state measures and the alleged damage of the investor, 
are the same, tribunals would still consider that treaty claims and contract claims 
relate to different “disputes”. Treaty claims before international tribunals and contract 
claims before domestic courts have been seen as different causes of action or different 
disputes in that they have different legal ground. In domestic proceedings, no matter 
civil or administrative proceedings, the legal ground cannot be anything but domestic 
laws. But in investment arbitration proceedings, the investment treaty between the 
host state and the home state of the investor must be invoked as the jurisdictional 
basis. From this formalized perspective, claims before domestic courts and claims 
before investment tribunals could never be identical. Therefore, after the submission 
of contract claims to domestic courts, the investor may still submit such contract 
claims “dressed as” treaty claims to international arbitration. This prevailing 
interpretation, as can be imagined, would likely cause fork-in-the-road clauses to be 
applicable in no circumstance since any claim submitted by investors to the local 
courts could be categorized as domestic law claims while the same claim submitted to 
the international tribunals could be labeled as treaty claims. Fork-in-the-road clauses 
would not be an effective tool for host states to prevent investors’ forum-shopping or 
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running multiple proceedings. 
Since tribunals have interpreted the fork-in-the-road clause restrictively, namely, 
the fork-in-the-road clause will be triggered only if the dispute and the parties in 
domestic proceedings and investment arbitration proceedings are identical. It would 
be possible for investors to circumvent the application of fork-in-the-road clauses 
through the following strategies separately or cumulatively. Firstly, the investor itself 
may initiate investment arbitration proceedings, while the investment (i.e. the local 
subsidiary company of the investor) files a domestic lawsuit to protect its contract or 
other domestic legal rights, including those stemming from the investment treaty. The 
commencing of domestic proceedings by the local subsidiary company of the investor 
thereby defeats the identity-of-the-parties requirement and thus does not trigger the 
fork-in-the-road clause. A variation of this strategy is that the domestic claim will be 
submitted against a sub-national government unit or other State entity, rather than the 
State itself.
 262
 Secondly, the investor may dress its domestic law claims in domestic 
proceedings as treaty claims in investment arbitration proceedings. The cause of 
action in domestic proceedings will be a breach of contract or domestic law, while the 
cause of action in investment arbitration proceedings will be a breach of investment 
treaty obligations. The dressing of domestic law claims (usually contract claims) as 
treaty claims arising out of the same facts by investors to avoid the limitation of 
fork-in-the-road clause has frequently arisen before investment tribunals. An 
investment tribunal will unhesitatingly find jurisdiction if the cause of action in the 
arbitration proceedings is not the same as those in domestic proceedings. Thirdly, the 
investor may alter the sequence of domestic lawsuits and investment arbitration 
proceedings. One can easily imagine situations in which the investor may submit a 
claim to domestic courts after the submission to investment arbitration. In this way, 
the investor’s choice of investment arbitration will not be affected, while the 
possibility of local remedy remains.  
According to the tribunals’ restrictive interpretation of fork-in-the-road clauses, a 
state’s attempt to trigger the fork-in-the-road clause can hardly be successful since the 
identity of parties and the disputes requires a high threshold to satisfy.
 
Running 
beneath the restrictive interpretation of fork-in-the-road clauses is the tribunals’ 
logical basis that international proceedings in principle have primacy over purely 
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domestic proceedings.
 263
 It is even argued that to see any utilization of domestic 
courts as a choice under the fork-in-the-road clause would “put the investor in an 
intolerable position” since “the investor would have to sit still and endure any form of 
injustice passively on pain of losing its access to international arbitration”. 264 If so, 
fork-in-the-road clauses would, losing its meaning and effect, never prevent investors 
from submitting to investment arbitration after its submission to domestic courts.  
3.8 Flexible interpretation of the temporal scope of investment treaties 
The jurisdiction of an investment tribunal only extends to covered investment and 
covered investment disputes within the time limits laid down by the applicable 
investment treaty. Most investment treaties limit their coverage to disputes arising 
after their entry into force. Article 10(2) of the China-Argentina BIT, for instance, 
provides that the BIT shall not apply to any dispute, claim or difference which arose 
before its entry into force. Even if an investment treaty does not contain a similar 
provision, such treaty will not bind treaty parties in relation to any act or fact which 
took place before the date of the entry into force of the treaty according to Article 28 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Therefore, an investor generally 
cannot submit disputes which arose before the treaty’s entry into force to investment 
arbitration even if those disputes involve an internationally wrongful act of a host 
state under customary international law. However, in arbitral practice, investment 
tribunals tend to interpret the temporal scope of investment treaties in a flexible way 
to establish their jurisdiction more easily. 
Firstly, tribunals tend to distinguish the dispute from the events leading to the 
dispute. Even though the events leading to the dispute could arise before the entry into 
force of the treaty, the dispute itself could be construed as arising after the treaty’s 
entry into force.
 265
 In Maffezini v. Spain, the respondent state objected to the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction contending that the dispute took place before the entry into 
force of the Argentina-Spain BIT. The claimant relied on facts and events that 
occurred before the BIT’s entry into force, but argued that a “dispute” arises only 
when it is formally presented as such. In rejecting the respondent’s contention, the 
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tribunal distinguished the dispute itself from prior events leading to the dispute. The 
tribunal accordingly found that the events on which the parties disagreed began before 
the BIT’s entry into force, but this did not mean that a legal dispute could be said to 
have existed at the time. The tribunal was satisfied that in this case the dispute in its 
technical and legal sense began to take shape after the Argentina-Spain BIT’s entry 
into force and thus established its jurisdiction over the dispute deemed to take place 
after the BIT’s entry into force. 266 
Similarly, the Helnan v. Egypt case concerned a provision in the Denmark-Egypt 
BIT which excluded its applicability to divergences or disputes that had arisen prior to 
its entry into force. The tribunal separated divergences from disputes since the two 
terms did not imply the same degree of animosity. A divergence could crystallize as a 
dispute as soon as one of the parties decides to have it solved, whether or not by a 
third party. On that basis, the tribunal found that, even though a divergence had 
existed before the BIT’s entry into force, that divergence was of a different nature 
from the dispute that had arisen after the BIT’s entry into force, and for this reason the 
tribunal had jurisdiction over the dispute.
 267
 
Secondly, tribunals tend to separate disputes arising before the treaty’s entry into 
force from disputes arising after the treaty’s entry into force. While admitting that a 
dispute may have occurred before the treaty’s entry into force, tribunals find that a 
new dispute arises when the treaty comes into force since the new dispute involves 
claims based on violations of the treaty obligations. It follows that tribunals utilize the 
same logical approach in distinguishing treaty disputes and domestic law disputes 
while dealing with both temporal scope provisions and fork-in-the-road clauses in 
investment treaties. In Jan de Nul v. Egypt, for instance, the claimant submitted its 
dispute with the host state to the local courts and was unsuccessful in its claim. After 
the BIT between the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and Egypt came into force, 
the claimant resubmitted its dispute to investment arbitration. In supporting the 
claimant’s argument, the tribunal held that the dispute submitted to the Egyptian court 
was a domestic law dispute relating to breaches of contract and Egyptian law, while 
the dispute submitted to the present tribunal was a treaty dispute involving breaches 
of the BIT. In particular, when the Egyptian court rendered its decision denying the 
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claimant’s claims, the original dispute had “crystallized into a new dispute”. It 
followed that the tribunal found jurisdiction over the “new dispute”. 268 
Thirdly, in some cases tribunals have applied the concept of a continuing breach to 
find their jurisdiction ratione temporis. Contrary with the above two approaches, this 
approach treats disputes that occurred before the treaty’s entry into force as continuing 
disputes, meaning that disputes may have taken place prior to the treaty’s entry into 
force but they persisted thereafter. Therefore, disputes arose before the treaty’s entry 
into force but continued to exist until the coming into effect of the treaty, would be 
considered to be covered by the temporal scope provision of investment treaty and 
thus would suffice to give the tribunal jurisdiction ratione temporis. The conduct or 
measure occurring before the entry into force of the treaty may be considered a 
constituting part of a treaty breach and thus is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. 
The persistent failure to pay debts due under a contract, for instance, was 
considered a typical continuing breach. In SGS v. Philippines, the tribunal applied the 
theory of continuing breach and considered it unnecessary to examine whether Article 
VIII of the Switzerland-Philippines BIT applied to disputes concerning breaches of 
investment contracts which had occurred before its entry into force. The tribunal 
found its jurisdiction ratione temporis on the basis that “at least it is clear that it 
applies to breaches which are continuing at that date, and the failure to pay sums due 
under a contract is an example of a continuing breach.” 269 Tribunals in Feldman v. 
Mexico and Mondev v. USA equally confirmed the continuing nature of disputes and 
accordingly established jurisdiction.
 270
  
3.9 Relaxing the burden of proof for investors 
In an international dispute settlement process, the claimant bears the burden of 
proof showing prima facie evidence of jurisdictional basis at the stage of determining 
jurisdiction. Judge Higgins in her Separate Opinion in the Oil Platforms case 
compellingly put forward the prima facie test. It requires that the claimant show the 
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facts it alleged could be capable of sustaining a violation of the respondent’s 
obligations under international law.
 271
  
The prima facie test, as a widely accepted principle, is not in dispute in investment 
arbitration. 
272
 The investor as the claimant carries the prima facie burden of proving 
its factual and legal claims, including showing proof of a “covered investment”, a 
“covered investor” and a “covered investment dispute”. Merely “labeling” its claims 
without any proof will not satisfy the burden to prove jurisdiction. If the investor fails 
to meet the prima facie standard of proof, the tribunal will have to deny its 
jurisdiction. In Telenor v. Hungary, the tribunal found that the claimant had failed to 
make out a prima facie case of expropriation and thus concluded that it had no 
jurisdiction over claims for expropriation.
 273
 The tribunal in Mihaly v. Sri Lanka 
similarly found that the claimant had failed to furnish any evidence to the effect that 
pre-investment and development expenditures in the circumstances of the present case 
could automatically be admitted as “investment”.274 
Despite a consistent quotation of the prima facie standard, there has been 
significant departure from this standard in arbitral practice. Investment tribunals tend 
to lighten or even relieve the claimant’s burden of proof regarding jurisdiction in the 
following ways: (1) by refraining from questioning the claimant’s unilateral assertions 
of facts and legal foundations; (2) by placing burden on respondent states, as the 
objecting party, to prove that jurisdiction does not exist; or (3) by holding that neither 
party carry the burden of proof regarding jurisdiction.  
Firstly, tribunals tend to rest entirely on the claimant’s unilateral assertions of facts 
and legal foundations without scrutinizing whether there is obvious falsehood in facts 
or error in the characterization of the claim for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction. 
When faced with the claimant’s assertions of facts and legal issues, tribunals usually 
do not review their authenticity or accuracy and accept the claimant’s characterization 
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of the claim as the treaty claim. The claimant’s version of the facts and legal 
foundations is relied upon to establish the tribunal’s jurisdiction without further 
examination of any type. The prima facie standard will thus be reduced to a mere 
labeling or quoting of the claimant. Naturally, this will lead to presumption in favor of 
jurisdiction which is in breach of the jurisdictional neutrality principle. 
In the case of Salini v. Jordan, the claimants did not explain how the alleged facts 
could constitute not only a breach of the contract, but also a breach of the Italy-Jordan 
BIT in its written submissions. They presented no argument, and no evidence 
whatsoever, to sustain their treaty claim and did not show that the alleged facts were 
capable of falling within the provisions of the Italy-Jordan BIT. While observing that 
“the file submitted by the Claimants is lacking, in terms of both the facts and the law”, 
the tribunal nevertheless did not believe that “it must rule out from the outset that the 
alleged facts, if established, may constitute breaches of Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the 
BIT.” Thus, the tribunal found jurisdiction over the claimants’ claims.275 In Abaclat v. 
Argentina, more than 180,000 bondholders of Argentine sovereign bonds, both natural 
persons and juridical persons, collectively submitted claims to investment arbitration 
claiming compensatory damages due to Argentina’s alleged breach of its obligations 
under the Italy-Argentina BIT. The tribunal admitted that in order to establish the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personae, each claimant had to fulfill the conditions of 
covered investors under the Italy-Argentina BIT. The tribunal however felt 
unnecessary to make a determination with respect to any individual claimant. 
276
  
Secondly, some tribunals have required respondent states, as the objecting party, to 
prove the lack of jurisdiction. As the proverb goes, he who asserts must prove. The 
burden of proving the tribunal’s jurisdiction is generally on the claimant. The claimant 
must satisfy all the prescribed jurisdictional requirements. However, in several cases, 
the burden of proof regarding jurisdiction has been shifted from the claimants to the 
respondents. The respondent states had to prove that the jurisdiction did not exist.  
On the legality of investment, the respondent states were required to prove the 
inconformity of an alleged investment with the laws of the host state. Otherwise the 
alleged investment would be presumed to be in accordance with the laws of host state. 
For example, in Desert Line Projects v. Yemen, the tribunal considered that “the 
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Respondent has not come close to satisfying the Arbitral Tribunal that the Claimant 
made an investment which was either inconsistent with Yemeni laws or regulations or 
failed to achieve acceptance by the Respondent.”277 Likewise, some tribunals ruled 
that the respondent had the burden of showing that the claimant was not a “covered 
investor” within the meaning of the investment treaty. The tribunal in Rompetrol v. 
Romania held that the respondent bore the burden of proving that the claimant was 
not a covered investor and that the dispute was not covered investment dispute.
 278
   
On the application of denial of benefits clauses, the respondent states were imposed 
the burden to prove that the claimant could be denied treaty benefits according to the 
denial of benefits clause. In the case of Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, the tribunal 
found that Ukraine failed to provide sufficient evidence with regard to “third country 
control” over the claimant and thus had no right to deny treaty benefits to the claimant 
relying on the denial of benefits clause in the United States-Ukraine BIT.
 279
 The 
imposing of burden of proof on the host state to trigger the denial of benefits clause 
was further confirmed by other tribunals.
 280
 
When fork-in-the-road clauses were invoked, the respondent states also bore the 
evidentiary burden of proving the identity of parties and of causes of action in 
domestic proceedings and in international arbitration proceedings. Otherwise the 
fork-in-the-road clause would not be triggered and the claimant thus would not be 
precluded from submitting disputes to international arbitration after its submission to 
domestic courts. In several cases, tribunals decided that the respondents had failed to 
discharge their burden of proof for the triggering of fork-in-the-road clauses and thus 
found jurisdiction over the claimants’ claims.  
Thirdly, contrary with the above two approaches, there were several tribunals 
requiring neither the claimants nor the respondents to prove the existence of the 
tribunals’ jurisdiction. Tribunals chose to determine the jurisdiction for themselves. In 
Grand River v. USA, the parties were in dispute as to who bore the burden of proof on 
disputed facts bearing on the existence of jurisdiction. The claimants argued that, as 
the moving party opposing jurisdiction, the Respondent bore the burden of proof to 
prove the lack of jurisdiction. Conversely, the respondent contended that the claimants 
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were obliged to establish the facts required for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal did not find it necessary to determine which Party had a 
burden of going forward with the evidence because both Parties had presented 
extensive evidence for the tribunal to make a decision on its jurisdiction.
281
 The 
tribunal’s stance could be traced back to the ICJ’s decision in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case where the ICJ stated that neither the claimant nor the respondent 
had the burden of proof in showing the existence of jurisdiction. In its decision on 
jurisdiction, the ICJ reasoned that “the establishment or otherwise of jurisdiction is 
not a matter for the parties but for the Court itself. Although a party seeking to assert a 
fact must bear the burden of proving it, this has no relevance for the establishment of 
the Court’s jurisdiction, which is a question of law to be resolved in the light of the 
relevant facts.” The ICJ therefore placed burden of proof on neither party in the matter 
of jurisdiction, but rather determined itself “whether the force of the arguments 
militating in favour of jurisdiction is preponderant”.282  
3.10 Frequent use of obiter dictum 
Obiter dictum, meaning something said by the way, is a common law concept, the 
opposite concept of which is ratio decidendi. A judicial statement can be ratio 
decidendi only if it is essential to the disposition of the case, for example, dealing 
with the crucial facts and legal issues of the case. Judicial statements which are not 
essential to the disposition of the case, or which refer to hypothetical or unrelated 
facts and legal issues, are obiter dicta. In common law system, ratio decidendi has 
binding force and can be cited as binding precedent, while obiter dicta have no 
binding force and cannot be cited as precedents by later courts. Even so, obiter dicta 
may still have persuasive effect and can be greatly influential. 
In investment arbitration, obiter dicta have been frequently utilized by tribunals. 
For one thing, the use of obiter dicta, such as additional remarks or observations, may 
have the effect of avoiding jurisdictional limitations. Tribunals could thus have a 
chance to show their hypothetical stance towards additional issues of jurisdiction and 
merits in the case of absence of jurisdiction or a very limited jurisdiction. For another, 
there is no strict doctrine of precedent in the investment arbitration mechanism, a 
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mandatory rule distinguishing obiter dicta from ratio decidendi is also lacking. 
Therefore, those remarks or observations dealing with hypothetical or unrelated facts 
and legal issues can be freely mixed up with ratio decidendi without any systemic 
limitation.  
Despite the lack of binding precedent in investment arbitration, disputing parties 
usually cite favorable prior decisions in whole or in part to their advantage, no matter 
the cited judicial statements in prior decisions are ratio decidendi or obiter dicta. The 
same is true of investment tribunals. In reaching decisions, tribunals sometimes quote 
passages of obiter dicta found in the decisions from prior cases, without 
acknowledging the cited passage’s status as obiter dicta. The quoted obiter dicta 
would become part of the holding or ruling in a later decision and thus would upgrade 
its status and its judicial significance. In this way, obiter dicta would have a 
precedential value which is not markedly inferior to that of ratio decidendi.
283
 The 
frequent pronouncement and later quotation of obiter dicta, therefore, to a great 
degree breaks the jurisdictional boundaries specified in investment treaties.  
Firstly, tribunals finding themselves without jurisdiction might be tempted to offer 
comments or extra-judicial recommendations showing how the case might have been 
decided on the merits had this been possible. There has been a detectable trend 
whereby the ICJ, unable to go into all or part of the merits of a case, nevertheless 
includes in its decision some observations indicating what might have been its 
approach.
 284
 The same goes with investment tribunals. In Soufraki v. United Arab 
Emirates, for instance, the tribunal found that the claimant, a natural person, had not 
proved its alleged Italian nationality and thus had to conclude that the claimant’s 
claims fell outside its jurisdiction under the Italy-United Arab Emirates BIT. The 
tribunal, however, added an additional passage of obiter dicta. In the words of the 
tribunal, 
The Tribunal recognizes that it is difficult for Mr. Soufraki, whose business 
interests span continents and who constantly travels the world, to reconstruct 
his actual residence during a twelve or thirteen month period more than ten 
years earlier. It recognizes that Mr. Soufraki, had he been properly advised at 
the time, easily could have reacquired Italian nationality by a timely 
application. It further appreciates that, had Mr. Soufraki contracted with the 
                                                             
283 Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 157-159. 
284 Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 
Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 1638. 
Chapter 3: Approaches to Achieve the Creeping Jurisdiction in the Practice of Investor-State 
Arbitration 
108 
 
United Arab Emirates through a corporate vehicle incorporated in Italy, 
rather than contracting in his personal capacity, no problem of jurisdiction 
would now arise.
 285
 (emphasis added) 
The philosophy underlying these obiter dicta seems to be that the tribunal wanted 
to seize the opportunity to pronounce on the issue of whether shell companies or 
special purpose vehicles could be regarded as covered investors under the investment 
treaty despite the absence of jurisdiction.  
Secondly, tribunals might make pronouncement on matters beyond their 
jurisdiction and interpret treaty obligations outside their mandate. For example, in 
Loewen v. USA, the tribunal found that the claimants were not covered investors under 
the NAFTA due to the dissatisfaction of nationality requirements and thus the tribunal 
decided that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the claimant’s claims under the 
NAFTA.
 286
 The tribunal, nonetheless, recalled the treaty obligations of the 
respondent under the NAFTA and offered additional comments and observations 
showing its critical attitude towards the respondent. In the words of the tribunal, the 
United States court process involving the claimants “was a disgrace” and “failed to 
afford Loewen the process that was due”. The relevant US court proceedings, as a 
state measure, “were clearly improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with 
minimum standards of international law and fair and equitable treatment.” 287 In ADC 
v. Hungary, the applicable investment treaty was the Cyprus-Hungary BIT, Article 7 
of which provided that any dispute between the foreign investor and the host state 
“concerning expropriation of an investment” can be submitted to international 
arbitration. The jurisdiction of the tribunal would be limited to the dispute 
“concerning expropriation of an investment” according to the arbitration provision. 
Nevertheless, besides finding the respondent to have violated its obligations 
concerning expropriation provision, the tribunal was also satisfied to conclude that 
other standards of protection in the BIT, namely fair and equitable treatment, 
reasonable or non-discriminatory measure, and full security and protection, had all 
been breached by the respondent.
 288
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Traditionally, once the tribunal found it had no jurisdiction in a case, or no 
jurisdiction in a particular respect, it was restrained from ruling on issues presented in 
that specific context. The tribunals in the foregoing cases, however, chose to make 
pronouncements on issues beyond their mandate. Against this background, we may 
safely conclude that tribunals proceeded in this way because they wanted to have the 
opportunity of condemning the host states for their unlawful measures.  
Finally, individual arbitrators usually append their individual opinions to the 
tribunal’s decision, which is allowed or not prohibited by the rules of most 
international dispute settlement bodies. Individual opinions may include dissenting 
opinions and separate opinions. Dissenting opinions are intended to controvert the 
majority’s opinion in full or in part. While separate opinions do not dissent from the 
conclusion of the majority but rather make an extra or even different pronouncement 
on the majority’s reasoning. Article 47 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, for example, 
provides that any member of the tribunal may attach his individual opinion to the 
award, whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement of his dissent. 
Individual opinions do not form part of the tribunal’s decision and do not affect the 
formal authority of the decision.
 289
 Therefore, the arguments and reasoning of an 
individual opinion may themselves be regarded as obiter dicta.  
Although not binding on the disputing parties in the case, individual opinions have 
an institutional status in the sense that, unlike the views of a scholar, they have been 
expressed by a jurist sitting as an independent arbitrator and writing in a judicial 
capacity. The status and the legal significance of individual opinions have been 
strengthened in arbitral practice. It is permissible and even advisable by tribunals to 
take into account any dissenting or separate opinions in order to understand and cite a 
prior decision. Moreover, the frequent appending of individual opinions raises the 
judicial authority of individual arbitrators. On one hand, not being bound to the 
tribunal’s position, individual arbitrators can liberally touch upon any issue they 
consider relevant but not referred to by the majority, which may simply fall outside 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal. On the other, individual opinions are frequently quoted 
and debated by disputing parties and tribunals in later cases. Therefore, appending 
individual opinions would predictably become a powerful tool to break the 
jurisdictional boundaries specified in investment treaties and would inspire and 
stimulate later tribunals to do the same.  
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Chapter 4: Causes and Institutional Foundations of the 
Creeping Jurisdiction of Investment Treaty Tribunals 
4.1 Causes of the creeping jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals 
4.1.1 Aggressive pushing by investors 
Private parties have strong incentives to challenge the alleged illegal measures of 
host states and monitor their own claims before international courts and tribunals. The 
aggressive use of investor-state arbitration by private investors is among the most 
direct driving forces for the jurisdictional expansion of investment treaty tribunals. 
Apparently, foreign investors do not like investor-state arbitration provisions worded 
restrictively. Efforts have been made to convince arbitral tribunals that their 
jurisdiction was not limited to the matters explicitly mentioned in the relevant ISAPs, 
but extended to any alleged violation of the applicable treaties. 
290 
Foreign investors 
also have tried to circumvent the procedural preconditions to investor-state arbitration 
contained in applicable treaties.  
Although the establishment of jurisdiction does not necessarily bring a favorable 
award on merits for foreign investors, it is indeed a weighty bargaining chip for 
investors against the host state. When facd with the risks of losing in investor-state 
arbitration, the host states could normally be pressured into settlement with foreign 
investors under the table after a lengthy and costly arbitration process.
 291
 As a matter 
of fact, according to the statistics of ICSID Secretariat, of the concluded ICSID cases 
decided by tribunals as of December 2014, awards declining jurisdiction made up 
only 25% while award upholding investors’ claims in part or in full accounted for 
46%.
292
 It can be seen that foreign investors have a better chance of success in 
investor-state arbitration, which will further stimulate other investors to bring more 
cases.  
The reason why foreign investors are “litigious” can mainly be attributed to two 
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aspects. On one hand, investors have their own claims under the applicable 
investment treaties. An investor is entitled to submit its own claims against the host 
state to a treaty tribunal under the applicable investment treaty without having to ask 
for approval from its home state. The investor may submit a claim of which its home 
state actually disapproves. And the home state has no control over the investor’s 
claims. This occurred in GAMI v. Mexico, for instance, in which the United States, the 
home state of GAMI, filed a submission that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction. The 
tribunal however ultimately upheld its jurisdiction.
293
 On the other hand, investors 
actually have a diversity of legal techniques to bypass jurisdictional limitations to 
investment treaty tribunals. In the investors’ arsenal, there are several key weapons 
which are frequently and effectively utilized in investor-state arbitration. It needs to 
be further explained as follows.  
To illustrate, there are many investment treaties containing provisions limiting 
investors’ access to international arbitration only to those disputes over the amount of 
compensation for expropriation. Investors, however, have enough techniques to 
override such limitation. There are plenty of choices for investors: (1) interpreting the 
provision as covering disputes over both the existence of an expropriation and the 
amount of compensation for expropriation;
 294
 (2) borrowing a wider investor-state 
arbitration provision from a third-party treaty by relying on the MFN clause in the 
basic treaty;
 295
 and (3) treaty shopping, which means structuring its investment 
through a third state to shop for a favorable third-party investment treaty.
 296
 
Firstly, investors may interpret narrow investor-state arbitration provisions 
expansively in order to establish the tribunal’s jurisdiction over any dispute relating to 
compensation for expropriation. Nevertheless, this technique is not without restriction. 
For the provision covering only disputes concerning the amount of compensation for 
expropriation, it has the potential to be interpreted as covering both the dispute over 
the existence of an expropriation and the dispute over the amount of compensation for 
expropriation. However, no matter how expansively such a provision is interpreted, it 
cannot exceed the range of dispute “concerning” the amount of compensation for 
expropriation. For instance, the investor cannot submit disputes concerning violations 
of national treatment clauses or fair and equitable treatment clauses to investment 
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arbitration under such narrow provisions. Therefore, if the dispute between the 
investor and the host state only concerns an alleged expropriation, it would be 
sufficient in contending an expansive interpretation of narrow investor-state 
arbitration provision to establish the tribunal’s jurisdiction. But if the investor believes 
that the alleged measures of the host state not only constitute an expropriation but also 
violate other treaty obligations of the host state, the investor would then turn to other 
options, such as the MFN treatment and treaty shopping, for submitting wider claims 
to the investment tribunal.  
Secondly, investors may borrow a wider investor-state arbitration provision from a 
third-party treaty by relying on the MFN clause in the basic treaty. For a long time, 
MFN clauses have been “sleeping beauties” and have rarely been invoked by 
investors since substantive standards of investment protection offered by various 
investment treaties shows little difference. However, since the Maffezini tribunal 
firstly started to expand the application of MFN clauses to procedural matters, MFN 
clauses have been commonly utilized to import broader and freer investor-state 
arbitration provisions from third-party treaties. In arbitral practice, MFN clauses have 
been relied upon to overcome the narrow investor-state arbitration provisions in two 
circumstances, including overriding procedural preconditions to arbitration and 
broadening the coverage of investment disputes subject to arbitration. Therefore, 
investors could submit claims based on any investment treatment standard other than 
expropriation treatment to investment arbitration in spite of the explicit limitation of 
narrow investor-state arbitration provisions.  
Finally, even if neither the expansive reading of such provisions nor the invocation 
of MFN clauses is supported by tribunals, investors still have a choice of treaty 
shopping by structuring its investment through special purpose vehicles or shell 
companies. It is the safest and surest means for investors to avoid the restrictive 
arbitration provisions meant to apply. Treaty shopping may take place in two 
scenarios, including investment via a third state and round-trip investment. In the 
scenario of investment via a third state, the investor may seek treaty protection for its 
investment by structuring its investment through a shell company incorporated in a 
third state that has a favorable investment treaty with the target host state. In the 
scenario of round-trip investment, an investor investing in its home state may also 
seek to evade the jurisdiction of local authorities and acquire treaty protection by 
incorporating a shell company in a foreign state that has favorable treaty terms with 
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its home state. Therefore, through the technique of treaty shopping or nationality 
planning, the bilateral and reciprocal character of investment treaties can be avoided, 
and any favorable third-party investment treaty can be shopped by investors.  
Without doubt, it cannot be said that investors have everything to gain and nothing 
to lose in investment arbitration. In practice, investors may hesitate in submitting 
claims to investment arbitration in view of the relatively high arbitration cost and risk 
of losing. Investment arbitration involves heavy costs both for the claimant investor 
and the respondent state. The recently increasing phenomenon of third-party funding 
in investment arbitration, however, dispels these worries of investors. Investment 
arbitration claims of investors are treated as an asset by third party funders. Third 
party funders, sometimes referred to as venture funds or vulture funds, find business 
opportunities in international investment disputes since the amount of investment 
claims is extremely large, usually no less than millions of dollars. Third party funders 
offer to pay the relevant legal fees and arbitration costs of investors in exchange for 
getting a share of the potential profits at the end. Put differently, third party funders 
buy into someone else’s arbitration claims in the hopes of dividing the spoils if a 
favorable award is rendered by the tribunal which can be enforced globally.
 297
   
Therefore, third party funders may profit from disputes between the foreign 
investor and the host state. By financing the legal fees and costs of arbitration 
proceedings for the foreign investor, third party funders may receive a certain 
percentage of the compensation from the respondent state obtained by award or 
settlement.
 298
 The involvement of third party funders in investment arbitration 
proceedings makes the investment claims themselves an asset or commodity. Third 
party funders may buy and finance any investment claim against the host state after an 
evaluation of the potential value of such claims. The market for the commoditization 
and monetization of investment arbitration claims is thus enormous. For this reason, 
third party funders see funding of investment arbitration claims as a “fast growing 
industry” and believe that third party funding will play a larger role in investment 
arbitration.
 299
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Indeed, the use of third-party funding in international investment arbitration is 
increasing rapidly.
 
In many investment arbitration cases, investors are actually 
supported and financed by third-party funders. The financing of arbitration claims by 
third-party funders is also noticed without criticism by investment tribunals.
300
 In the 
case of Teinver v. Argentina, for instance, the respondent questioned the claimants’ 
third-party funding agreement with Burford Capital concerning the financing of the 
claimants’ litigation expenses in this arbitration. According to the respondent, it was 
the third-party funder, not the claimants, that was the real party interested in this 
arbitration, and that the third-party funder did not meet the basic jurisdictional 
requirements under the applicable investment treaty. On the contrary, the claimants 
claimed that third-party funding was frequently made in practice and was not 
illegitimate, unlawful or inappropriate. While noting the existence of third-party 
funding agreement between the claimants and Burford Capital, the tribunal however 
found that third-party funding of the claimants’ litigation did not affect the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.
301
 
The third party funders fund the investment arbitration in return for a certain 
percentage of the recovery in the case of a successful claim in both jurisdiction and 
merits. Although bearing the legal costs and risks of losing, the third party funders 
may still benefit a lot from its funding. Before entering into a funding agreement with 
the investor, the third party funder will carry out thorough due diligence based on its 
reach experience in arbitration and thus will increase the chances of obtaining a 
favourable award.
 302
 From the perspective of investors, shifting the risk of losing the 
case and the management of that risk to a third party funder may thus provide the 
necessary incentive to foreign investors, which may result in an increased recourse to 
investor-state arbitration against host States.
 303
  
More importantly, third party funding of investment claims will facilitate access to 
arbitration and encourage the speculation or gambling of investors in submitting 
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frivolous claims to investment arbitration. Without outside funding, foreign investors 
may be reluctant to initiate investor-state arbitration proceedings after taking into 
account the jurisdictional basis, the prospects of success, the arbitration costs and the 
quantum of the claim. Investment arbitration involves a heavy cost, and the outcome 
of arbitration proceedings is uncertain. Once lost in arbitration, foreign investors may 
have to pay the costs in terms of legal fees, time and other opportunities. With the 
funding from a third party, however, foreign investors would no longer worry about 
the legal costs and risks of losing. What foreign investors need to do is to submit 
investment claims to arbitration in their name. The relevant legal fees and risk of 
losing will be in the responsibility of the third party funder. If the claim fails, the 
foreign investor would lose nothing. Therefore, any dispute between the foreign 
investor and the host state may be regarded as an asset with a price. Even frivolous 
disputes could be submitted to arbitration using third party funding. Instead of 
bringing equity and justice to arbitration, third-party funding of investment arbitration 
claims poses substantial risks of abusing the arbitration process.
 304
  
4.1.2 Ambiguity of investment treaty provisions 
The ambiguity has its good side from the perspective of tribunals. Its existence and 
the need to resolve it when it arises provide leeways for judicial choice.
305
 The 
vagueness of investment treaty provisions is the very pivot upon which the scope of 
jurisdiction could be expanded and the scrutiny of consistency of state measures with 
treaty obligations could be strengthened. Such ambiguity is manifested in both 
investment arbitration provisions and substantive treatment provisions. The ambiguity 
of investment arbitration provisions leaves the door open for the expansion of 
tribunals’ jurisdiction, which brings more chances for tribunals to interpret and 
develop substantive treatment provisions in applicable investment treaties. The more 
investment claims that are brought to tribunals, the more these tribunals have 
opportunities to interpret and make law. 
As to investment arbitration provisions, there are several crucial concepts lacking 
concrete definition. To illustrate, whether sovereign bonds and commercial contracts 
are covered “investment”? Whether shell companies are covered “investors”? Does 
the “dispute concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation” include 
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dispute over the existence of an expropriation? Are MFN clauses applicable to dispute 
settlement matters? Can “umbrella clauses” have the potential of elevating contract 
claims into treaty claims? What are the conditions for the triggering of 
“fork-in-the-road clauses”? And so on. By reading these concepts liberally, tribunals 
could circumvent limitations to their jurisdiction and establish jurisdiction over a 
rather broad scope of investment claims. Mixing together these vague concepts and 
pushing them to the extreme, tribunals may come to the following conclusion: if an 
investor from any state invests any kind of asset in the host state, irrespective of FDI, 
commercial contracts or financial securities, then any dispute arising from such 
investment, irrespective of contract disputes or treaty disputes, can be submitted to an 
investment treaty tribunal. And any limitation to the scope of arbitration or any 
precondition to the initiation of arbitration process can be avoided by shopping a 
third-party investment treaty using the techniques of MFN importation or nationality 
planning.  
Some commentators even conclude accordingly that “the only way to comply with 
the treaty is for the host state to assume that all investors - all companies - are covered 
by the highest standards of any BIT in force for the state.” 306 The “bilateral” 
obligations of the BIT, therefore, are held to be transformed into obligations erga 
omnes or “an obligation that the host state must consider potentially applicable to all 
investors”307 or so-called a “multilateralized” obligation.308 It means that host states 
would have to open access to investment arbitration for all investors from all 
countries in spite of absence of a universal investment treaty among most countries. 
This argument, although unduly radical, does reveal the potential of expansive 
reading of investment treaty provisions.  
The broader the investors’ access to an international tribunal, the greater the 
tribunal’s opportunity to interpret the applicable investment treaties and to scrutinize 
the alleged illegal measures of the host state based on substantial treatment provisions 
in investment treaties. The wording of substantive treatment provisions, such as the 
prohibition of indirect expropriation without compensation and the requirements of 
providing national treatment and fair and equitable treatment are so vague that they 
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lack precisely ascertainable content. These obligations are drafted in the form of 
open-ended standards rather than precise obligations. For example, what is exactly an 
indirect expropriation? What are the yardsticks to measure the “fairness” and 
“equitableness” under the requirement of fair and equitable treatment? These phrases 
are elastic and are open to different interpretations. This vagueness and elasticity 
leaves arbitral tribunals with ample discretionary choices about how to concretize the 
content of investment treaty obligations.
 309
 Therefore, to enhance the credibility of 
these broad and open-ended obligations and to strengthen the enforceability of treaty 
commitments, tribunals may thus be inclined to lean in favour of finding jurisdiction 
when they consider it to be desirable. The accumulation of investment arbitration 
cases over time, in turn, would determine and develop the precise meaning of these 
vague commitments. Through the expansionary development of substantive treatment 
provisions, tribunals apply strict standards to review the legality of state measures, 
push the boundary of treaty obligations to protect investment and curtail the 
applicability of escape clauses contained in investment treaties. It reduces the policy 
space of treaty parties in regulating foreign investment and exceeds the treaty parties’ 
anticipation of treaty obligations and is thus referred to as creative lawmaking by 
tribunals according to commentators.
 310
  
4.1.3 Pro-investor preference of investment treaty tribunals 
Although sitting as independent third-party adjudicators of investment disputes, 
most tribunals do not conceal their preference for investment protection. It is held that 
the only object and purpose of international investment treaties is the encouragement 
and protection of foreign investment which is emphasized in the preambles of 
investment treaties. However, the liberalization and protection of foreign investment 
is not the only purpose of investment treaties. The importance of stimulating the flow 
of private capital and the economic development or prosperity of the host state is also 
mentioned in the preamble of most investment treaties. Therefore, investment treaties 
not only aim to encourage and protect investment, but also seek to promote the 
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economic development or prosperity of the host state in the sense of teleology or 
treaty purpose. Investment treaties strike a balance between the promotion and 
protection of investment on the one hand and the respect of host states’ right to 
regulate foreign investment in the public interest on the other. Overemphasis on any 
aspect would break the balance of overall balance of rights and obligations in 
international investment between investors and host states. 
The emphasis on investment protection leads tribunals to position themselves as 
guardians of investment protection commitments and the propellants of investment 
liberalization rather than as guardians of the public interest of host states.
 311
 With 
their dispute settlement function, investment tribunals undertake an important role in 
safeguarding and enforcing the treaty rights of foreign investors and in constraining 
host states in their treatment of foreign investors. In arbitral practice, tribunals have 
interpreted the investment treatment provisions of BITs and FTAs as liberally or as 
broadly as possible in favour of foreign investors.
 312
 In establishing jurisdiction and 
scrutinizing the conformity of state measures with treaty obligations, tribunals have 
shown their willingness to find for the investors and against the states. The so-called 
“investor-centered” or “pro-investor” approach is employed to strengthen and expand 
the standard of protection available to foreign investors. 
313
 The result of that would 
inevitably be over-interpretation of investment protection commitments of host states. 
Host states commit to provide a certain standard of substantive and procedural 
protection to foreign investment under investment treaties. Tribunals are empowered 
to settle investment disputes between foreign investors and host states on the basis of 
investment treaty provisions. The establishment of jurisdiction is the crucial step 
leading to the judicial review power of tribunals. Efforts have been made by tribunals 
to enhance the judicial review of investment protection commitments in investment 
treaties through an expansive reading of states’ consent to investor-state arbitration.  
 enerally, absent the state’s consent to arbitration, an arbitral tribunal has no power 
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to scrutinize and adjudicate the regulatory measures of the state regarding foreign 
investment, even if the measures in issue could be serious, gross or outrageous 
violations of the state’s obligations under international law. The state is in a position 
to shield or exempt from international judicial scrutiny except there has been consent. 
The ICJ in the case of Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: 
Greece Intervening) also concluded that “a State is not deprived of immunity by 
reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights 
law or the international law of armed conflict.”314 Such conclusion applies not only to 
state’s jurisdictional immunity from foreign courts but also to state’s jurisdictional 
immunity from international courts or tribunals except that the state explicitly or 
implicitly consents to their jurisdiction. However, investment tribunals tend to justify 
their expansive reading of state consent to arbitration by the importance and value of 
investment protection rules. It is also echoed by the philosophy of “procedure over 
substance”, which believes that the substance of the law of investment protection 
would follow through a strong procedural adjudicatory mechanism.  
4.1.4 Intense competition in attracting foreign investment among host states 
and under-estimation of arbitration risks by host states 
Although BITs are bilateral treaties with the expectation of reciprocal obligations, 
they cannot be understood purely from this perspective. The majority of BITs and 
FTAs are concluded between developed states and developing states, which are 
respectively capital-exporting states and capital-importing states. Capital-exporting 
states usually hold more bargaining chips than capital-importing states. The 
obligations under bilateral investment treaties are reciprocal in theory but not in fact, 
for it is generally only the less developed country that bears the risk of being sued.
 315
 
The majority of investor-state arbitration cases involve claims made by investors of 
developed states against the governments of developing states.
 316
 Investors of 
developed states, in particular those from United States, Canada, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Germany and several other EU countries, has been the main users of the 
investor-state arbitration system responsible for over 80 percent of all investment 
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arbitration claims as of end 2014.
 317
  The conclusion of bilateral investment treaties 
may thus be more likely to embody the interests of capital-exporting states in 
protecting investment abroad. The actual asymmetry in the use of investor-state 
arbitration, however, does not negate the validity of bilateral investment treaties. It is 
because “international law does not admit the argument that an unfair balance 
between the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties allows for the suspension or 
termination of a treaty” 318  and the validity of a treaty devoid of substantive 
reciprocity can be challenged “only if the lack of reciprocity has been brought out by 
illegal means.” 319 
Then, why are developing countries keen to conclude investment treaties that may 
hurt them? The increasing number of investment treaties is based on the hypothesis 
that it will bring about larger flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into host states. 
It is still highly controversial whether the conclusion of BITs and FTAs results in a 
marked increase in incoming FDI inflows.
 320
 It is true that during the past several 
decades the rapid increase of FDI inflows into developing countries has been 
accompanied by a huge proliferation of BITs and FTAs concluded by developing 
countries. Is this phenomenon sufficient to conclude that investment treaties have 
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actually contributed to the increased FDI inflows into developing countries? It seems 
that most developing countries tend to believe in the assumptive advantage of 
investment treaties in bringing more FDI inflows. Capital-importing countries, usually 
developing countries, compete intensely with each other to attract foreign investment 
from capital-exporting countries, usually western developed countries. Therefore, 
developing a global network of bilateral investment treaties with as many 
counterparties as possible would be an important way for developing countries to 
maintain a competitive edge in attracting international capital from various countries.
 
321
  
The competing relationship among host states in attracting foreign investment leads 
to competitive dynamics of investment liberalization and investment protection.
322
 
Driven by the motivations of attracting foreign investment, the number of bilateral 
investment treaties has rapidly expanded, and the level of investment liberalization 
and the standard of investment protection have evolved from a weaker model to a 
stronger model. Put simply, host states may have to “tie their hands” more tightly or 
constrain their regulatory space more rigidly to stay one step ahead of other 
competitors in attracting foreign investment. The weaker their bargaining chip, the 
tighter their possible willingness to tie their hands to satisfy foreign investors. As the 
saying goes, when the river rises, the boat floats high. It is exactly what has happened 
in the gradual improvement of investment protection commitments and in the 
expansion of investors’ access to investor-state arbitration when various host states 
compete with each other for capital.  
Along with the expansion of investment treaties network, developing states seem to 
underestimate the risks of being sued associated with the signing of investment 
treaties. Pakistan’s attorney general, for instance, described the general ignorance of 
his country about the legal risks associated with the conclusion of BITs when Pakistan 
was sued by a Swiss investor under the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT in SGS v. Pakistan. 
“To be perfectly honest, I did not have a clue, so I had to look it upon  oogle. I typed 
in ‘ICSID’ and ‘BIT’, and that’s how I learned about these instruments for the first 
time.” “Since Pakistan had signed BITs without any consequences for a long time, 
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everyone simply considered the treaties a piece of paper, something for the press, a 
good photo opportunity-and that was the end of it.” 323  
BITs and FTAs are sometimes signed by host states without seriously considering 
their implications. In fact, they may have more teeth than originally thought. The 
stringent constraint of investment treaties on the regulatory power of host states would 
become apparent only after foreign investors sue host states before an international 
investment tribunal based on such treaties. Giving foreign investors a direct access to 
international arbitration allows them to decide when, where, and on what basis to sue 
host states for their regulatory measures of foreign investment. The broader the 
investors’ access to international arbitration and the more general the terms of 
substantive treatment provisions, the bigger the risks of losing in international 
arbitration for host states. In view of the elastic and general wordings of investment 
treaties concluded by host states, they are exposed to a rather high risk of being sued 
and losing lawsuits in international arbitration. First and foremost, the fundamental 
concepts and clauses, such as the concepts of “investment”, “investor” and 
“investment dispute” and the clauses of MFN treatment and fair and equitable 
treatment, are phrased in vague terms in most investment treaties. Tribunals thus have 
ample space of discretion to push the limits of their meaning. Secondly, most host 
states usually do not pay close attention to the quickly emerging jurisprudence of 
investment treaty arbitration and thus cannot timely apprehend the expansionary trend 
of arbitral jurisprudence in establishing arbitral jurisdiction. Unless being sued by 
foreign investors, host states are not likely to keep an eye on the investment arbitral 
cases against other host states. Even if host states wish to follow up the jurisprudence, 
they may lack ability to do so since their bureaucracy is not well funded and well 
staffed to track and evaluate investment arbitration cases. Therefore, in investment 
arbitration proceedings, it is normally the respondent state which would passively 
defend under the applicable investment treaty while other treaty parties to the treaty 
may not stay vigilant for lack of ability to know, assess and respond to the case.  
4.2 Institutional capacity of investment treaty tribunals to achieve the 
creeping jurisdiction 
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4.2.1 The doctrine of competence-competence 
The doctrine of competence-competence, also known as la competence de la 
competence in French or kompetenz-kompetenz in German, refers to the right of 
international courts or tribunals to adjudicate on their own competence. While there is 
general agreement on the principle that a court or tribunal has jurisdiction to decide on 
its own jurisdiction, there are however different explanations for its existence. One 
view regards the consent of the disputing parties, whether explicitly or implicitly, as 
the origin of tribunals’ power to decide on their competence. Accordingly, the 
disputing parties are presumed to have agreed to confer on the tribunal the right to 
determine its jurisdiction. Another view believes that the power of 
competence-competence is inherent in each dispute settlement body and is 
independent of the will of the disputing parties.
 324
 Despite the contrary propositions 
in theory, there has been no serious obstacle to the application of the principle of 
competence-competence in practice. The principle of competence-competence has 
been applied consistently without serious challenge by the disputing parties whether 
or not the power to determine jurisdiction is expressly conferred by the disputing 
parties. 
325
 The power of competence-competence has found an expression in the 
statutes of all of the important international courts and tribunals of this date. To 
illustrate, Article 36(6) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that 
“in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be 
settled by the decision of the Court.” Therefore, the ICJ has competence to pronounce 
on its own jurisdiction.
326
 Besides, Article 32(2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Article 288(4) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea also vest the power of competence-competence to the European Court of Human 
Rights and the United Nations Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.  
Investment arbitral tribunals are no exception. They have the power to determine 
their own jurisdiction, which has been confirmed by various international arbitration 
rules. Article 41(1) of the ICSID Convention, for instance, stipulates unequivocally 
that the ICSID tribunal “shall be the judge of its own competence”. Article 21(1) of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules also states that “the arbitral tribunal shall have the 
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power to rule on objections that it has no jurisdiction, including any objections with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration clause or of the separate 
arbitration agreement.” Similarly, Article 6(5) of the ICC Arbitration Rules provides 
that “any decision as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, except as to parties or 
claims with respect to which the Court decides that the arbitration cannot proceed, 
shall then be taken by the arbitral tribunal itself.” According to these arbitration rules, 
the tribunal is the judge of its own competence or jurisdiction. The defaulting of the 
respondent states or any objections of the respondent states to the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction does not impair the tribunal’s power to decide its own jurisdiction.  
4.2.2 Interpretive authority of investment treaty tribunals 
The interpretive authority enjoyed by investment treaty tribunals is closely related 
to the principle of competence-competence. The jurisdiction of investment treaty 
tribunals originates from state’s consent provided in applicable investment treaties. In 
determining whether it has jurisdiction, an investment treaty tribunal would need to 
interpret the arbitration provision in the applicable investment treaty and to identify 
whether the respondent state has given its consent to arbitration.  
There are two kinds of interpretive power with respect to investment treaties. One 
of them is authoritative interpretation controlled by treaty parties collectively. The 
other one is judicial interpretation power enjoyed by investment tribunals in 
establishing jurisdiction and scrutinizing the consistency of state measures with treaty 
obligations under investment treaties. As a matter of theory, states as a whole, being 
treaty parties, should sit at the top of the interpretation hierarchy,
327
 since they are 
masters or legislators of investment treaties.
 However, treaty parties’ interpretive 
power has been questioned and suppressed by tribunals in arbitral practice. The 
balance of power between treaty parties and tribunals concerning the power to 
interpret investment treaties is askew.
 328
  
On the one hand, treaty parties as the creator of investment treaties are supposed to 
have authority to interpret and clarify the provisions of investment treaties. On the 
other hand, treaty parties are actual or potential respondents in investor-state 
arbitration proceedings and foreign investors as third parties to investment treaty 
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appear as claimants. The “dual role” of states as both treaty parties and respondents 
under investment treaties provides investment tribunals with a “legitimate basis” to 
restrict the interpretive power of states. In the view of tribunals, in contrast to 
inter-state arbitration where states may appear both as claimants and as respondents 
arguing for either broad or narrow interpretation, in investor-state arbitration states 
only appear as respondents. Therefore, states in investor-state arbitration may 
interpret investment treaties improperly by narrowing the rights of foreign investors 
already created by investment treaties. State interpretations may thus be treated by 
tribunals as inadmissible “self-serving attempts” to evade jurisdiction and to avoid 
liability.
329
 
The dominant position of tribunals in interpreting investment treaties makes them a 
crucial and indispensable force advancing the development of international 
investment law. The primary task of investment tribunals is to settle investment 
disputes between foreign investors and host states. In an effort to accomplish this task, 
tribunals need to interpret and apply investment treaties in order to determine whether 
they have jurisdiction and whether measures of host states are in breach of their treaty 
obligations and, if any, how much host states should compensate for investors’ 
damage. However, treaty interpretation does not necessarily lead to the only answer. 
The distinction between interpreting and creating the law is sometimes a fiction.
 330
 
The difference between interpreting and creating the law is one of degree rather than 
of kind. With regard to a vague provision in an investment treaty, its concretization 
will arise from the development of jurisprudence via investment tribunals. It is 
through the judicial interpretation process that vague treaty commitments are given 
extensive meaning and made reality.  
Depending on the interpretive approach adopted and the interpretation results, the 
functioning and the authority of investment tribunals may distribute in a continuum 
between two extremes. At one extreme is a tribunal that “strictly and solely focuses on 
solving the dispute”, which can be called a dispute solving-oriented tribunal. At the 
other extreme is a tribunal that creates meaning rather than merely finding what an 
investment treaty means. Such a tribunal can be characterized as a 
lawmaking-oriented tribunal. 
331
 The less developed the body of rules is, the more 
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important the disputing resolver will be with respect to the creation of rules.  
In the field of international investment law, there is currently still no universally 
applicable investment treaty to all countries. Most investment treaties take the form of 
bilateral investment treaties and efforts to establish multilateral investment treaties 
also turned out to be a failure. It is exactly the failure of proposed multilateral 
investment treaties and lack of established rules that leads to the proliferation of 
various bilateral investment treaties. Over 3000 BITs and FTAs around the world 
constitute the main sources of rules for international investment protection. Most of 
them however are phrased in vague and elastic terms regarding foreign investors’ 
substantive treatment and procedural access to investor-state arbitration. Such 
vagueness leaves ample space for tribunals’ creative interpretation and provides 
textual support for the jurisdictional expansion of investment tribunals. 
332
 Arbitral 
practice shows that investment tribunals are located closer to lawmaking-oriented 
tribunals than to dispute solving-oriented tribunals.
333
 Tribunals’ interpretation of 
investment treaties assumes features of norm generation. Except that there exist 
impenetrable legal barriers, tribunals tend to affirm their jurisdiction over investors’ 
claims and to conduct judicial review of lawfulness of state measures under applicable 
investment treaties. It is against this background that some commentators regard 
international investment law as the “tribunal-driven” law. 334 
4.2.3 The ad hoc nature of tribunals does not limit their law-making power 
Contrary to permanent dispute settlement bodies, international investment tribunals 
are one-off or ad hoc tribunals in nature created for the resolution of specific 
individual disputes. There is no single permanent or standing tribunal for all 
investment disputes. Moreover, permanent dispute settlement bodies generally have 
fixed judges which are not appointed by disputing parties, while arbitrators of ad hoc 
tribunals are normally appointed by disputing parties in accordance with the 
applicable arbitration rule. The ad hoc feature of investment tribunals, however, does 
not negate their judicial authority. Although being delegated to settle particular cases 
between foreign investors and host states, tribunals can still contribute to the 
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interpretation and thus the development of international investment law. Those 
tribunal awards that are widely cited are considered to be the authoritative elaboration 
and even creative development of international investment law.  
Extensive attention has been paid to the issue of law making by permanent 
international dispute settlement bodies like the ICJ, the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body and the European Court of Justice.
 335
 When states create a dispute settlement 
body, they risk “creating a monster”, meaning that the court or tribunal may adopt 
interpretations of laws that are out of step with the will of the relevant states. 
336
 
When states can reach consensus only at the highest level of abstracting in a treaty, 
the judicial process offers a more direct route to filling in the details.
 337
 Although 
international courts and tribunals have no formal power to create binding international 
legal rules, they do have tremendous influence on the concretization and the 
development of international law by rendering judgments and decisions. It is such 
influence that can amount to law-making. The creative function of permanent 
international judicial bodies has already been acknowledged by their judges. To 
illustrate, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Tanaka famously stated that: 
Undoubtedly, a court of law declares what is the law, but does not legislate. 
In reality, however, where the borderline can be drawn is a very delicate and 
difficult matter. Of course, judges declare the law, but they do not function 
automatically. We cannot deny the possibility of some degree of creative 
element in their judicial activities. What is not permitted to judges is to 
establish law independently of an existing legal system, institution or norm. 
What is permitted to them is to declare what can be logically inferred from 
the raison d’être of a legal system, legal institution or norm. In the latter case 
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the lacuna in the intent of legislation or parties can be filled.
338
 
The difference between investment tribunals and permanent dispute settlement 
bodies lies not in whether they have law-making power or not, but in the extent to 
which they can influence the concretization and the development of international law. 
The following characteristics of investment arbitration mechanism build up a certain 
law-making power for investment tribunals. First and foremost, investment treaties 
create directly enforceable rights for non-state actors, namely foreign investors. 
Foreign investors are able to challenge the regulatory measures of the host state by 
starting the investor-state arbitration process in accordance with investment treaties 
while the host state can only passively participate in the arbitration process. Secondly, 
tribunals have the competence to decide on their own jurisdiction and have the 
incentive to decide in favor of their jurisdiction as far as possible. A greater 
jurisdictional reach would expand the ability of tribunals to pronounce on the concrete 
content of investment protection obligations contained in investment treaties. Thirdly, 
the arbitral award rendered by tribunals is final and the disputing parties are obliged to 
enforce it. The award can hardly be overturned by treaty parties via the political 
process.  
In comparison with a strong law-making power enjoyed by permanent international 
judicial bodies such as the WTO Appellate Body and the ICJ, investment tribunals’ 
influence on the concretization and the development of international law is limited to 
particular investment treaties and their treaty parties. According to rules of treaty law, 
a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent. 
Tribunals’ rulings on an investment treaty would not impact the effect of a third-party 
treaty. The obligations and rights under a third-party treaty remain unaffected in spite 
of a creative interpretation of an investment treaty by a tribunal. Furthermore, there is 
no hierarchical relationship between various ad hoc tribunals. The possibility that 
different ad hoc tribunals give different interpretation for the same legal issue may 
undermine the law-making power of tribunals as a whole.  
Even so, it does not accord with reality to conclude that investment tribunals may 
only develop the law in the limited sense of creating extra-rules for the disputing 
parties in particular cases. Put another way, tribunal awards have the effect of 
influencing the perception of third-party treaties and the obligations of third states 
beyond particular cases. A closer examination of arbitral practice reveals that tribunals 
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do in fact follow an informal and de facto system of precedent.
 339
 It is a common 
feature that tribunals cite prior awards to support their judgments and seek to 
contribute to the coherent development of international investment law beyond 
individual cases. The strengthening of the de facto system of precedent has broken the 
ad hoc limitation of investment tribunals.
 
Various ad hoc tribunals as a whole may 
work in harmony to expand their jurisdictional reach and to fulfill the task of 
clarifying and developing international investment law, to be specific, the 
international regime of investment protection.  
As regards to the issue of jurisdiction, investment tribunals resemble the ICJ to a 
great extent. Due to the lack of compulsory jurisdiction, the establishment of its 
jurisdiction is the core of the work of the ICJ.
 340
 The disputing states may specially 
consent to refer their disputes to the ICJ through an international treaty or convention. 
Besides, States may also unilaterally declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso 
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the ICJ in all or particular legal disputes of international 
law. The consent of the disputing states, embodied in an international treaty or a 
unilateral declaration, constitutes the foundation of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. In 
practice, however, the ICJ has shown a high flexibility in construing the consent of 
the disputing states to its jurisdiction. The jurisdictional provision embodied in an 
international treaty or a unilateral declaration has always been given its “maximum 
possible effect” to establish the ICJ’s jurisdiction. 341  Similarly, finding and 
interpreting state’s consent to arbitration is also at the core of establishing their 
jurisdiction for investment tribunals. But what makes a fundamental difference 
between investment tribunals and the ICJ is that the disputing parties in investor-state 
arbitration are private parties and sovereign states. And the right to initiate 
investor-state arbitration process is always placed at the hands of foreign investors 
rather than host states.  
Compared with that of the WTO Appellate Body, the jurisdictional reach and the 
law-making power of investment tribunals are still in their early stage. The WTO 
Appellate Body is a permanent dispute settlement body having compulsory 
jurisdiction over any legal dispute arising under WTO Agreements, which have 161 
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members up to now. According to Article 3(2) of the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, the dispute settlement system of the 
WTO is defined as “a central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system” and it “serves to preserve the rights and obligations of 
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.” Conversely, investment tribunals are independent of each other, 
and their jurisdiction depends upon the arbitration agreement between foreign 
investors and host states. The treaties that investment tribunals may interpret and 
apply are usually bilateral treaties applicable only to a limited number of states. 
Therefore, an investment tribunal would have to give an arbitration provision 
“maximum possible effect” to establish its jurisdiction before it can clarify and even 
develop the substantive rules of investment protection.  
Thus, there is no universal judicial model for distinct international dispute 
settlement bodies. The effectiveness and possible law-making power of each 
international dispute settlement body may scatter ranging from a strong point to a 
weak point. The status and function of a weak international dispute settlement body 
cannot be denied by that of a strong and active international judicial body. Borrowing 
the words of Judge Shahabudden, it is of course an exaggeration to suggest that 
investment tribunals are legislators; it is also an exaggeration to assert that they 
cannot create any law at all.
 342
 
4.3 Legal techniques employed by investment treaty tribunals to achieve 
the creeping jurisdiction 
4.3.1 Flexible application of treaty interpretation rules 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are widely 
accepted as customary rules of treaty interpretation. International courts and tribunals 
are thus required to apply the interpretation rules codified in the Vienna Convention 
irrespective of whether the disputing states are contracting states to the Vienna 
Convention or whether the applicable treaty explicitly provides for application of the 
Vienna Convention rules. The primary interpretation rule is stated in paragraph 1 of 
Article 31 requiring that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
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the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.” Article 32 concerns supplementary means of 
interpretation. A delegated interpreter may have recourse to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of 
its conclusion, in order to “confirm” the meaning resulting from the application of 
Article 31. Alternatively, when the interpretation according to article 31 leaves the 
meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable, supplementary means of interpretation may be taken into account to 
“determine” the meaning. Accordingly, the terms and their context are the 
fundamental basis for treaty interpretation and the object and purpose of a treaty is 
also relevant in interpreting the ordinary meaning of a treaty. The preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion can only be taken into account after 
the investigation of the ordinary meaning of a treaty under Article 31.  
Although quoting and professing fidelity to the interpretation rules codified in the 
Vienna Convention, most investment tribunals do not strictly adhere to these rules of 
treaty interpretation in examining the meaning of the applicable investment treaties. 
While paying lip service to the Vienna Convention rules of treaty interpretation in the 
abstract, tribunals often utilize these rules in a highly flexible and selective way. 
Express reference of treaty interpretation rules by tribunals does not necessarily keep 
consistent with the reality of their analysis. The actual use of these rules of 
interpretation by tribunals is very likely to be inconsistent, insufficient and even 
flawed. 
343
 It can be manifested in the following situations: (1) undue emphasis on 
the object and purpose of a treaty; (2) doubting the authentic interpretation of treaty 
parties; (3) taking into account third-party treaties or instruments not applicable in the 
relations between the host state and the home state; (4) elevating the role of 
supplementary means of interpretation; (5) expansive interpretation of investors’ 
rights; and (6) relying upon previous awards. The first four items represent departure 
from the normal use of the Vienna Convention rules of treaty interpretation. And the 
latter two items show the utilization of interpretation methods beyond the Vienna 
Convention rules.  
Notably, tribunals would not confine themselves to one of the above methods of 
treaty interpretation. In practice, various methods could be cumulatively used if 
needed. The very choice of any single interpretive method or of a combination or 
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accumulation of them may depend upon factors, such as considerations of justice and 
policy, other than the authority of interpretive methods. It has been rightly stated that 
rules of interpretation “are not the determining cause of judicial decision, but the form 
in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means.” It cannot be assumed 
that the existence of these rules of treaty interpretation is a secure safeguard against 
arbitrariness or partiality. 
344
 Many commentators therefore consider that treaty 
interpretation is to some extent a delicate art rather than a strict or exact science.
 345
 
(1) Undue emphasis on the object and purpose of a treaty 
The terms and their context of a treaty are both the starting point and the ending 
point of treaty interpretation. Yet, the object and purpose of a treaty is also relevant in 
seeking the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context. 
The question remains. From where can an interpreter derive the object and purpose? 
How important are the object and purpose in interpreting a treaty? In practice, these 
questions are subject to the discretion of a delegated interpreter. This elasticity, 
however, has the danger of enabling interpreters to push textual boundaries by using 
teleological or purposive approaches. As Sinclair rightly pointed out, the placing of 
undue emphasis on the “object and purpose” of a treaty will encourage teleological 
methods of interpretation which, in some of its more extreme forms, will even deny 
the relevance of the intentions of the parties.
 346
 
Certainly, the finding and ascertainment of the object and purpose of treaties is by 
no means a mechanical operation. The teleological interpretation is a value-based 
interpretation having the potential of overriding the explicit language of the applicable 
treaty. 
347
 In the field of international investment treaties, the emphasis on the object 
and purpose of an investment treaty often leads to an interpretation that is favorable to 
investors.
 348
 Investment tribunals have frequently found the object and purpose of 
investment treaties by looking at their titles and preambles. Sometimes, tribunals even 
were of the opinion that the object and purpose were evident without indicating where 
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they derived the object and purpose. The promotion and protection of foreign 
investment have usually been considered to be the only object and purpose of 
investment treaties in spite of the fact that most investment treaties do not specify 
their objectives. 
The purpose of the promotion and protection of investment has been extensively 
applied in interpreting both the investor-state arbitration provisions and the 
substantive investment treatment provisions. For instance, with regard to the scope of 
covered “investment” and covered “investors”, the Tokios tribunal found that the 
object and purpose of the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT is to provide broad protection of 
investors and their investments. In the view of the tribunal, the Respondent’s request 
to restrict the scope of covered investors through a control-test would be inconsistent 
with the object and purpose of the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, which is to provide broad 
protection of investors and their investments.
 349
 Equally, in determining whether 
preconditions to arbitration are mandatory in nature, whether MFN clauses apply to 
dispute settlement matters and whether umbrella clauses can elevate contract claims 
into treaty claims, most tribunals have reached an interpretation in favor of investors 
on the ground that it would otherwise be contrary with the purpose of investment 
protection.
 350
  Besides, the emphasis on investor protection also leads tribunals to 
adopt an expansive reading of standards of investment treatment, such as the standard 
of fair and equitable treatment. 
351
  
It follows that fulfilling and strengthening the purpose of investment protection is 
the underlying starting point of most tribunals in interpreting investment treaties. As a 
matter of fact, the promotion and protection of investments is not the sole “object and 
purpose” of investment treaties, the importance of stimulating the flow of private 
capital and the economic development or prosperity of the host state is also mentioned 
in the preamble of most investment treaties. Therefore, investment treaties not only 
aim to protect investment, but also seek to promote the economic development or 
prosperity of the host state in the sense of teleology or treaty purpose. Investment 
treaties strike a balance between the promotion and protection of investment on the 
one hand and the respect of host states’ right to regulate foreign investment in the 
public interest on the other. This calls for a balanced approach to the interpretation of 
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investment treaties. Overemphasis on any aspect would break the balance of overall 
balance of rights and obligations in international investment between foreign investors 
and the host countries. Nevertheless, reference is usually made by tribunals to the 
purpose of investment protection but not to the promotion of the economic 
development of the host state.
352
 
(2) Doubting the authentic interpretation of treaty parties 
In accordance with paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Article 31 in the Vienna Convention, 
together with the context, “any subsequent agreement” between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions and “any subsequent 
practice” in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation shall be taken into account. Therefore, the parties’ 
authentic interpretation of the treaty terms, in the form of either a subsequent 
agreement or a subsequent practice, demonstrates the common understanding of the 
treaty parties as to the meaning of the terms and ought to have binding force on the 
interpreters.
 353
 An agreement as to the interpretation of a provision reached after the 
conclusion of the treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties which 
must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation.
 354
 A subsequent 
agreement or practice can only be invoked if they indeed establish the agreement of 
all the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty. Any agreement or practice, 
regardless of its legal form, establishing the consent of all the parties as to the 
interpretation of the treaty is to be considered as authoritative. Nevertheless, unilateral 
interpretative declaration of one treaty party cannot be deemed to be a subsequent 
agreement or a subsequent practice since one treaty party cannot unilaterally give 
authentic interpretation. 
Yet in arbitral practice, investment tribunals have rarely taken into account 
subsequent agreements or subsequent practice between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the investment treaty. The binding force of the authentic 
interpretation of all the treaty parties has been questioned and suppressed by tribunals. 
It was argued that the subsequent interpretation of treaty parties was self-interested 
and could improperly narrow the rights of foreign investors already created by 
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investment treaties. State interpretations might thus amount to unlawful and 
impermissible attempt to amend the treaty in the view of tribunals. 
355
 Therefore, 
interpretations to the treaty, which clarify the meaning of the treaty, could be 
identified by tribunals as amendments to the treaty, which change that meaning. The 
drawing of a strict distinction between interpretations and amendments is of great 
significance since interpretations presumptively have both prospective and 
retrospective effect but amendments would presumptively have only prospective 
effect. 
356
 
A typical example of authentic interpretation of treaty parties in the field of 
investment treaties is the NAFTA Free Trade Commission’s Note of Interpretation. 
The Free Trade Commission is established by the parties to the NAFTA, namely 
America, Canada and Mexico. The Free Trade Commission is empowered to 
supervise the implementation of the NAFTA and to resolve disputes that may arise 
regarding its interpretation or application according to Article 2001 of the NAFTA. 
Article 1131(2) of the NAFTA further stipulates that an interpretation by the Free 
Trade Commission of a provision of the NAFTA shall be binding on a Tribunal. 
Therefore, the interpretation issued by the Free Trade Commission is certainly a 
subsequent agreement in the sense of paragraphs 3(a) of Article 31 in the Vienna 
Convention. On 31 July 2001, the Free Trade Commission issued an interpretation 
clarifying that fair and equitable treatment provided for in Article 1105 of the NAFTA 
does not require treatment above and beyond the minimum standard of treatment 
under customary international law. Despite this, in the case of Pope & Talbot v. 
Canada, the tribunal held that the interpretation put forward by the Free Trade 
Commission of NAFTA was in fact an amendment rather than an interpretation on the 
basis that the interpretation was an illegitimate attempt to amend the treaty 
retroactively in order to interfere with an ongoing case. 
357
 This argument denied the 
binding force of the authentic interpretation of treaty parties by characterizing it as 
amendment rather than interpretation.  
(3) Taking into account third-party treaties or instruments not applicable in the 
relations between the host state and the home state 
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Paragraph 3(c) of Article 31 in the Vienna Convention adds a third element to be 
taken into account together with the context: any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties. Limitations are placed on the scope of 
rules to be taken into account. The rules must be those that are “relevant” and 
“applicable in the relations between the parties”. In interpreting a treaty, an interpreter 
may only take into account any “relevant rules” of international law beyond the treaty 
context, whether conventional or customary, which are “applicable in the relations 
between the parties”. Therefore, third-party treaties which are not applicable in the 
relations between the parties cannot be taken into account in interpreting a treaty 
between the parties.  
An investment treaty between State A and State B is to be interpreted independently 
from other treaties, such as treaties between State B and State C or treaties between 
State C and State D. The same or similar wordings may have different meanings in 
different treaty relationships depending on the respective context. As a matter of 
practice, however, investment tribunals have often taken into account third-party 
treaties or instruments in interpreting an investment treaty between the host state and 
the home state. The similarities and differences in the treaties offer infinite 
possibilities for tribunals to try and draw conclusions as they wish.  
The use of third-party investment treaties of the states involved in an investment 
dispute has been frequently employed by investment tribunals in interpreting an 
investment treaty between the states. For instance, in Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, the 
applicable investment treaty was the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. While admitting that 
“the BIT practice of the Netherlands and Bolivia is necessarily of limited probative 
value to the task of interpreting the BIT between the Netherlands and Bolivia”, the 
tribunal nevertheless held that “the practice of a State as regards to the negotiation of 
BITs may be helpful, however, in testing the assertions of Parties as to the general 
policies of either Bolivia or the Netherlands concerning BITs, and in testing 
assumptions a tribunal may make regarding BITs.” 358 The general BIT practice of 
the Netherlands and Bolivia were thus examined, such as the Netherlands-Argentina 
BIT and the Bolivia-Argentina BIT. The purpose of making reference to the BIT 
practice of the home state or the host state lies in clarifying the intentions of the home 
state and of the host state to a specific BIT.  
Other than the reference to investment treaties of the home state or the host state, 
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the use of wholly unrelated third-party investment treaties is also regularly relied upon 
in interpreting the applicable investment treaty between the home state and the host 
state in issue. In Maffezini v. Spain, the tribunal firstly made reference to the BIT 
practice of the host state Spain, such as the Chile-Spain BIT, and concluded that 
Spain’s preferred practice was to allow for arbitration following a six-months effort to 
reach a friendly settlement. In addition, the tribunal also took into account wholly 
unrelated third-party investment treaties, such as the BIT practice of the United 
Kingdom, in interpreting the MFN clause in the applicable Argentina-Spain BIT. The 
tribunal noted that a number of investment treaties concluded by the United Kingdom 
expressly stipulated that MFN clauses applied to dispute settlement. Despite the fact 
that the Argentina-Spain BIT did not explicitly allow the application of the MFN 
clause to dispute settlement, the tribunal however reached a positive answer after the 
reference to third-party investment treaties allowing the application of MFN clauses 
to dispute settlement.
 359
 Likewise, in Enron v. Argentina, the tribunal clearly asserted 
that “the interpretation of a bilateral treaty between two parties in connection with the 
text of another treaty between different parties will normally be the same, unless the 
parties express a different intention in accordance with international law.” 360 
Sometimes, tribunals invoked a wholly unrelated third-party treaty in order to make 
an argumentum e contrario. In Tokios v. Ukraine case, in order to justify its 
conclusion that a foreign company controlled by nationals of the host state could be 
characterized as foreign investors under the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT, the tribunal 
compared the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT with two third-party treaties, the US-Argentina 
BIT and the Energy Charter Treaty. These two third-party treaties
 
explicitly excluded 
entities controlled by nationals of the host state from the scope of covered investors, 
while the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT
 
contained no such explicit exclusion provision. The 
tribunal therefore confirmed the investor status of the claimant under the 
Lithuania-Ukraine BIT.
361
 
Apart from third party treaties, instruments not in force may also be referred to by 
tribunals as an interpretive material. Model investment treaties of the host state or the 
home state or even a third state could be used in interpretation even though they have 
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no binding force to any state. In El Paso v. Argentina, the tribunal invoked the 2004 
US Model BIT in interpreting the umbrella clause in the US-Argentina BIT signed in 
1991. In the opinion of the tribunal, the 2004 US Model BIT clearly elevates only the 
contract claims stemming from an investment agreement stricto sensu, that is an 
agreement in which the State appears as a sovereign, to the level of treaty claims.
362
  
It follows that third-party treaties or instruments have been frequently referred to by 
investment tribunals, whether or not antecedent or subsequent to the treaty in dispute, 
to support or to confirm an interpretation.
 
They can be used to clarify the meaning of a 
provision of the treaty in dispute or to infer the intention of the parties to the treaty in 
dispute. 
363
 BITs or FTAs are viewed as a common framework to provide protection 
for foreign investments and thus are interpreted in connection with each other. The 
reference to third-party investment treaties or instruments departs from the bilateral 
method of treaty interpretation and indicates a general preference of investment 
tribunals in multilateralizing the bilateral relationship of parties in an investment 
treaty. Instead of stressing differences between different bilateral investment treaties, 
tribunals tend to view them not as isolated and mutually independent bilateral treaties 
but rather as a greater framework of investment protection with common concepts and 
common values.
364
 
(4) Elevating the role of supplementary means of interpretation  
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention clearly requires that the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion may be introduced in order to 
“confirm” the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 or to “determine” 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
Therefore, the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion 
can only be taken into account after the investigation of the ordinary meaning of a 
treaty under Article 31. Article 31 and Article 32 have to be applied following a 
sequential order. In other words, the methodology of Article 32 kicks in when the 
integrated method of Article 31 fails.
 365
 However, such sequential order in 
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application is not strictly followed by investment tribunals. Supplementary means of 
interpretation prescribed in Article 32 has been applied as a starting point in 
determining the meaning of an investment treaty. Tribunals might consider the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion whenever they 
are pleaded, regardless of whether or not the treaty text is ambiguous or obscure or 
leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result.
 366
 Thus the interpretive role of 
supplementary means of interpretation has been elevated.  
In MHS v. Malaysia, the annulment committee explicitly held that “in any event, 
courts and tribunals interpreting treaties regularly review the travaux preparatoires 
whenever they are brought to their attention; it is mythological to pretend that they do 
so only when they first conclude that the term requiring interpretation is ambiguous or 
obscure.” 367 The annulment committee resorted to the supplementary means of 
interpretation not because of the relevant treaty term’s ambiguity or obscurity, or the 
absurdity of its ordinary meaning. Rather, the travaux preparatoires were introduced 
to determine the ordinary meaning of the relevant treaty term. In the view of the 
committee, the travaux preparatoires of the ICSID Convention did not support the 
imposition of “outer limits” such as those imposed by the Sole Arbitrator to the 
definition of “investment”. Therefore, the automatic admissibility and review of any 
travaux preparatoires, without confirming the failure of textual interpretation applying 
Article 31, enables interpreters to “mix and match” the treaty text and the travaux 
preparatoires of the treaty.  
(5) Expansive interpretation of investors’ rights  
The approach of expansive interpretation, also called extensive, broad or liberal 
interpretation, requires an expansive interpretation of treaty provisions in case of 
ambiguity. Contrary to the expansive approach, the restrictive approach construes a 
limitation of sovereignty restrictively or narrowly in case of doubt. The restrictive 
approach is also summed up in the literature as in dubio mitius. According to the 
restrictive approach, jurisdictional clauses amount to a limitation of state sovereignty 
and should be construed strictly. The host states often insist on the restrictive 
approach arguing that where there is any ambiguity in jurisdictional clauses, a 
restrictive interpretation should be made to favour maintaining the jurisdiction of 
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local courts over international tribunals. Conversely, the foreign investors usually 
support the expansive approach arguing that it is appropriate to resolve legal 
uncertainty in favor of the protection of investors’ rights from the host states. 
Investor-state arbitration provisions are considered to be provisions conferring rights 
upon foreign investors and are thus subject to expansive interpretation. 
368
  
The idea that treaty provisions constituting derogations from state sovereignty 
should be interpreted restrictively is rarely endorsed nowadays. The approach of 
extensive interpretation in the opposite sense equally does not turn into a customary 
method of treaty interpretation.
369
 There is no principle either of extensive or 
restrictive interpretation of jurisdictional provisions in treaties under international law.
 
370
 It was famously held in SPP v. Egypt that “jurisdictional instruments are to be 
interpreted neither restrictively nor expansively, but rather objectively and in good 
faith, and jurisdiction will be found to exist if - but only if – the force of the 
arguments militating in favor of it is preponderant.”371 Nevertheless, most tribunals 
have taken the expansive approach, either overt or covert, that favours investors rather 
than restricts their rights in establishing jurisdiction and in reviewing the legality of 
state measures with provisions of the applicable investment treaties. 
In Tradex v. Albania, the tribunal found it appropriate to interpret the domestic law 
clause conferring jurisdiction upon ICSID in favour of investor protection and in 
favour of ICSID jurisdiction in particular in case of doubt.
372
 In the case of SGS v. 
Philippines, it is held by the tribunal that the BIT is a treaty for the promotion and 
reciprocal protection of investments. According to the preamble it is intended “to 
create and maintain favourable conditions for investments by investors of one 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other.” It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties 
in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered investments.
373
 In CSOB 
v. Slovakia case, the tribunal undisguisedly supported “a liberal interpretation of the 
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question whether a particular transaction constitutes an investment.” It was asserted 
that “investment as a concept should be interpreted broadly because the drafters of the 
Convention did not impose any restrictions on its meaning.”374 
Likewise, the tribunal in Loewen v. USA also did not accept the respondent’s 
submission that NAFTA was to be understood in accordance with the principle that 
treaties were to be interpreted in deference to the sovereignty of states. On the 
contrary, in the view of the tribunal, the purpose, text and context of Chapter Eleven 
of NAFTA combined to “support a liberal rather than a restricted interpretation which 
provides protection and security for the foreign investor and its investment.”375 The 
Tribunal in Mondev v. United States equally concluded that “NAFTA should be 
interpreted broadly to cover any legal claims arising out of the treatment of an 
investment as defined in Article 1139, whether or not the investment subsists as such 
at the time of the treatment which is complained of. Otherwise issues of the effective 
protection of investment at the international level will be overshadowed by technical 
questions of the application of local property laws and the classification of local 
property interests affected by foreclosure or other action subsequent to the failure of 
the investment.”376 
It is worth noting that the professed preference of tribunals for one or the other 
method of interpretation should not necessarily be taken at face value. While paying 
lip service to a particular approach to interpretation, an investment tribunal may not 
actually follow that approach.
 377
 Therefore, what matters is what the tribunal really 
does, not what it says it is doing. A tribunal’s avowed rejection of expansive 
interpretation is not always reflected in its actual decision. For instance, in Noble v. 
Romania, while holding that the interpretation of an “umbrella clause” should follow 
a strict, if not indeed restrictive, approach, the tribunal ultimately concluded that the 
“umbrella clause” had the effect of elevating a breach of investment contract into a 
breach of investment treaty. 
378
 It thus actually expanded the effect of umbrella 
clauses. Likewise, in Siemens v. Argentina, the tribunal asserted that it would adhere 
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to the Vienna Convention rules of interpretation and considered that the treaty in issue 
had to be interpreted neither liberally nor restrictively. However, it turned to the 
purpose of the treaty, which was “to create favorable conditions for investments and 
to stimulate private initiative” according to the tribunal. Such construed purpose 
ultimately guided the tribunal to make a liberal reading of MFN clauses. The tribunal 
accordingly believed that investor-state arbitration mechanism was “part of the 
treatment of foreign investors and investments and of the advantages accessible 
through a MFN clause.” 379 
The adoption of an expansive approach in investment arbitration manifests as 
expansive interpretation of investors’ rights. But it does not necessarily result in an 
expansive reading of treaty provisions. There are not only provisions conferring rights 
upon foreign investors, but also provisions restricting the scope and the exercise of 
investors’ rights in investment treaties. In the case of the legal standing of foreign 
investors in submitting claims against the host states, the host states may grant foreign 
investors such rights in investor-state arbitration provisions, but may also impose 
limitations and preconditions to such rights. For provisions entitling investors’ 
submission to arbitration, they will be interpreted broadly. Conversely, for provisions 
limiting investors’ submission to arbitration, they will be interpreted restrictively. This 
is exactly why the scope of covered investors, covered investment and covered 
investment disputes are interpreted broadly, whereas “fork-in-the-road clauses” and 
the provisions imposing preconditions to arbitration are interpreted narrowly. It thus 
follows that a tendency of interpretation in favor of foreign investors has already 
emerged in arbitral practice. In case of doubt the interpretation favourable to 
international jurisdiction and regulation against national ones is preferred by 
investment tribunals. 
380
 
In addition to the expansive approach of interpretation, the so-called principle of 
effective interpretation or effet utile is also frequently employed by investment 
tribunals although that principle is not expressly codified in the Vienna Convention. 
The principle requires that a clause must be so interpreted as to give it a meaning 
rather than so as to deprive it of meaning. Each and every clause of a treaty is to be 
interpreted as meaningful rather than meaningless.
 381
 According to several tribunals, 
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the principle of effective interpretation that treaty clauses are to be interpreted so as to 
render them effective rather than ineffective is an established and cardinal rule of 
treaty interpretation. 
382
 The principle of effectiveness is closely intertwined with the 
teleological approach to treaty interpretation in the sense that the principle can be 
formulated as favoring the interpretation that would most effectively fulfill the 
objectives of a provision or a treaty. 
383
 Effective interpretation and the strengthening 
of object and purpose are usually placed on the same level. Maximum possible effect 
to be given to the object and purpose of a treaty is supposed to be the best and most 
effective interpretation. 
384
 In arbitral practice, provisions conferring rights on 
foreign investors are often interpreted in an effective way so as to give them most 
effective meaning relying on the highlighted object and purpose of investment 
protection. However, provisions limiting investors’ rights are frequently interpreted 
narrowly since they might render the enabling provisions ineffective. Thus, the 
general tendency seems to be in the direction of utilizing the principle of effectiveness 
so as to most effectively fulfill the investment protection purpose of investment 
treaties. The application of effective interpretation would be basically equal to the 
expansive approach of interpretation. The principle of effectiveness has become a 
rhetorical excuse for tribunals’ actual inclination in resolving ambiguities in favor of 
investors rather than host states.  
(6) Relying upon previous awards 
Relying upon previous awards is also a frequent approach of investment tribunals 
in justifying their interpretation of treaty provisions. The de facto precedent effect of 
previous awards in the practice of investment arbitration will be discussed as follows.  
4.3.2 Strengthening the de facto precedent effect of prior awards 
Taking into account prior cases and treating the same case equally is of great 
importance in safeguarding the stability and predictability of law and in reinforcing 
the legal authority of adjudicators. In the field of international law, both permanent 
international dispute settlement bodies and ad hoc international tribunals frequently 
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and abundantly cite and seek guidance from previous judgments and awards.
 385
 
Nevertheless, the use of precedents in international law differs from the doctrine of 
stare decisis in common law system. Depending on their hierarchy of legal effect, 
precedents may operate in the following ways. Firstly, precedents may be considered 
as only part of the general legal material from which the law on a given point can be 
ascertained. Secondly, a stronger formulation of precedents may oblige adjudicators to 
decide the case in the same way as a previous case unless they can give a good reason 
for not doing so. Lastly, the most stringent type of precedents may oblige adjudicators 
to decide the case in the same way as a previous case even if they can give a good 
reason for not doing so. 
386
 The use of precedents in international law is of the first 
kind. Occasionally, they incline to the second type. The last kind of precedents is said 
to be based on the doctrine of stare decisis in common law system, which gives 
precedents the binding effect.  
International law does not recognize a doctrine of binding precedent or stare decisis. 
However, the fact that the doctrine of binding precedents does not apply does not 
mean that they are not precedents. The term precedent frequently occurs in the 
jurisprudence of international dispute settlement bodies, in the individual opinions of 
judges or arbitrators, in the pleadings of disputing parties and in the scholarly writings. 
Lack of obligation to follow precedents does not conflict with adjudicators’ actual use 
of precedents on their own initiative. The use of precedents as an argument is not tied 
to a particular system of stare decisis. The practice of the ICJ shows that its prior 
judgments have a certain degree of precedential value as “settled jurisprudence”. 
While normatively not obliged to follow its previous decisions, the ICJ avoids 
accepting that it is departing from its previous decisions. The ICJ, like every court, 
hesitates to overrule former pronouncements; quite to the contrary, it often refers to 
previous decisions and to reasons developed in such decisions, whether these reasons 
are ratio decidendi or obiter dicta.
 387
  It follows that the case law of the ICJ has 
been moving in the direction of regarding its prior decisions as authoritative 
precedents. 
388
  
The decisions of the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, including that of ad hoc 
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panels and of the permanent Appellate Body, equally do not have a formal status of 
precedential effect. Nevertheless, dispute settlement practice of the WTO 
demonstrates that both the Dispute Settlement Body and WTO Members attach great 
significance to previous panel and Appellate Body reports. Adopted panel and 
Appellate Body reports are often cited by disputing parties in support of their legal 
arguments in dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and the 
Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. While noting the fact that Appellate Body 
reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between 
the parties, the Appellate Body of the WTO however held that this “does not mean 
that subsequent panels are free to disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio 
decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports.” According to the Appellate 
Body, “the legal interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports 
becomes part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute settlement system.” 
“Absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal questions in 
the same way in subsequent cases.”389 Thus, the practice of the DSB of the WTO 
reinforces the legal expectation of WTO Members in believing that pronouncements 
in previous panel and Appellate Body reports are the authoritative and reliable 
statements of the WTO law.  
Likewise, although without normative obligations to follow prior arbitral decisions, 
most investment tribunals indeed acknowledge the actual precedential value of prior 
arbitral decisions and cite prior decisions to confirm or justify their interpretation of 
investment treaty provisions. 
390
 Notwithstanding the absence of any binding 
precedential effect of prior awards, the use of prior awards or decisions has already 
become the “common practice” of investment tribunals to find support. 391 It would 
be “unavoidable” that prior arbitral decisions have a practical precedential value 
similar to that of the ICJ and of the DSB of the WTO.
 392
 A de facto practice of 
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precedent “certainly exists”. 393 As a matter of fact, previous decisions are usually 
cited and discussed in the name of “case law”. According to an empirical statistics, 
previous decisions or so-called “case law” was used as an interpretive argument in 92 
out of 98 investment arbitral decisions. 
394
 As the number of investment treaty 
arbitration cases have increased sharply over time, the frequency of citation to 
previous awards and decisions have accordingly increased markedly. 
395
 Even so, it 
is still argued by some commentators that the precedential effect of investment 
arbitral decisions remains to be improved and that “a stronger doctrine of precedent” 
is desired to contribute to the certainty and stability of investment protection rules. 
396
  
Despite denying their obligation to follow precedents, tribunals do rely on previous 
decisions in terms of case law. In El Paso v. Argentina, the tribunal found “no 
provision, either in that Convention or in the BIT, establishing an obligation of stare 
decisis.” Yet, the significance of precedents was heavily emphasized by the tribunal: 
“It is, nonetheless, a reasonable assumption that international arbitral tribunals, 
notably those established within the ICSID system, will generally take account of the 
precedents established by other arbitration organs, especially those set by other 
international tribunals. The present Tribunal will follow the same line, especially 
since both parties, in their written pleadings and oral arguments, have heavily relied 
on precedent.” 397 In ADC v. Hungary, the relevance of international case law was 
also discussed by the tribunal. In the view of the tribunal, “cautious reliance on certain 
principles developed in a number of those cases, as persuasive authority, may advance 
the body of law, which in turn may serve predictability in the interest of both investors 
and host States.” 398  Moreover, the tribunal in Saipem v. Bangladesh further 
highlighted the precedential value of investment arbitral decisions. It was of the 
opinion that: 
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It must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It 
believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt 
solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, 
subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the 
actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development 
of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the 
community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.
 399
 
In Quiborax v. Bolivia, both disputing parties have relied on previous decisions or 
awards in support of their positions, either to conclude that the same solution should 
be adopted in the present case, or in an effort to explain why this Tribunal should 
depart from that solution. The tribunal in its decision on jurisdiction exactly repeated 
the same holding of the Saipem tribunal concerning the relevance of previous arbitral 
decisions.
 400
 As a methodological matter, the Quiborax tribunal’s analysis on the 
definition of investment was driven entirely by precedents.
 401
  The tribunal in its 
decision of Glamis v. USA has also followed the same line in finding that it was not 
bound by precedents but would take due account of them. The tribunal stressed its 
case-specific mandate and the absence of any obligation to apply earlier arbitral 
decisions. However, “a modicum of awareness of each of these tribunals for each 
other and the system as a whole” was required. A case-specific mandate is not license 
to ignore systemic implications. To the contrary, it arguably makes it all the more 
important that each tribunal renders its case-specific decision with sensitivity to the 
position of future tribunals and an awareness of other systemic implications. 
Therefore, it was held that an investment treaty tribunal “should indicate its reasons 
for departing from a major trend of previous reasoning, if it chooses to do so.”402 
It follows that investment tribunals in practice tend to justify their findings by 
reference to earlier awards. Tribunals do not confine themselves to an adjudicator to a 
specific dispute. They will also keep sensitive to the overall context of international 
system of investment protection. Neutral adjudication to a specific case without taking 
into account previous cases belongs to a narrow dispute resolving-oriented approach. 
While the extensive use of previous case law and the contextual awareness of 
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investment protection system as a whole would lean to lawmaking-oriented approach. 
403
 The closer to lawmaking-oriented approach, the more these tribunals have 
opportunities to preserve the legitimate expectation of disputing parties and to engage 
in a law-making function and thus to contribute to the progressive development of 
international investment law.  
In addition to the interpretation of jurisdictional provisions, the extensive use of 
prior decisions also contributes to the concretization of the normative content of 
substantive standard of investment treatment. Substantive provisions of investment 
treatment in investment treaties, such as fair and equitable treatment provisions, are 
usually vague and open-ended without precise definition. Besides seeking guidance 
from the Vienna Convention rules of treaty interpretation, making reference to prior 
decisions and awards represents a standard method in the practice of tribunals in 
concretizing and developing the normative content of these broad substantive 
provisions. Although tribunals do not admit themselves to be bound by prior cases, 
they still consider them as a primary basis for their findings. In fact, the concretization 
of these substantial treatment provisions is driven more by arbitral practice than by 
the texts of investment treaties. As regards to the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment, tribunals turn to relevant prior cases as the primary source.
 404
 Extensive 
meanings are given to the concept of fair and equitable treatment, including the 
protection of investors’ legitimate expectation, denial of justice and due process, 
manifest arbitrariness, discrimination and outright abusive treatment.
 405
 This makes 
the provisions of fair and equitable treatment in different investment treaties a 
correlative entirety which can be interpreted consistently across various investment 
treaties.  
The extensive use of previous case law is the catalyst of continuous jurisdictional 
expansion by investment tribunals. Investment tribunals are one-off or ad hoc 
tribunals created for the resolution of individual disputes. There is no single standing 
tribunal for all investment disputes. Therefore, the possibility that different ad hoc 
tribunals give different interpretation for the same legal issue remains. It is argued that 
permanent dispute settlement bodies tend to use precedent to build case law coherence 
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while ad hoc tribunals adjudicate more on a case-by-case basis and are less likely to 
defer to previous case law.
 406
 Not a few scholars believe that the phenomenon of 
inconsistent decisions rendered by different tribunals is serious enough to pose a 
legitimate crisis to the system of investor-state arbitration.
 407
 It seems to be largely 
exaggerated. 
The reality is that participants in the community of investor-state arbitration, 
including arbitrators, lawyers, treaty parties, disputing parties and scholars, rely upon 
prior arbitral awards. A closer examination of arbitral practice reveals that tribunals do 
in fact follow an informal and de facto system of precedent. Tribunals generally try to 
avoid openly criticizing prior awards. It is a common feature that tribunals cite prior 
awards to support their judgments and seek to contribute to the coherent development 
of international investment law beyond individual cases. Tribunals have an interest in 
preserving and enhancing the international regime of investment protection, especially 
the system of investor-state arbitration. The expansive readings of ISAPs lead to a 
greater reach of jurisdiction and authority for tribunals. Prior awards that accord with 
such value will be followed and refined by later tribunals and become a strong 
precedent difficult to overturn.  
States and investors argue their cases primarily in terms of this case law, accepting 
its precedential status. The influence of precedents also extends to future potential 
disputing parties. The flexible interpretation of jurisdictional provisions and the better 
chance of success for investors in previous decisions would encourage other investors 
to bring more cases to investment arbitration. The more investment claims that are 
brought to tribunals, the more these tribunals have opportunities to take into account 
previous case law and to reinforce the legitimate expectation of investment protection. 
Precedents impose argumentative burden on the party seeking a distinct interpretation 
result from that reached in a series of consistent cases. Unless treaty parties 
collectively interpret or amend the applicable investment treaty, later tribunals are not 
prevented from adopting the same interpretation result established in previous 
precedents.  
Certainly, not every arbitral decision is completely consistent with every other 
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decision, nor do tribunals always refuse to depart from precedents. Notwithstanding, 
the occurrence of open dissent with previous arbitral decisions is rare. Even if later 
tribunals consider it desirable and necessary to depart from previous decisions, they 
generally refrain from openly disagreeing with them. Instead, they will often seek to 
substitute open dissent with alternative interpretative strategies that uphold the unity 
of international investment law. 
408
 The various strategies and techniques available 
for tribunals to harmonize their decisions with precedents may include: (1) 
distinguishing the cases at hand from earlier cases by stressing differences in the legal 
and/or factual aspects; (2) reconciling the seemingly incompatible decisions on the 
basis of the relationship between rules and exceptions; and (3) concealing the 
existence of inconsistency by way of selectively citing precedents which support their 
findings.  
First and foremost, tribunals may employ the technique of distinguishing the case at 
hand from previous cases with regard to the factual and/or legal aspects. The spirit of 
citing and following precedents lies in the idea that same cases should be treated 
equally. Thus, the premise to follow precedent would be examining whether the case 
at hand is the same with previous case in the first place. The practice of distinguishing 
one case from another is well established in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. The ICJ 
would stress the legal or factual difference between the case at hand and the cited case 
in order to depart from the cited case.
 409
  Following this, previous cases are not 
followed not because they lack authority, but because the legal or factual framework 
of the new case is significantly different. This technique of distinguishing is equally 
employed by investment tribunals. In AES v. Argentina, the tribunal concurred with 
the opinion that “repeating decisions taken in other cases, without making the factual 
and legal distinctions, may constitute an excess of power and may affect the integrity 
of the international system for the protection of investments.” 410 
The decisions in CME v. Czech and Lauder v. Czech have attracted wide attention 
and concern and have been subject to criticism for the phenomenon of inconsistent 
decisions that may pose a legitimate crisis to the system of investor-state arbitration. 
411
 Mr. Lauder, an American citizen, invested in a local company in Czech through an 
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intermediate company CME which was incorporated in the Netherlands. After the 
host state Czech adopted a series of measures against the local company, Mr. Lauder 
initiated arbitration proceedings against Czech pursuant to the US-Czech BIT. And 
CME, Mr. Lauder’s investment vehicle, also submitted its investment claims against 
Czech under the Netherlands-Czech BIT. Two tribunals were thus constituted 
separately. Both tribunals found jurisdiction over the claims, but ultimately reached 
the contrary conclusions with respect to the merits. The CME award was posterior to 
the Lauder award. The CME tribunal was aware of the Lauder award when rendering 
its award. While referring to the Lauder award, the CME tribunal heavily stressed the 
difference. According to the CME tribunal, the parties in the CME arbitration differed 
from the parties in the Lauder arbitration since CME was a Dutch holding company 
and Mr. Lauder was a U.S. citizen. Also importantly, the two arbitration cases were 
based on different bilateral investment treaties. The CME tribunal thus considered that 
it “cannot judge whether the facts submitted to the two tribunals for decision are 
identical and it may well be that facts and circumstances presented to this Tribunal 
have been presented quite differently to the London Tribunal.”412 It seems that the 
CME tribunal tried to avoid criticizing the Lauder award by way of distinguishing in 
legal and factual points.  
The interpretation of umbrella clauses and MFN clauses by differing investment 
tribunals is also considered to be another area revealing the inconsistency of 
investment awards. As a matter of fact, regarding the interpretation of umbrella 
clauses and MFN clauses, tribunals tend to avoid direct conflict with precedents by 
distinguishing cases on the basis of factual and/or legal differences. Tribunals attribute 
their divergence in interpreting umbrella clauses to differences in the wording of 
umbrella clauses in different cases. 
413
 For instance, in Noble v. Romania, the 
tribunal held that the umbrella clause in the US-Romania BIT had the effect of 
elevating contract obligations into treaty obligations such that breaches of contract 
were also breaches of treaty. On the contrary, the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan believed 
that the umbrella clause in the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT did not have such effect. 
However, the Noble tribunal did not consider the decision in SGS v. Pakistan to be 
wrong. According to the Noble tribunal, the formulation of umbrella clauses in two 
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cases were different and the umbrella clause in SGS v. Pakistan might be interpreted 
as having no effect of elevating contractual breaches to the level of breaches of 
international law. 
414
 Similarly, in Salini v. Jordan, the tribunal also implied that the 
divergence between the decisions in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines stemmed 
from the different wording of umbrella clauses in two cases. 
415
 
The technique of distinguishing is also employed to avoid open dissent as regards 
to the interpretation of MFN clauses. In Suez v. Argentina, the tribunal chose to depart 
from the decision in Plama v. Bulgaria since “whatever its merits, it is in any event 
clearly distinguishable from the present case on a number of grounds.” First, at a basic 
level, the Suez tribunal believed that the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT was 
much broader in scope in the Suez case than the wording of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT 
in the Plama case. Second, subsequent negotiations between Bulgaria and Cyprus 
showed the two treaty parties did not consider that the MFN clause might extend to 
the dispute settlement provision in other BITs. But no evidence of any comparable 
intent has been suggested in the Suez case. Third, as a further distinguishing factor, 
the effect of the MFN clause in two cases was considered to be different. In the Plama 
case, the Claimant attempted to replace the dispute settlement provisions in the 
applicable Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT in toto by a dispute resolution mechanism 
“incorporated” from another treaty. But the Claimant in the Suez case only attempted 
to seek a “much more limited” effect, which merely involves replacing a preliminary 
procedure in accessing the investor-state arbitration. Therefore, the Suez tribunal 
decided to follow the broader interpretation in Maffezini v. Spain rather than the 
narrower interpretation in Plama v. Bulgaria. 
416
 Likewise, in RosInvest v. Russia, 
the tribunal held that the wording of the MFN clause in the UK-USSR BIT was not 
identical to that in any of such other treaties considered in previous cases and thus 
concluded that it could rely on the MFN clause to broaden the coverage of matters 
subject to arbitration. 
417
 In this way, the broader interpretation of MFN clauses in 
some previous cases was followed as persuasive and appropriate precedent, while the 
narrower interpretation of MFN clauses in other previous cases was disregarded and 
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had no influence on later cases since they are distinguishable.  
Secondly, tribunals may try to reconcile the seemingly incompatible decisions on 
the basis of the relationship between rules and exceptions. In Plama v. Bulgaria, while 
differing from the decision in Maffezini v. Spain with respect to the interpretation of 
MFN clauses, the tribunal however held that the decision in Maffezini was 
“understandable” since the Maffezini case concerned an exceptional circumstance in 
which the tribunal attempted to neutralize a “nonsensical” requirement that during the 
first 18 months the dispute should be tried in the local courts before access to 
international arbitration. Such exceptional circumstances were not present in the 
Plama case.
 
Besides, the Plama tribunal recognized one exception to the principle: a 
MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute settlement 
provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in 
the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate 
them. 
418
 Thus, it can be seen that the Plama tribunal tried to reconcile its decision 
with the decision in Maffezini by way of depicting the Maffezini decision as a possible 
exception to a principle established by its own decision.  
Lastly, tribunals may conceal the existence of inconsistency by way of selectively 
citing precedents which support their findings. For instance, in LG & E v. Argentina, 
the tribunal cited the decision in CMS v. Argentina in supporting its interpretation of 
the umbrella clause and the fair and equitable treatment provision in the US-Argentina 
BIT. However, it did not mention that the CMS decision differed greatly with respect 
to the application of emergency escape clause in the US-Argentina BIT. The CMS 
decision applied the rule of necessity under customary international law and 
concluded that the international responsibility of Argentina could not be excused since 
the requirements for invoking the state of necessity were not satisfied. On the contrary, 
the LG & E tribunal applied the emergency escape clause in the US-Argentina BIT 
and held that Argentina was excused from complying with its BIT obligations and 
thus was exempt of responsibility during the period of its economic crisis. 
419
 It 
seems that the LG & E tribunal cited the CMS decision in a selective way to support 
its interpretation of the umbrella clause and the fair and equitable treatment provision 
and to conceal the divergence in the finding of liability in the meantime. It would 
appear to the public that these two decisions are not inconsistent.  
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It is worth pointing out that precedent is only a legal tool in interpreting and 
applying rules. Legal precedent in international dispute settlement is neither to be 
worshipped nor ignored.
 420
 Different precedents may have varying weight and 
authority for later adjudicators. In investment arbitration, those precedents that 
preserved and enhanced the international regime of investment protection would be 
more likely to be cited and refined by later tribunals. However, prior arbitral decisions 
that gave precedence to the sovereignty of host states rather than to the rights of 
foreign investors would be more likely to be discarded. Therefore, prior decisions 
making an expansive interpretation of investor-state arbitration provisions and 
substantive provisions of investment protection, as persuasive and influential 
precedent, would mostly be followed and reinforced by later tribunals and further 
become a strong precedent difficult to depart from. 
4.4 Arbitrator incentives to achieve the creeping jurisdiction 
In general, although being appointed by the disputing parties, arbitrators have to 
adjudicate neutrally and independently. The impartiality and independence are among 
the fundamental requirements of arbitrators in adjudicating disputes between the 
disputing parties. One of the central issues of arbitration theory is maintaining a 
proper balance between parties’ autonomy to select arbitrators and the neutrality 
requirement of arbitration. Procedural fairness between the disputing parties is 
considered to be an important premise to achieve the neutral and independent 
adjudication. In inter-state arbitration, the disputing parties are states which are equal 
in sovereignty. In international commercial arbitration, the dispute involves private 
rights and obligations belonging to private parties on an equal footing. Both inter-state 
arbitration and international commercial arbitration are used to resolve disputes 
arising from a reciprocal legal relationship between the disputing parties. Either 
disputing party is capable of bringing a claim and of possessing the same sets of legal 
rights and obligations. Quite distinctively, in investor-state arbitration, the dispute 
arises between a foreign investor and the host state which are not equal in status. The 
relationship between investors and host states is one of governing and being governed. 
Nevertheless, this regulatory relationship does not lead to states’ excessive control 
over the arbitration process. Oppositely, it constitutes the very theoretical basis and 
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value appeal that tribunals emphasize the safeguarding of investors’ rights and the 
scrutiny of host state measures in order to level the playing field between investors 
and host states. In various aspects of arbitrator candidates, arbitrators’ conflict of 
interest and arbitrators’ pro-arbitration inclination, the invest-state arbitration 
mechanism appears likely to favor the interests of foreign investors and to limit the 
policy space of host states.  
4.4.1 Arbitrator candidates 
Where only one class of parties (foreign investors) can bring the claims against the 
other class (host states), the opportunity to be appointed as arbitrators will be 
dependent upon whether foreign investors initiate the arbitration proceedings. In 
contrast to inter-state arbitration or international commercial arbitration where both 
disputing parties may bring the claims, in investor-state arbitration only foreign 
investors are entitled to bring the claims against host states. Foreign investors are able 
to challenge the regulatory measures of host states by starting the arbitration process 
while host states can only passively participate in the arbitration process. In addition, 
investment tribunals are one-off or ad hoc tribunals created for the resolution of 
individual disputes. There is no single standing tribunal for all investment disputes. 
States have less control over who is appointed to investment tribunals compared to 
other international courts because arbitrators are not chosen by the treaty parties but 
rather selected by the disputing parties. Therefore, the number of ad hoc investment 
tribunals depends upon whether investors activate the arbitration process.  
If investment treaty arbitration can be analogized as a commodity, then foreign 
investors would be the customer. The market of investment treaty arbitration will not 
grow unless investors consider it worthwhile to bring claims to investment treaty 
arbitration. Thus, investment arbitrators have an apparent interest to interpret the law 
in a way that facilitates or encourages claims. Arbitrators have a critical interest in the 
existence and the booming of investment arbitration.
 421
 They tend to favor potential 
investor claimants in order to grow the industry and thus to increase the opportunities 
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to be appointed as arbitrators in future cases.  
Arbitrators have a professional and financial stake in reappointment. According to 
the statistics, in case of ICSID arbitration, there are several arbitrators appointed 
repeatedly in most cases.
 422
 There are 29 arbitrators, constituting a small inner elite 
group, who have sat in more than 10 ICSID arbitration cases. Of these 29 arbitrators, 
a group of 15 arbitrators can be considered as “the movers and shakers of 
international investment arbitration”. The elite 15 arbitrators have decided on 55% of 
the total investment treaty arbitration cases known today. 
423
 These elite arbitrators 
frequently sit side by side as co-arbitrators or even as arbitrators and counsels for 
investors. As a matter of practice, arbitrators receive a substantial financial interest 
from an investment arbitration case. Arbitrators’ fees can range from US$375 to 
US$700 per hour depending on which arbitration rule governs the proceedings.
 424
 
For instance, in the case of Chevron v. Ecuador, the fees and expenses of Prof. 
Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, the Presiding Arbitrator and also one of the 15 elite 
arbitrators, amount to €652,12 .   (US$ 3 ,    under the then exchange rate) and 
€27,7 8.55, respectively. 425 The increasing confidence of investors in investment 
arbitration mechanism encourages investors to submit more cases to tribunals and 
meanwhile brings considerable financial incomes for those frequently appointed 
arbitrators.  
As to the composition of appointed arbitrators, most arbitrators have commercial 
backgrounds. Besides, arbitrators may also act as counsels, advocates or experts in 
other cases. Lawyers in private practice dominate the field with over 60% of ICSID 
investment arbitrators in private practice.
 426
 About 70% of ICSID arbitrators come 
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from North America and Western Europe. 
427
 Differing from the fact that most 
arbitrators come from developed countries, most of the countries being sued before 
investment treaty tribunals have been either developing countries or economies in 
transition. In almost 85 percent of cases an investor from a developed country brings a 
claim against a developing country and another 10 percent of cases are between an 
investor from a developing country and developing host country.
 428
  
A counterargument may be presented against the commercial background of 
arbitrator candidates since the respondent states may appoint arbitrators with public 
international law background which are more likely to favor the interests of states. It 
cannot hold water due to the following two reasons. First, as a matter of fact, the high 
percentage of appointed arbitrators with a commercial background invariably affects 
the way in which the respondent states select their arbitrators. Since the respondent 
states must be cognizant of the need to appoint arbitrators who will carry weight with 
the presiding arbitrator and the other party-appointed arbitrator. Choosing someone 
with extreme pro-state stances or obvious connections to the host state is unlikely to 
achieve this purpose. This might explain why some respondent states themselves 
surprisingly appoint arbitrators with a commercial background. 
429
  
Second, the presiding arbitrators play a dominant role in arbitration 
decision-making and thus the appointment mechanism of the presiding arbitrators is 
crucial for arbitration outcomes. 
430
 Three-person tribunals are overwhelmingly 
dominant in the practice of investment arbitration. Each disputing party may appoint 
one arbitrator and the third arbitrator would be selected by both parties or by the 
party-appointed arbitrators. Where the disputing parties or their own party-appointed 
arbitrators of a tribunal cannot agree on whom to appoint, the appointing authorities 
designated under investment treaties would have the power to appoint the presiding 
arbitrator. Thus, the appointing authorities have wide discretion as to the appointment 
of the presiding arbitrators.  
For instance, Article 37(2) of the ICSID Convention provides that where the parties 
do not agree upon the number of arbitrators and the method of their appointment, the 
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Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and 
the third, who shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the 
parties. Article 38 of the ICSID Convention further stipulates that if the Tribunal shall 
not have been constituted within a certain period, the Chairman of the ICSID 
Administrative Council shall, at the request of either party and after consulting both 
parties as far as possible, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed. 
Accordingly, if the parties have not reached an agreement on the candidate of the 
presiding arbitrator, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council would be 
empowered to appoint the presiding arbitrator that are not subject to the approval of 
the parties. As a matter of theory, the appointing authority needs to be neutral and 
impartial in selecting the presiding arbitrator. However, as a matter of practice, the 
Chairman as the appointing authority appears to lean towards developed countries in 
choosing the presiding arbitrators. Among the arbitrators being appointed by the 
Chairman, approximately three-fourths of them have been nationals of industrial 
countries.
 431
 According to Article 5 of the ICSID Convention, the President of the 
World Bank shall be ex officio Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council. The 
President of the World Bank is by convention a US national nominated by the US 
government and confirmed by the Bank’s Board of Directors, where roughly 60% of 
the voting power is exercised by Executive Directors from 11 major capital-exporting 
states, including the United States, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland and Japan. Therefore, it is 
difficult to say with confidence that the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative 
Council is free from a bias in favor of certain state or private interests and against 
others in appointing the presiding arbitrators favoring certain state or private interests. 
432
  
Besides, the appointment mechanism of the presiding arbitrators can also be found 
in other international institutional arbitration rules. Article 12(4) of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules provides that “where the dispute is to be referred to three arbitrators, 
the third arbitrator, who will act as president of the arbitral tribunal, shall be appointed 
by the Court, unless the parties have agreed upon another procedure for such 
appointment.” Under the ICC Rules, the presiding arbitrators is generally appointed 
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by the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration, the members of which are chosen by 
the ICC world council of business on the recommendation of the ICC Executive 
Board. On its website, the ICC describes itself as “the world business organization”, 
as “the voice of world business”, and as an organization that “speaks for world 
business whenever government make decisions that crucially affect corporate 
strategies and the bottom line.” 433 It is doubtful whether the ICC would remain 
completely neutral in appointing arbitrators of investment tribunals considering that 
the disputes arise between private business and sovereign states. Similarly, according 
to Article 6 the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, if three arbitrators are to be appointed, 
each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose 
the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the arbitral tribunal. 
Where the two arbitrators have not agreed on the presiding arbitrator, the presiding 
arbitrator shall be appointed by the appointing authority. If the parties have not agreed 
on the choice of an appointing authority within 30 days after a proposal made has 
been received by all other parties, any party may request the Secretary-General of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration to designate the appointing authority. Notably, the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules imposing a greater discipline requiring that “the 
appointing authority shall have regard to such considerations as are likely to secure 
the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator”.  
Furthermore, the question of unequal information may lead to “information 
asymmetries” between the disputing parties in selecting arbitrators. The disputing 
parties may have unequal access to both public and non-public information about 
potential arbitrators, which is seen as a highly valuable commodity possessed by law 
firms specializing in investment arbitration. 
434
 Law firms in possession of more 
non-public information about potential arbitrators, including knowledge about a 
potential arbitrator’s opinions about the interpretation of particular investment treaty 
provisions, would provide significant advantages to the represented disputing party, 
usually foreign investors. 
4.4.2 Arbitrators’ conflicts of interest 
It is widely recognized that the independence and impartiality of arbitrators are 
fundamental to due process and the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration. 
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Arbitrators should be persons that may be relied upon to exercise independent and 
impartial judgment. The term independence suggests the absence of any connection, 
professional, financial or otherwise, with the disputing parties. As to the term 
impartiality, it suggests the absence of prejudice or bias.  
The multiple roles played by investment arbitrators, however, lead to potential 
conflict of interest and thus pose a significant threat to their independence and 
impartiality. A majority of investment arbitrators also serve as counsels for investors 
in other investment arbitration cases. 
435
 It has become normal for investment 
arbitrators to be involved as counsel, advocate, or expert witness for investors in other 
pending cases. Arbitrators thus wear several hats simultaneously: arbitrator, expert 
and counsel. The multiple roles of arbitrators may encourage arbitrators and investors 
to form a community of interests. 
436
 It raises questions of due process and may have 
a negative impact on the equality of the disputing parties. For one thing, the legal 
opinion of a person acting as counsel for investors in one case would inevitably 
influence the legal stance of the same person acting as arbitrator in other cases. An 
arbitrator may be tempted, consciously or unconsciously, to adjudicate a case in favor 
of the interests of a client in another case he serves as counsel. Conflict of interest can 
thus arise when an arbitrator has ongoing interests relating to the same legal issue as 
counsel in another case. For another, arbitrators have a financial and career stake, 
including further appointment in future investment arbitration cases, in strengthening 
investor protection and in being friendly to investors. Since investment arbitration is 
ad hoc in nature, the appointment of arbitrators is one-off but not permanent. To 
increase the opportunity of reappointment, arbitrators in a particular case may not 
refrain from showing their preference for investment protection. Furthermore, unlike 
arbitrators in commercial arbitration where they may frequently serve as counsels for 
either the claimants or the respondents in other cases, arbitrators in investment 
arbitration are more likely to work as counsels for the claimant investors rather than 
for the respondent states in other cases.  
However, under the existing investment arbitration rules, prohibitive or restrictive 
regulations on the multiple roles of investment arbitrators are missing. Arbitrators can 
                                                             
435 David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment 
Policy Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2012/3, 2012, p. 44; Michael 
Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political, ASIL Research Forum, UCLA, 5 November 2011, p. 28. 
436 Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are 
fuelling an investment arbitration boom, Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute, 2012, 
p. 43. 
Chapter 4: Causes and Institutional Foundations of the Creeping Jurisdiction of Investment Treaty 
Tribunals 
161 
 
freely act as counsel, advocate or expert in other cases without limitation. In spite that 
arbitration rules generally require arbitrators to disclose information that might give 
rise to justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality, they do not 
describe in detail what needs to be disclosed. The disclosure is left to the arbitrators’ 
discretion. Failure of arbitrators to disclose relevant information does not 
automatically lead to disqualification. Even if arbitrators indeed disclose their 
multiple roles as legal counsel, advocate or experts in other cases, it does not 
necessarily provide sufficient grounds for challenging the qualification of arbitrators 
under the existing arbitration rules since the multiple roles played by arbitrators may 
involve different parties and different legal relationships.  
Article 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides that each arbitrator shall sign a 
declaration disclosing (a) his past and present professional, business and other 
relationships (if any) with the parties and (b) any other circumstance that might cause 
his reliability for independent judgment to be questioned by a party. However, the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules contains no definition of the kind of relationships and the 
type of circumstances that should be disclosed by arbitrators. According to Article 9(4) 
of the Arbitration Rules, when a party proposes for disqualification of a minority of 
arbitrators, the other arbitrators of the tribunal shall promptly consider and vote on the 
proposal in the absence of the arbitrator concerned. If those arbitrators are equally 
divided, it is the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council who has to decide on 
a proposal to disqualify an arbitrator. Are an arbitrator’s multiple roles of counsel, 
advocate or expert in other cases a “relationship” or “circumstance” that needs to be 
disclosed? Do an arbitrator’s multiple roles of counsel, advocate or expert in other 
cases provide sufficient grounds for disqualification of the arbitrator? The ICSID 
Arbitration Rules provides no further specification on these questions.  
Disclosure requirements by arbitrators are also found in other international 
arbitration rules. Article 11(2) and 11(4) of the ICC Arbitration Rules stipulates that 
the prospective arbitrator shall disclose in writing to the Secretariat any facts or 
circumstances which might be of such a nature as to call into question the Arbitrator’s 
independence in the eyes of the parties, as well as any circumstances that could give 
rise to reasonable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality. The decisions of the Court 
as to the appointment or challenge of an arbitrator shall be final, and the reasons for 
such decisions shall not be communicated. Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules provides that when a person is approached in connection with his or her 
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possible appointment as an arbitrator, he or she shall disclose any circumstances likely 
to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence. An 
arbitrator, from the time of his or her appointment and throughout the arbitral 
proceedings, shall without delay disclose any such circumstances to the parties and 
the other arbitrators unless they have already been informed by him or her of these 
circumstances. Where a party challenges an arbitrator, it shall be decided by the 
appointing authority.  
These arbitration rules do not specify in detail the type of information or 
circumstance that needs to be disclosed by arbitrators. More importantly, the legal 
consequence of failure to satisfy the disclosure requirements is not stipulated in these 
arbitration rules. It seems that the disclosure is left to the arbitrators’ discretion and 
that failure of arbitrators to disclose relevant information does not automatically lead 
to disqualification. Even if arbitrators choose to disclose their multiple roles as legal 
counsel, advocate or experts in other cases, it does not necessarily provide sufficient 
ground for the disqualification of those arbitrators under the existing arbitration rules. 
Although dealing with similar legal issues, acting as arbitrator in a case and acting as 
counsel in another case might be considered as relating to different parties and thus 
having no relationship to the parties he is adjudicating as arbitrator. Yet it can be 
reasonably doubted that an arbitrator may not be able to maintain an entirely unbiased 
approach if he acts as counsel in other cases involving similar legal issues. Therefore, 
the existing investment arbitration rules are inadequate in avoiding arbitrators’ 
conflict of interest. 
To illustrate, in Gallo v. Canada, an investment arbitration case proceeded under 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the claimant challenged the respondent-appointed 
arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator was advising Mexico in another case. The 
former deputy Secretary-General of ICSID performing the Secretary- eneral’s 
functions, as the appointing authority, denied the challenge. It was ruled that “as 
things stand today, and irrespective of the advisability of such a situation, one may as 
a general matter be simultaneously an arbitrator in one case and a counsel in another. 
There is no need to disavow the possibility of assuming either role.” 437 The multiple 
roles of arbitrators and counsels in different cases have been acknowledged without 
condemnation in the practice of investment arbitration.  
The absence of regulation of dual arbitrator-counsel roles in investment arbitration 
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practice is in stark contrast to the practice of the ICJ and the WTO. In its Practice 
Direction VII, the ICJ considers that it is not in the interest of the sound 
administration of justice that a person sits as judge ad hoc in one case who is also 
acting or has recently acted as agent, counsel or advocate in another case before the 
Court. Accordingly, the ICJ has directed that parties, when appointing a judge ad hoc, 
should refrain from choosing persons who are acting as agent, counsel or advocate in 
another case before the Court or have acted in that capacity during the three years 
preceding the date of the nomination. Furthermore, parties should likewise refrain 
from designating as agent, counsel or advocate in a case before the Court a person 
sitting as a judge ad hoc in another case before the Court. Practice Direction VIII 
further provides that a person who has been a member of the court, a judge ad hoc, 
registrar, deputy-registrar, or high official of the Court should not, for a period of 
three years after leaving his or her position, be designated as agent, counsel, or 
advocate in a case before the Court. 
438
 
With respect to the WTO system, the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes was adopted to preserve 
the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settlement proceedings. Each covered 
person, including members of ad hoc WTO dispute settlement panels, the Standing 
Appellate Body, arbitrators and experts participating in the dispute settlement 
mechanism as well as members of the Secretariat, is required to disclose the existence 
or development of any interest, relationship or matter that that person could 
reasonably be expected to know and that is likely to affect, or give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to, that person’s independence or impartiality; and to take due care in the 
performance of their duties to fulfill these expectations, including through avoidance 
of any direct or indirect conflicts of interest in respect of the subject matter of the 
proceedings. Moreover, the disclosure requirement is accompanied by an Illustrative 
List of Information To Be Disclosed (Annex 2), which deserves full quotation here:  
Each covered person, as defined in Section IV:1 of these Rules of Conduct has a 
continuing duty to disclose the information described in Section VI:2 of these Rules 
which may include the following: 
(a) financial interests (e.g. investments, loans, shares, interests, other debts); 
business interests (e.g. directorship or other contractual interests); and property 
interests relevant to the dispute in question; 
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(b) professional interests (e.g. a past or present relationship with private clients, or 
any interests the person may have in domestic or international proceedings, and their 
implications, where these involve issues similar to those addressed in the dispute in 
question); 
(c) other active interests (e.g. active participation in public interest groups or other 
organisations which may have a declared agenda relevant to the dispute in question); 
(d) considered statements of personal opinion on issues relevant to the dispute in 
question (e.g. publications, public statements); 
(e) employment or family interests (e.g. the possibility of any indirect advantage or 
any likelihood of pressure which could arise from their employer, business associates 
or immediate family members).
 439
  
4.4.3 Arbitrators’ pro-arbitration inclination 
A recent empirical study shows that investment arbitrators, especially the 
claimant-appointed arbitrators, are significantly likely to affirm jurisdiction and 
liability of host states. 
440
 A similar observation was made by Singapore Chief 
Justice Sundaresh Menon, who noted that it was “in the interest of the entrepreneurial 
arbitrator to rule expansively on his own jurisdiction and then in favour of the investor 
on the merits because this increases the prospect of future claims and is thereby 
business-generating.” 441  Although empirical study does not provide conclusive 
evidence that investment arbitrators are not independent or not neutral, it does suggest 
that arbitrators have incentives to sustain and safeguard the mechanism of investment 
treaty arbitration.  
How arbitrators adjudicate on the jurisdiction and the merits may be greatly 
influenced by their backgrounds and interests. 
442
 The background of most arbitrators 
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in private practice guides them to treat commercial arbitration between private parties 
as a default template for investment treaty arbitration between foreign investors and 
host states. Notions of commercial dispute settlement between private parties are 
extended to public dispute settlement involving sovereign states. While being familiar 
with commercial rules, those arbitrators do not pay due regard to rules of public 
international law, especially customary rules of treaty interpretation and the absence 
of compulsory jurisdiction under international law unless and until there is consent. 
Given the asymmetrical nature of investment treaty arbitration (specifically, only 
investors can activate the investment arbitration process), arbitrators have an interest 
in ruling broadly on jurisdiction and favorably to investors on merits and damages to 
increase the likelihood of future claims and thus to sustain and expand the system of 
investment treaty arbitration. 
443
 Since lawyers acting as either arbitrators or counsels 
are dependent on future claims brought by investors, they tend to adopt an expansive 
interpretation of investment treaty clauses favoring the interests of investors who have 
the exclusive right to invoke the use of the investment treaty arbitration system. 
The pro-arbitration inclination is reflected not only in the arbitral awards, but also 
in the academic field. Many of the lawyers serving as arbitrators and counsels also 
hold academic positions. Arbitrators and counsels usually do not refrain from 
expressing their opinions on the system of investment treaty arbitration in academia. 
This is because an arbitrator’s published writings or public statements are not a basis 
for the disqualification of the arbitrator for lack of independence or impartiality. It is 
not illegitimate for parties to appoint arbitrators who they believe to be sympathetic to 
their arguments. It is usually from his published writings or public statements that an 
arbitrator candidate’s personal convictions may be known. Through academic 
teaching, international conferences, research and publications, arbitrators and 
counsels make an utmost effort to defend the investment arbitration system, and to 
encourage investors to make full use of investment arbitration to challenge the 
regulatory measures of host states.  
The participation of arbitrators and counsels in the academic field triggers a 
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scholarly boom of investment arbitration, creating an academic atmosphere justifying 
the expansionary trend of investment treaty arbitration. To illustrate, the editorial 
board members of important journals in the field of international investment law and 
investment treaty arbitration is dominated by people acting as arbitrators, counsels or 
from arbitral institutions. Arbitration International, ICSID Review-Foreign Investment 
Law Journal, Journal of International Arbitration, Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement, Journal of World Trade and Investment and Transnational Dispute 
Management are the leading journals in the field of investment treaty law and 
arbitration. Arbitrators and counsels account for 70% of the editorial board members 
on average in these top journals. Articles with strongly critical stances towards the 
practice of investment arbitration are difficult to get published “because people who 
peer review you are people who are within the system.” 444 It is argued that the 
practitioner’s dominance in the literature makes them “opinion leaders” and leads the 
academic research to a direction that defends and promotes the expansion of 
investment treaty arbitration. The expanding tendency of arbitrators in affirming 
jurisdiction and finding liability of host states can thus find support and be legitimized 
in academic writings. 
445
 As a matter of fact, academic opinions play an important 
role in the case law of investment arbitration. Tribunals often referred to books or 
articles on international investment law, usually written by arbitrators and counsels 
who simultaneously hold academic posts, as an essential interpretive argument.
 446
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Chapter 5: Competition and Interaction between States and 
Tribunals with respect to the Creeping Jurisdiction 
The expansion of jurisdiction in investor-state arbitration enhances the capabilities 
of the arbitration system. Nevertheless, the continuation of the investment arbitration 
system depends on finding the right balance between providing incentives for investor 
claimants to bring cases and giving comfort to state respondents considering whether 
to remain within the system. In considering the claims of investors, investment 
tribunals need to consider whether their rulings would go far beyond the tolerance 
limit of state respondents (host states). If the tribunals’ rulings on jurisdiction and 
merits go far beyond the acceptability of states, states might choose to exit the 
mechanism of investment arbitration, which will endanger the existence of investment 
arbitration “cake”. Only if the existence of the arbitration “cake” is guaranteed, can 
the size of the arbitration “cake” be increased. 447 Even arbitrators favoring the 
expansionary side also realized that investment arbitration was a “delicate 
mechanism”, and that “a single incident of an adventurist arbitrator going beyond the 
proper scope of jurisdiction in a sensitive case may be sufficient to generate a 
backlash.” 448  
Borrowing the words of Judge Pieter Kooijmans, if the result of jurisdictional 
analysis is too restrictive, the international dispute settlement body will undermine its 
authority, if it is too ambitious it will endanger its position, since States may become 
more reluctant to accept its jurisdiction or more inclined to withdraw the acceptance 
already given.
449
 Jurisdictional analysis of the international dispute settlement body is 
not a mechanical process without value judgment, but rather a manifestation of how it 
locates itself. International tribunals can be very creative and capable of extending 
considerably the scope and reach of their jurisdiction and the rules they are entrusted 
to interpret.
450
 The jurisdictional expansion understandably comes at the price of 
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limiting the discretion of treaty parties. It is thus necessary to consider the dynamics 
between investment tribunals and treaty parties. For example, what are the general 
stances of treaty parties towards the jurisdictional creep by investment tribunals? To 
what extent may investment tribunals coordinate the behavior patterns of treaty 
parties? If treaty parties feel dissatisfied, what measures are available for treaty parties 
to counter the jurisdictional expansion of tribunals? Do these control measures 
function as they are purported to be?  
5.1 Factors influencing the acceptability of investment arbitration awards 
by contracting states 
The concept of acceptability is introduced here to measure the extent of tolerance 
treaty parties have for the jurisdictional creep of investment tribunals. In general, an 
arbitral award has binding force on the disputing parties regardless of whether it is 
acceptable to them. It should be noted from the beginning that the concept of 
acceptability here does not deny the binding force of arbitral awards in individual 
cases, but rather evaluates the political effect of awards to treaty parties. Usually, the 
respondent states would not question the formal binding force of arbitral awards on 
them, but would question their legitimacy and accuracy. The acceptability of treaty 
parties for the jurisdictional expansion by tribunals is likely to change with factors 
such as the vagueness of investment treaty norms, the caseload of investment 
arbitration, the quality of their legal reasoning, the effect of prior arbitral decisions, 
the composition of tribunal members and their preferences. In addition, the finality 
and worldwide enforceability of investment arbitral awards also exerts considerable 
pressure on the respondent states to comply with them.  
Firstly, the less precise investment treaty norms are, the more discretion tribunals 
would have with respect to the interpretation of these treaty norms. The vagueness of 
investment treaty provisions is the very pivot upon which the scope of jurisdiction 
could be expanded and the scrutiny of consistency of state measures with treaty 
obligations could be strengthened. Such ambiguity is manifested in both investment 
arbitration provisions and substantive treatment provisions. The ambiguity of 
investment arbitration provisions leaves the door open for the expansion of tribunals’ 
jurisdiction, which brings more chances for tribunals to interpret and develop 
substantive treatment provisions in applicable investment treaties.  
As a matter of theory, treaty parties may express their opposition to an award by 
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clarifying or modifying the relevant investment treaty norms or threatening to exit 
investment treaties. As a matter of fact, however, the capability of treaty parties to 
control and overrule the interpretation of investment tribunals may be limited due to 
the following reasons. First, the vagueness of several concepts is sometimes intended 
by treaty parties. For example, the evolvement from the enterprise-based definition of 
investment to the asset-based definition of investment put forward by treaty parties 
leads to a broader but more obscure scope of investment. Second, treaty norms tend to 
become rigid and difficult to amend once concluded. Contrary with the majority rule 
for the amendment of domestic law, the amendment or interpretation of an 
international treaty requires collective action, which is consent from all treaty parties. 
It is rather difficult for treaty parties to reach an agreement on the modification or 
interpretation of treaty norms since treaty parties, especially capital-exporting 
countries and capital-importing countries, may have distinct interest preferences and 
thus may have different understandings of treaty norms. Third, the more costly it is 
for states to exit from the regime of investment arbitration and investment treaties, the 
greater the discretion of investment tribunals. Although exiting from the regime of 
investment arbitration and investment treaties is an absolute right of treaty parties, 
treaty parties rarely exercise this right since the cost of exiting remains high. States 
may be unwilling to withdraw from an investment treaty, even when they object to 
certain interpretations of investment tribunals, for fear of being excluded from the 
regime’s benefits, such as possible increases in investment flows and competitive 
advantages for their investors.
451
 Lastly, treaty parties may lack the capability to 
know, assess and respond to the enormous case law of investment arbitration because 
of the lack of human and financial resources. The fewer financial and human 
resources available to contracting states, the weaker their legal control over 
investment tribunals. Although the silence or inaction of treaty parties other than the 
respondent state cannot be simply equated with approval, it will be an important 
factor that investment tribunals rely upon to legitimize their expansive interpretation.  
Secondly, the impact of investment arbitral awards increases with the number of 
cases submitted to arbitration. Generally, controlling the number of future cases 
submitted to an international dispute settlement body is one of the ways to limit its 
legitimacy and capability. 
452
 Such control, however, does not function well in 
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investment arbitration mechanism. It is because foreign investors have direct access to 
investment arbitration under investment treaties even though they are not one of treaty 
parties. The broader and less costly the access to an international court or tribunal, the 
greater the number of cases it will receive.
 453
 The right to activate the investment 
arbitration process is allocated to foreign investors, while treaty parties cannot bring 
claims against foreign investors and cannot politically filter the initiation of claims by 
foreign investors. Except that all treaty parties consent in unanimity to restrict or 
abandon the investor-state arbitration provision, a covered foreign investor may 
submit the covered investment dispute to international arbitration at any time. The 
expansionary trend in establishing jurisdiction and finding liability of host states 
encourages other investors to bring more cases before investment tribunals. It thus 
allows investment tribunals to exercise jurisdiction over a theoretically infinite 
number of future investment disputes.  
In contrast to inter-state arbitration where only states may bring the claims, in 
investor-state arbitration only foreign investors are entitled to bring the claims against 
host states. Foreign investors are able to challenge the regulatory measures of host 
states by starting the arbitration process while host states can only passively 
participate in the arbitration process. The direct access of foreign investors to 
international arbitration ensures a steadily expanding caseload. Cases breed cases in a 
virtuous circle. Foreign investors who are likely to benefit from the expansive 
interpretation of tribunals will have an incentive to bring more cases to reiterate and 
enforce it. The more investment claims that are brought by foreign investors to 
tribunals, the more these tribunals have opportunities to improve their power and 
persuasion.  
Thirdly, the acceptability of arbitral awards heavily depends upon the quality of the 
tribunal’s legal reasoning. The higher the quality of their legal reasoning, the less 
political backlash these awards will receive from treaty parties. In the first place, it is 
of great importance how tribunals reflect distinct interest demand of disputing parties 
in their arbitral awards. The arbitral awards are more likely to be accepted by treaty 
parties if the tribunals convincingly balance investors’ interests in the protection of 
their investments against governmental interference, on the one hand, and 
governments’ interests in the protection of the public interest, on the other. In practice, 
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tribunals may split the difference by giving each disputing party part of what they 
requested. Giving each party a partial victory rather than a full victory or failure is the 
easy way to please each disputing party. To increase both parties’ satisfaction in the 
arbitration result, tribunals may avoid rendering “all or nothing” decisions and will 
instead render awards that come closer to the middle ground of the parties’ contention. 
For instance, a tribunal may affirm its jurisdiction on one basis but simultaneously 
deny its jurisdiction on another basis. After affirming its jurisdiction, a tribunal may 
still dismiss claims of investors in part or even in full. Even if a tribunal refrains from 
establishing its jurisdiction, it may still express its criticism and make pronouncement 
on the merits. In Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, the tribunal affirmed its jurisdiction on the 
basis of the restrictive investor-state arbitration provision, but at the same time 
refused to broaden its jurisdiction on the basis of the MFN clause. Similarly, in the 
case of Loewen v. USA, the tribunal found that the claimants were not covered 
investors under the NAFTA due to the dissatisfaction of nationality requirements and 
thus the tribunal decided that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the claimant’s claims 
under the NAFTA.
 454
 The tribunal, nonetheless, recalled the treaty obligations of the 
respondent under the NAFTA and offered additional comments and observations 
showing its critical attitude towards the respondent. In the words of the tribunal, the 
United States court process involving the claimants “was a disgrace” and “failed to 
afford Loewen the process that was due”. The relevant US court proceedings, as a 
state measure, “were clearly improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with 
minimum standards of international law and fair and equitable treatment.” 455 The 
tribunal chose to deny its jurisdiction while condemning the United States since it was 
convinced that “finding against the United States would generate immense heat and 
opposition and that this could jeopardize the future of NAFTA and the investment 
rules regime, more generally.” 456 
In the second place, tribunals may show their flexibility in the extent to which they 
expand their jurisdiction on different jurisdictional bases. A comparison between the 
interpretation of waiting period requirements and that of MFN clauses reflects such 
flexibility. For the requirements of waiting periods, tribunals generally hold a rather 
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radical interpretation denying their mandatory and jurisdictional nature. Although 
such interpretation does not synch with the language of waiting period requirements, 
it nevertheless does not generate a strong backlash from treaty parties. It is because 
waiting period requirements only limit the timing of submission of claims and thus 
could be easily satisfied. Even if tribunals refrain from exercising jurisdiction before 
the expiration of waiting periods, investors may still submit their claims as soon as 
waiting periods elapse. On the contrary, concerning the applicability of MFN clauses 
to dispute settlement matters, tribunals are relatively cautious. Most tribunals support 
that MFN clauses could be used to override or modify procedural conditions on 
access to investment arbitration. Only several tribunals rely upon MFN clauses to 
broaden the coverage of disputes subject to arbitration under the basic treaty and thus 
to expand their jurisdiction. It seems that a progressive rather than a radical expansion 
of jurisdiction is more likely to be tolerated by treaty parties. Besides, the bifurcation 
of jurisdiction and merits may also influence the attitude of treaty parties towards 
tribunals’ jurisdictional expansion. If tribunals remain prudent in the merits stage, 
then their expansion of jurisdiction would more likely be tolerated or accepted by 
treaty parties. As explained above, however, the expansionary trend in investment 
arbitration happens both in establishing jurisdiction and in finding breaches of 
substantial treatment. 
Fourthly, the effect of prior awards in later cases influences the legal anticipation of 
investment treaty norms by foreign investors and treaty parties. Although investment 
arbitration does not recognize a formal doctrine of binding precedent, a de facto 
system of precedent indeed exists. Disputing parties, including host states and foreign 
investors, heavily rely upon previous awards in support of their positions. Most 
tribunals acknowledge the actual precedential value of prior decisions and cite prior 
decisions to confirm or justify their interpretation of investment treaty norms. Prior 
awards that correspond with the value of investment protection will be followed and 
refined by later tribunals and become a strong precedent difficult to overturn. It in 
turn will become the disputing parties’ legal anticipation of investment treaty norms. 
The party seeking a distinct interpretation result from that reached in a series of 
consistent cases would bear the argumentative burden. The informal system of 
precedent therefore leads to path dependence and keeps various tribunals consistent 
with each other in safeguarding the expectation of investment protection. Moreover, 
treaty parties cannot control the access of foreign investors to investment arbitration 
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in individual cases, and thus cannot attack or overturn those precedents unfavorable to 
them by filtering the cases submitted to arbitration. Therefore, a strong effect of 
precedent would reinforce the authority of investment tribunals and meanwhile 
weaken the political backlash from treaty parties.  
Fifthly, the composition of tribunal members and their preferences are relevant to 
the credibility of arbitral awards. The impartiality and independence of arbitrators are 
fundamental to due process and the legitimacy of investment arbitration. Undeniably, 
there may be different subjective understandings by disputing parties on whether 
arbitrators are independent and impartial in adjudicating cases. Thus, establishing an 
objective standard in appointing arbitrators and developing a reasonable code of 
conduct for arbitrators is of critical significance in ensuring arbitrators’ impartiality 
and independence. As regards to the appointment of arbitrators, arbitration rules 
generally give equal right to foreign investors and host states in appointing arbitrators. 
The fact, that most arbitrators come from commercial fields and are nationals of 
developed countries, does not violate the equal right of disputing parties in appointing 
arbitrators. What treaty parties can do is to impose more qualifications on arbitrator 
candidates. Regarding the code of conduct for arbitrators, the issue of conflict of 
interest is where the focus lies. Under the existing investment arbitration rules, 
regulations on the multiple roles of investment arbitrators is absent, which leads to a 
high possibility of arbitrators’ conflict of interest. It in turn becomes a major ground 
on which the respondent states attack the legitimacy of investment arbitration. 
Therefore, the higher standard the code of conduct is for arbitrators, the more likely 
the respondent states will trust the credibility of arbitration process.  
Lastly, the finality and worldwide enforceability of investment arbitral awards also 
exerts considerable pressure on the respondent states to comply with the awards. The 
investment arbitral awards are final and binding for the disputing parties even if the 
treaty parties disagree with the outcome or reasoning of investment tribunals. Treaty 
parties have no power to overrule the binding force of awards. Moreover, investment 
arbitral awards are effectively shielded from judicial review by domestic courts in the 
host state as well as any third state since they are not subject to any appeal. 
457
 A 
review of investment awards is possible only under very limited circumstances. For 
ICSID investment awards, the exclusive remedy is an annulment process under 
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention on strictly limited procedural grounds. The 
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request for annulment of the ICSID award is to be decided by an ad hoc Annulment 
Committee of three persons appointed by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative 
Council. For non-ICSID investment awards, the only remedy against awards is an 
application for setting aside awards in the domestic courts at the place of arbitration 
on primarily procedural grounds, for example for lack of arbitral jurisdiction or 
violation of due process.  
An investment award, if not annulled by an ad hoc Annulment Committee or not 
set aside by the domestic court at the place of arbitration, has worldwide 
enforceability without court review of its merits. For ICSID investment awards, each 
contracting state of the ICSID Convention shall recognize and enforce them within its 
territories “as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State” according to Article 
54 of the Convention. Therefore, ICSID awards can be recognized and enforced in 
any contracting state of the ICSID Convention having 151 state parties. For 
non-ICSID investment awards, the winning party may seek the recognition and 
enforcement of investment awards in one of the 155 contracting states of the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
The widespread enforceability of investment awards certainly will give the losing 
states a strong incentive to comply with them.  
5.2 Coping strategies provided by the investor-state arbitration 
mechanism 
5.2.1 Selecting arbitrators prudently 
The selection of arbitrators is critical to the arbitration outcomes. In the ICJ and the 
WTO, treaty parties have a high control over their judges or members. On the contrary, 
in investment arbitration treaty parties have a limited control over the composition of 
arbitrators since arbitrators are not appointed by treaty parties. Foreign investors and 
host states are treated as parties on equal footing. As an essential feature of arbitration, 
foreign investors and host states as the disputing parties share powers to appoint 
arbitrators. On the premise investors and states have equal right to appoint arbitrators, 
treaty parties may still adopt the following strategies to select and regulate arbitrators.  
Firstly, treaty parties may impose specific qualifications on arbitrator candidates. 
Although methods and practices vary, arbitrator selection by both the claimant and the 
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respondent tends to involve complex guesswork and strategizing.
 458
 Parties and 
especially their counsels generally will spend a great deal of time and effort to 
scrutinize the background of arbitrators, their reputation, academic opinions, prior 
appointments and their persuasiveness to convince the other two arbitrators (in 
particular the presiding arbitrator). 
459
 Since most arbitration rules impose 
qualifications on arbitrators in general terms, such as requiring arbitrators to be 
persons of high moral character, any person could be appointed by the disputing party 
as an arbitrator as long as he is considered to be sympathetic to the party. Thus, a 
stricter demand of arbitrator qualification can be expected if treaty parties desire to 
limit the pool of arbitration candidates. For instance, treaty parties may require 
arbitrators, especially the presiding arbitrator, to have recognized competence or 
experience in the field of public international law. 
460
 For those arbitrators coming 
from a commercial background, treaty parties may require them to have knowledge of 
public international law including treaty interpretation rules. Article 35(2) of the 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, for example, expressly requires that 
“any person appointed as an arbitrator shall have expertise or experience in public 
international law, international trade or international investment rules. An arbitrator 
shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and 
independence.” Likewise, Article 24(2) of the China-Canada BIT provides that 
“arbitrators shall have expertise or experience in public international law, 
international trade or international investment rules, or the resolution of disputes 
arising under international trade or international investment agreements.” 
Secondly, treaty parties may strengthen their control over the presiding arbitrator 
candidates. According to most existing investment treaties, the appointing authorities 
designated have wide discretion as to the appointment of the presiding arbitrators. If 
treaty parties were to determine that the presiding arbitrators should be selected from 
a limited pool of candidates, they could provide a list of the presiding arbitrator 
candidates who meet the qualifications specifically set out in investment treaties. Thus, 
treaty parties may require that the presiding arbitrator be appointed by agreement of 
both disputing parties. If the parties cannot agree, then the presiding arbitrator will be 
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appointed from the list established by parties to the investment treaty. 
Thirdly, treaty parties may intensify the rules of conduct for arbitrators to avoid 
their conflict of interest. It is true that major arbitration rules, including ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and ICC Arbitration Rules, do not 
have prohibitive or restrictive regulations on the multiple roles of investment 
arbitrators as counsels, advocates or expert witnesses in other cases. While arbitration 
rules generally require arbitrators to disclose information that might give rise to 
justifiable doubts about their independence and impartiality, they do not describe in 
detail what needs to be disclosed. The disclosure is left to the arbitrators’ discretion. 
Failure of arbitrators to disclose relevant information does not automatically lead to 
disqualification. Even if arbitrators indeed disclose their multiple roles as legal 
counsels, advocates or experts in other cases, it does not necessarily provide sufficient 
ground for challenging the qualification of arbitrators under the existing arbitration 
rules.  
Given these issues, a number of options can be adopted to address the issue of 
potential conflict of interest. These options are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they 
can be used in combination. One option would be through revising these major 
arbitration rules. Arbitration rules may be revised to clarify the disclosure obligations 
of arbitrators and grounds for challenging the qualification of arbitrators. 
Theoretically, arbitration rules could be revised to prohibit or restrict arbitrators 
concurrently acting as counsels in other cases. In practice, amending these arbitration 
rules cannot be easily expected. An alternative approach would be through issuing 
interpretative guidance by the arbitral institutions regarding the application of 
arbitration rules. The arbitral institutions may issue mandatory directions or 
non-binding guidance on the issue of arbitrators’ conflict of interest. Of particular 
relevance, in its Practice Direction VII and VIII, the ICJ directs the parties, when 
choosing a judge ad hoc, to refrain from nominating persons who are acting as agent, 
counsel or advocate in another case before the Court in the last three years. In the 
same vein, a person who has been a member of the court, a judge ad hoc, registrar, 
deputy-registrar, or high official of the Court should not, for a period of three years 
after leaving his or her position, be designated as agent, counsel, or advocate in a case 
before the Court.  
A third option would be to impose strict requirements on the conduct of arbitrators 
in specific investment treaties. Treaty parties may require a strict obligation of timely 
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and complete disclosure for arbitrators in cases of potential conflict of interest in 
investment treaties.
 461
 An illustrative list of information to be disclosed is needed to 
describe in detail what needs to be disclosed. The multiple roles of arbitrators in other 
cases should be included in the list of information to be disclosed. A striking example 
of this approach is the WTO’s Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Besides imposing the disclosure 
obligation on members of WTO Dispute Settlement Body, it provides an Illustrative 
List of Information To Be Disclosed. Each covered person has a continuing duty to 
disclose information about “any interests the person may have in domestic or 
international proceedings, and their implications, where these involve issues similar to 
those addressed in the dispute in question”. Meanwhile, treaty parties may identify the 
dual arbitrator/counsel role as a ground for challenging the qualification of arbitrators 
to avoid their conflict of interest caused by multiple roles as arbitrator, counsel or 
expert witness in various cases. Likewise, failure to disclose this information may also 
be considered as sufficient ground for the disqualification of arbitrators.  
The inclusion of express requirements on the conduct of arbitrators in investment 
treaties is a very direct approach in addressing the issue of arbitrators’ conflict of 
interest. It nevertheless presents at least two difficulties. First, the other treaty parties 
may not wish to include such a restriction. Second, investment treaties may end up 
containing lengthy and complex provisions on the conduct of arbitrators in order to 
exhaust all kinds of possible circumstances of arbitrators’ conflict of interest. An 
alternative option is to refer to a separate code of conduct for arbitrators in which the 
concrete rules of conduct are laid down.
 462
 The separate code of conduct option may 
have some advantages over the inclusion of express requirements in investment 
treaties option. Particularly, a separate code of conduct could be amended on 
agreement of treaty parties without the need to renegotiate the investment treaty itself. 
A separate code of conduct for arbitrators could also be more comprehensive than a 
few provisions on arbitrators in the investment treaty.  
An example can be found in Article X.25 of the Canada-EU FTA, which provides 
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that “arbitrators shall comply with the International Bar Association Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration or any supplemental rules adopted 
pursuant to Article X.42(2)(b) (Committee on Services and Investment).” According 
to Article X.42(2)(b), the Committee “shall, on agreement of the Parties, adopt a code 
of conduct for arbitrators to be applied in disputes arising out of this Chapter, which 
may replace or supplement the rules in application, and that may address topics 
including: (i) disclosure obligations; (ii) the independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators; and (iii) confidentiality.” Therefore, the Parties, Canada and European 
Union, may adopt a precisely designed code of conduct for arbitrators to prevent 
arbitrators’ potential conflict of interest.  
5.2.2 Initiating state-to-state arbitration proceedings 
Most investment treaties provide for two dispute settlement mechanisms: one is to 
permit investor-state arbitration for investment disputes between foreign investors and 
host states, and the other permits state-to-state arbitration for disputes between treaty 
parties concerning the interpretation and application of the treaty. Investment treaties 
enable investors to bring investor-state claims but do not disable treaty parties from 
bringing state-to-state claims. Although having no right to initiate investor-state 
arbitration proceedings, host states do have the right to activate state-to-state 
arbitration proceedings under most investment treaties.  
It seems that state-to-state arbitration proceedings may be used by host states to 
influence or even displace the outcome of investor-state arbitration proceedings. This 
would be the case if foreign investors bring claims against host states for alleged 
violations of substantive treatment required by investment treaties, while host states 
bring inter-state claims seeking authoritative interpretation that they have not violated 
the investment treaties. However, it remains questionable whether such effect can be 
achieved. In fact, in spite of the prevalence of state-to-state arbitration provisions in 
most investment treaties, they have been rarely used by treaty parties. There exist 
hundreds of investor-state arbitration cases but almost no state-to-state arbitration 
cases. The question remains: why is inter-state arbitration not attractive to host states?  
Debate exists about the legal effect of inter-state awards on the interpretation and 
application of investment treaties. The co-existence of investor-state arbitration and 
inter-state arbitration under the same treaty opens the door to potential jurisdictional 
tensions between investor-state tribunals and inter-state tribunals. Most investment 
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treaties provide that a state-to-state award shall be binding but do not specify whether 
it binds the treaty parties, subsequent tribunals interpreting or applying the same 
treaty provision, or both. There are three possible interpretations regarding the 
binding effect of inter-state awards. The narrowest reading is that inter-state awards 
are binding on the treaty parties only with respect to the particular case. The 
intermediate interpretation is that such awards are binding on the treaty parties in 
general. The broadest interpretation is that inter-state awards are binding on the treaty 
parties, foreign investors and future investor-state tribunals interpreting or applying 
the same treaty provision. 
463
 The narrowest reading is preferred by investor-state 
tribunals. Adhering to the narrowest reading, however, would substantially deprive 
inter-state award of practical effect since the purpose of inter-state arbitration is to 
provide a binding award on the interpretation of the treaty.  
There seemed to be consensus that inter-state arbitration should neither interfere in 
investor-state cases nor affect the finality of investor-state awards. Inter-state 
arbitration cannot function as appeal or substitution to investor-state arbitration. The 
mandate of inter-state arbitration is resolving disputes between the treaty parties about 
the interpretation and application of the treaty rather than adjudicating particular 
investment disputes between foreign investors and host states. Thus, the finality of 
investor-state awards and the obligation of state respondents to comply with them 
would not be affected by subsequent inter-state awards. For instance, in Ecuador v. 
US, both Ecuador and United States accepted that the investor-state award in Chevron 
v. Ecuador was final and binding, as required by the Ecuador-United States BIT, 
subject only to the right to challenge the award under the laws of the seat of the 
arbitration. In initiating inter-state arbitration proceedings, Ecuador did not seek to 
affect, let alone appeal, set aside or nullify that award. Ecuador expressly indicated 
that the inter-state tribunal’s award would have no impact on the legal effect of the 
investor-state award.
 464
  
A more complex scenario arises if one of the treaty parties initiates inter-state 
arbitration proceedings concerning the interpretation or application of a treaty 
provision at issue in an ongoing investor-state arbitration case.
 465
 Is the 
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investor-state tribunal obliged to stay its proceedings in deference to the inter-state 
tribunal? If so, is the inter-state award binding on the investor-state tribunal with 
respect to the interpretation of the same treaty provision? The arbitral practice seems 
to have denied such arguments. In Lucchetti v. Peru, the investor had initiated 
arbitration against the host state under the Chile-Peru BIT. Shortly after that, the 
respondent state initiated inter-state arbitration proceedings under the same BIT 
against Chile, the investor’s home state, and requested that the investor-state tribunal 
shall stay its hearings pending the resolution of the inter-state arbitration case. The 
tribunal in the investor-state arbitration proceedings refused the request for the 
suspension of its proceedings without giving further explanation. 
466
  
The co-existence of two dispute settlement tracks in the same treaty does not make 
the inter-state arbitration track superior to the investor-state arbitration track. 
Considering the general tendency of investor-state tribunals in avoiding the 
interference or influence of inter-state tribunals in particular investment disputes, 
initiating inter-state arbitration is not the best option for host states to attack 
investor-state awards that they feel dissatisfied. Conversely, another possibility exists 
that inter-state arbitration may be initiated by the investors’ home state for purpose of 
diplomatic protection if host states refuse to comply with the investor-state award.  
Thus, if the treaty parties intend to improve the legal effect of inter-state awards on 
investor-state tribunals, it would be preferable to say so in explicit terms delegating 
binding interpretive authority to inter-state tribunals. One such provision can be found 
in the recent China-Canada BIT. Article 20(2) of the China-Canada BIT provides that 
if the host state invokes a “prudential measures” exception in the investor-state 
arbitration, the investor-state tribunal cannot decide whether that exception is a valid 
defense. Instead, the tribunal shall request for a report on the matter from the treaty 
parties, who may then reach a joint decision that is binding on the investor-state 
tribunal. If, after 60 days, the treaty parties are unable to reach a joint decision on the 
issue, either treaty party can refer the matter to a state-to-state tribunal, whose 
decision shall then be binding on the investor-state tribunal. According to this 
provision, the inter-state award on the matter of prudential measures will be binding 
on the investor-state tribunal.  
5.2.3 Requesting annulment of the award 
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Requesting annulment of the award is one of the options available for the losing 
parties. The legitimacy and correctness of ICSID awards are not subject to judicial 
review by domestic courts under national laws. Domestic courts have no power of 
review over ICSID awards. Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, however, offers its 
own self-contained system for international review. Each disputing party may request 
annulment of the ICSID award, which is to be decided by an ad hoc Annulment 
Committee of three persons appointed by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative 
Council. The grounds for annulment under the ICSID Convention are listed 
exhaustively, including (a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the 
Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part 
of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on 
which it is based.  
The annulment of ICSID awards is restricted to these five grounds, mostly 
procedural in nature. Ad hoc Annulment Committees are not courts of appeal. 
Annulment is different from an appeal in two aspects. The first relates to the decision 
under review. Annulment is concerned only with the legitimacy of the process of the 
decision but not with its substantive correctness. Appeal is concerned with both. As to 
the second aspect, the result of a successful annulment is merely the invalidation of 
the original decision, whereas a successful appeal may result in the replacement of the 
decision by a new decision. 
467
  
Article 52(3) of the ICSID Convention stipulates that an ad hoc Annulment 
Committee “shall have the authority to annul the award or any part thereof.” In 
practice, it has been interpreted as giving committees a wide discretion or flexibility 
in determining whether annulment is appropriate in the circumstances. The ad hoc 
Committee in Vivendi v. Argentina, for instance, said that “it appears to be established 
that an ad hoc committee has a certain measure of discretion as to whether to annul an 
award, even if an annullable error is found” and that “it is necessary for an ad hoc 
committee to consider the significance of the error relative to the legal rights of the 
parties.” 468 It seems that preserving the finality of the award is often viewed by ad 
hoc committees to take precedence over the principle of correctness. Ad hoc 
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committees tend to refrain from exercising annulment review in an extensive way. 
Even if a violation of one of the five grounds in Article 52(1) is found, an annulment 
would not necessarily be the outcome. An ICSID award would not be annulled unless 
the ad hoc committee is convinced that there has been a serious violation of one of the 
five grounds.  
Of the five grounds for annulment, improper constitution of the tribunal and 
corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal has rarely been used. The other 
three grounds, manifest excess of powers, serious departure from a fundamental rule 
of procedure and failure to state reasons, have been frequently invoked by the parties 
requesting annulment. The very language of these grounds, however, demands a 
cautious approach for ad hoc committees. For instance, the tribunal’s excess of 
powers must be “manifest” in order to constitute a ground for annulment. Only a 
“serious” departure from a “fundamental” rule of procedure can justify challenging an 
award.  
An excess of powers occurs when a tribunal exceeds the limits of its jurisdiction. 
The question is what a “manifest” excess of powers is. In practice, ad hoc committees 
have adopted the approach that the excess of powers must be “plain”, “clear”, 
“obvious” or “evident” on its face to become “manifest”. The tribunal’s excess of 
powers, if susceptible of argument one way or the other and cannot be found with 
certainty and immediacy, is not manifest. 
469
 Therefore, if the tribunal’s excess of 
jurisdiction is not obvious or self-evident on its face but rather could be argued one 
way or the other, there would not be a manifest excess of powers. To make things 
more complicated, most jurisdictional provisions relied upon by tribunals, such as 
umbrella clauses and MFN clauses, may be subject to wide or narrow interpretation. 
They may be interpreted one way or the other as if they were accordions. According 
to the approach followed by ad hoc committees, wide interpretation of umbrella 
clauses and MFN clauses, as a possible interpretation, is not obviously untenable or 
arbitrary and thus does not amount to manifest excess of powers. It follows that the 
request for annulment of awards on the ground of manifest excess of jurisdiction has 
rarely been accepted by ad hoc committees. As a matter of fact, the issue of excess of 
jurisdiction has been ruled on in 18 annulment decisions and has led to only one 
annulment.
 470
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Furthermore, it has been recognized by ad hoc committees that failure to exercise 
an existing jurisdiction also amounts to an excess of powers. It is held that the tribunal 
commits an excess of powers not only if it exercises a jurisdiction which it does not 
have, but also if it refuses or fails to exercise a jurisdiction which it possesses. 
Therefore, an award interpreting the investor-state arbitration provision in an 
extensive way may not be annulled since it does not constitute a manifest excess of 
powers, while an award interpreting the same provision in a strict way may instead be 
annulled due to the tribunal’s failure to exercise its existing jurisdiction. For example, 
in MHS v. Malaysia, the tribunal found that the service contract for the location and 
salvage of historical relics from an ancient shipwreck, similar to other commercial 
contracts, was not an “investment” for the purpose of the ICSID arbitration, and thus 
concluded that it had no jurisdiction over the dispute. 
471
 The award, however, was 
annulled by an ad hoc annulment committee on the ground that the tribunal 
manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to exercise a jurisdiction over the dispute. 
In the view of the annulment committee, the term “investment” was unqualified under 
both the ICSID Convention and the UK-Malaysia BIT. No requirement of objective 
characteristics was added to the term “investment”. Since the contract at issue was 
one of a kind of asset constituting a claim to money and to performance in accordance 
with the UK-Malaysia BIT, there was an investment within the meaning of the 
UK-Malaysia BIT.
 472
 
In addition, with respect to the appointment of members of ad hoc committees, the 
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council has wide discretion, while the 
disputing parties have no say. In contrast to the appointment of arbitrators, the 
appointment of ad hoc committee members is less predictable and more uncertain. It 
seems that requesting annulment of the award is not a credible strategy for the host 
states to deal with the jurisdictional expansion of tribunals. It is not only because 
annulment is an exceptional and narrowly circumscribed remedy, but also ad hoc 
committees appointed entirely by the ICSID Administrative Council tend to defeat the 
request for annulment on the ground of manifest excess of jurisdiction. 
5.2.4 Resisting enforcement of the award 
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Arbitral awards are binding upon the disputing parties and create an obligation to 
comply with them. However, arbitral awards cannot be automatically enforced. The 
recognition and enforcement of awards is heavily dependent upon domestic courts. 
The host state, as the losing party, may resist the recognition and enforcement of the 
award before domestic courts under national laws. Notably, the regime for the 
recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards and non-ICSID awards are slightly 
different.  
According to Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention, each Contracting State shall 
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the 
pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final 
judgment of a court in that State. An ICSID award is thus equated with a final 
judgment of each Contracting State’s domestic courts. Therefore, the ICSID award 
will be automatically recognized by each Contracting State’s domestic courts as if it 
were its final judgment. The obligation to recognize the ICSID award applies to all 
State parties to the ICSID Convention, not just to the respondent state to the 
proceedings. Domestic courts may not examine the legitimacy and correctness of the 
ICSID award, for example whether the ICSID tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction. 
Domestic courts are limited to verifying that the award is authentic.  
However, the ICSID Convention does not require domestic courts to go beyond 
that and to undertake forced execution of ICSID awards. Article 54(3) of the ICSID 
Convention provides that “execution of the award shall be governed by the laws 
concerning the execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories such 
execution is sought.” Article 55, stipulating that “nothing in Article 54 shall be 
construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to 
immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution”, further clarifies that 
the law referred to in Article 54(3) includes the law on state immunity. Therefore, the 
obligation to recognize and enforce the ICSID award does not affect any immunity 
from execution that states enjoy. The doctrine of sovereign immunity from execution 
may prevent the enforcement of ICSID awards. It seems that the losing respondent 
states may resist the enforcement of ICSID awards on the ground that their state 
properties enjoy immunity from execution.  
Even so, the losing parties may still face a high possibility of being enforced since 
ICSID awards have worldwide enforceability. Recognition and enforcement may be 
sought not only in the host state or in the investor’s state of nationality, but also in any 
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state that is a party to the ICSID Convention. The winning party, usually the foreign 
investor, may select a state or several states where enforcement seems most promising. 
This choice is likely to be determined by the availability of enforceable assets.
 473
  
Proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards may be initiated in 
several states simultaneously.  
Moreover, domestic legislations and practice concerning the issue of state 
immunity from execution are not consistent. The United Nations Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property adopted in 2004 makes a 
distinction between commercial and non-commercial properties. State properties used 
for non-commercial purposes enjoy immunity from execution and thus cannot be 
enforced without the consent of the state, while state properties serving commercial 
purposes may be enforced. This Convention, however, still awaits approval by states. 
A number of states, such as United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and 
Japan, have passed domestic legislations on state immunity. An approach of 
restrictive immunity is roughly followed by these states in distinguishing state 
properties used for commercial purposes and state properties used for non-commercial 
purposes. The criterion of distinction between commercial and non-commercial state 
properties in theses domestic legislations, however, is not always consistent and clear. 
On the contrary, several states, such as China, unequivocally hold the position that a 
state and its property shall, in foreign courts, enjoy absolute immunity, including 
absolute immunity from jurisdiction and from execution. Considering the 
inconsistency of practice on the law of state immunity, foreign investors may apply 
the forum-shopping strategy in seeking enforcement of ICSID awards in those states 
adopting the restrictive immunity approach. The losing respondent state may resist 
enforcement of the ICSID award in its own court, but it cannot prevent courts of other 
state parties to the ICSID Convention from enforcing the award under their national 
laws.  
In contrast to the self-contained mechanism of recognition and enforcement of 
ICSID awards, the recognition and enforcement of non-ICSID awards is subject to 
more judicial review by domestic courts. For non-ICSID investment awards, foreign 
investors may seek their recognition and enforcement in domestic courts of state 
parties to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards. Article 5 of the New York Convention lists a number of specific 
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grounds on which recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be 
refused. The most important of these grounds are the invalidity of the arbitration 
agreement, lack of proper notice or violation of due process, excess of jurisdiction by 
the arbitral tribunal, improper composition of the tribunal, an award that is not yet 
binding or has been set aside. In addition, recognition and enforcement may be 
refused if a subject matter not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the 
state in which enforcement is sought (lack of arbitrability), of if it would be contrary 
to the public policy of that state. These obstacles to the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards are also commonly found in many national arbitration laws.  
Therefore, state respondents may have two techniques to attack non-ICSID awards. 
When an investment award is rendered pursuant to non-ICSID arbitration rules, state 
respondents may first attempt to set aside the award in the domestic courts at the place 
of arbitration on primarily procedural grounds, for example for lack of arbitral 
jurisdiction or violation of due process. If the application for setting aside the award is 
defeated by the domestic court at the place of arbitration, state respondents may still 
request refusal of recognition and enforcement of the award. Compared with the 
enforcement of ICSID awards where state immunity from execution is the only 
obstacle, the enforcement of non-ICSID awards may be refused by domestic courts on 
a wider ground, such as lack of arbitral jurisdiction, lack of arbitrability and public 
policy defense. The enforcement procedures of ICSID awards are plainly superior to 
those of non-ICSID awards. 
474
 It thus seems more favorable for state respondents to 
choose non-ICSID arbitration rules as the governing rules on arbitration process since 
they may have more flexibility in resisting the enforcement of awards rendered under 
non- ICSID arbitration rules.  
Although the enforcement of non-ICSID awards is subject to greater supervision 
and review by domestic courts under the national law of the place of enforcement, 
courts generally have acknowledged that setting aside or refusal to recognize and 
enforce an award should be possible only in exceptional circumstances. The trend in 
the practice of domestic courts is to restrict the review of foreign awards. Besides, the 
two special grounds for refusing enforcement of non-ICSID awards, the lack of the 
arbitrability defense and the public policy defense, do not appear to have posed 
serious problems in the enforcement practice concerning non-ICSID awards. Many 
domestic courts, especially courts in arbitration-friendly jurisdictions such as United 
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States, United Kingdom and France, have developed a deferential attitude toward 
foreign awards and have restricted their arbitrability filter and public policy filter. 
475
  
Notwithstanding the distinction between ICSID awards and non-ICSID awards 
regarding their recognition and enforcement, state respondents have generally 
complied with investment awards in a voluntary way in practice. The instances in 
which state respondents have refused to abide by awards are still rare. 
476
 The high 
level of voluntary compliance with investment awards by state respondents may be 
attributed to the following factors.  
First, state respondents are concerned about their reputation and investment climate 
as an attraction to foreign investment and to the inflow of foreign capital. State 
respondents’ non-compliance with investment awards may influence their reputation 
and investment climate. Such considerations of economic cost-benefit analyses of 
states play an important though hardly measurable role. Second, grounds for refusing 
enforcement of investment awards are merely procedural bars but do not affect the 
obligation of state respondents to comply with them. Successful reliance on grounds 
for refusing enforcement does not alter the fact that non-compliance with an 
investment award is a breach of an international obligation under investment treaties. 
Failure to comply with the award leads to the revival of the right to diplomatic 
protection by the prevailing investor’s home state. Therefore, grounds for refusing 
enforcement of an award provide neither argument nor excuse for failing to comply 
with it. Refusal by a state respondent to comply with the award constitutes a violation 
of the state’s international obligations and will incur its international responsibility. 
Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention, for instance, permits the granting of 
diplomatic protection in case a state respondent fails to abide by and comply with the 
award. Diplomatic protection is a political supplement to the enforcement of 
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investment awards. Diplomatic protection exercised by powerful home states will 
certainly be a great pressure for state respondents. Third, non-compliance with 
investment awards may lead to adverse consequences in other field. There are 
examples when home States have suspended advantages otherwise available to 
non-complying States and have exerted diplomatic pressure. In March 2012, the 
United States suspended application of its generalized system of tariff preferences 
(GSP) to Argentina after Argentina had failed to comply with investment awards 
rendered against it in favour of US claimants. The United States’  SP scheme allows 
exporters from eligible countries to pay lower customs duties on their exports to the 
United States. The United States would not consider giving GSP benefit to Argentina 
unless it honors investment awards.
 477
  Fourth, a state’s refusal to comply with 
investment awards, especially ICSID awards, would be likely to reduce its chance to 
obtain loans or financial assistance from the World Bank
478
 or even the International 
Monetary Fund since ICSID is one of the five organizations of the World Bank 
Group.  
5.3 Reforming the investor-state arbitration mechanism 
5.3.1 Revising arbitration rules to strengthen the involvement of non-disputing 
states in investor-state arbitration 
In a bilateral investment treaty context, non-disputing state in investor-state 
arbitration refers to the investors’ home state which is a contracting party to the treaty. 
In multilateral investment treaty context, non-disputing states refer to both the 
investor’s home state and other non-disputing contracting states. Non-disputing states 
as well as the respondent state, as the creator and master of investment treaties, are 
supposed to have direct interest to the interpretation and application of investment 
treaties. In arbitral practice, however, non-disputing states are rarely involved in the 
proceedings of investor-state arbitration. It in turn leads to the tribunals’ neglect of the 
interpretive interests of non-disputing states. A dilemma thus arises: non-disputing 
states as the creator of investment treaties have no chance to express their interests 
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and concern to the interpretation and application of investment treaties in 
investor-state arbitration. One of the main reasons leading to this dilemma is the 
absence of non-disputing states’ right to know and to express in the investor-state 
arbitration process under current arbitration rules. Therefore, revising current 
arbitration rules in the following aspects to permit the intervention of non-disputing 
states throughout the arbitration proceedings will ensure their right to know the 
investment disputes and right to express their concern to the application and 
interpretation of investment treaties.  
Firstly, non-disputing states may be entitled to be noticed as to the existence and 
the details of a particular investor-state arbitration case. 
479
 The documents to be 
delivered to non-disputing states may include the notice of arbitration, all pleadings, 
memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal, minutes or transcripts of hearings of 
the tribunal, and orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal. Certainly, any protected 
or confidential information that is submitted to the tribunal shall be protected from 
disclosure. In case a document contains protected or confidential information, only 
the redacted version of the document containing no such information shall be 
provided to the non-disputing states. The notice requirement has been incorporated in 
Article 29 of the 2012 United States Model BIT and Articles 33 and 34 of the 2004 
Canada Model BIT.  
Secondly, tribunals may be required to permit the intervention by non-disputing 
states into the arbitration proceedings and to allow submissions of non-disputing 
states concerning the interpretation and application of investment treaties. Notice to 
non-disputing states gives them an opportunity to know and assess a particular 
arbitration case. Nevertheless, notice by itself is not sufficient to ensure the interested 
non-disputing states an adequate opportunity to intervene in the arbitration process. 
To facilitate the participation of non-disputing states in the arbitration process, 
non-disputing states shall be granted the right to make oral and/or written submissions 
to the tribunal. Article 28(2) of the 2012 United States Model BIT, for instance, 
provides that the non-disputing Party may make oral and written submissions to the 
tribunal regarding the interpretation of this Treaty. A similar provision can be found 
in Article 35 of the 2004 Canada Model BIT, which stipulates that the non-disputing 
Party may make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this 
Agreement and shall have the right to attend any hearings whether or not it makes 
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submissions to the Tribunal. Such a provision is reflected in Article 27 of the 
China-Canada BIT.  
Outside of the United States and Canadian BIT practice, the explicit permission of 
non-disputing states’ involvement in arbitration process is rare. Most investment 
treaties do not have comparable provisions. Before its amendment in 2006, the old 
ICSID Arbitration Rules did not explicitly allow oral or written submissions from 
non-disputing states. The 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules, in its new Article 37(2), 
provides that “after consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity 
that is not a party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “non-disputing party”) to file a 
written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the 
dispute.” The non-disputing party here includes not only non-disputing state parties, 
but also non-disputing private parties, such as NGOs. In contrast to the United States 
and Canadian Model BIT in which non-disputing states have the right to participate in 
the arbitration process and to make submissions, the 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules 
give the tribunal the right to determine whether to allow the submission of 
non-disputing party. In other words, the tribunal “may”, but is not required to, allow 
submissions from non-disputing state parties under the 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
Besides, the 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules do not contain provisions requiring 
non-disputing states to be noticed as to the existence and the details of a particular 
investment arbitration case.  
The participation of non-disputing states in the investor-state arbitration process is 
allowed in several cases where the applicable investment treaties permit. In Pac Rim 
Cayman v. El Salvador, the United States investor brought a claim against the host 
state El Salvador on the basis of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”). The United States and the Central 
American countries of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Dominica are contracting states to the CAFTA-DR. Article 10.20.2 of the CAFTA-DR 
authorizes that “a non-disputing Party may make oral and written submissions to the 
tribunal regarding the interpretation of this Agreement.” One of the issues in dispute 
concerned the denial of benefits under Article 10.12.2 of the CAFTA-DR, which 
permits, but does not require, a CAFTA Party to “deny the benefits of [Chapter 10 of 
CAFTA] to an investor of another Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to 
investments of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial business activities in 
the territory of any Party, other than the denying Party and persons of a non-Party, or 
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of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise.” After receiving the 
dispute-related documents, the United States and Costa Rica as non-disputing state 
parties to the dispute made submissions to the tribunal regarding the interpretation of 
the denial of benefits clause. Both the United States submission and the Costa Rica 
submission supported the proposition of the respondent state El Salvador in 
contending that the CAFTA-DR did not impose a time limit on the invocation of the 
denial of benefits clause. 
480
 After a full consideration of the submissions, the 
tribunal in this case accepted the respondent state’s argument in respect of the 
interpretation of the denial of benefits clause. 
Thirdly, tribunals may be required to send the draft decisions or awards to both the 
disputing parties and the non-disputing state parties to the investment treaty for 
comments. It is rather rare in current investment treaties to give the non-disputing 
state parties a right to comment on the draft awards. The 2007 Colombia-Peru BIT, as 
a rare example, provides in its Article 25(14) that before issuing a decision, any 
disputing party can request the tribunal to send the draft award for comments to the 
disputing parties and the non-disputing State party to the treaty. All State parties have 
60 days to provide comments. The tribunal shall consider these comments and issue 
its decision within 45 days from receipt of the parties’ comments. 481 The US Model 
BIT, by contrast, only provides the right to comment on the draft award to the 
disputing parties.
 482
 According to Article 29(1) of the 2 12 US Model BIT, “at the 
request of a disputing party”, a tribunal shall, before issuing a decision or award on 
liability, transmit its proposed decision or award to “the disputing parties” and to “the 
non-disputing Party”. However, only “the disputing parties” may submit written 
comments to the tribunal concerning any aspect of its proposed decision or award 
within 60 days after the transmission of the draft decision or award. It is argued in this 
dissertation that requiring the tribunal to send the draft award to both the disputing 
parties and the non-disputing states for comments may enhance the control of the 
treaty parties over tribunal outputs and prevent the tribunal from adopting manifestly 
arbitrary interpretation. The treaty parties would have the opportunity to respond and 
take measures jointly, such as issuing a binding interpretation of the relevant treaty 
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provisions, if they feel dissatisfied with the tribunal’s legal reasoning. Furthermore, it 
may also encourage the disputing parties to settle their dispute before the draft award 
comes into effect.  
5.3.2 Enhancing transparency is not always in the interest of contracting states 
Enhancing transparency of the investor-state arbitration process, especially 
publication of investment awards, is considered by commentators to be an effective 
way to provide greater legitimacy to the mechanism of investor-state arbitration. 
483
 
Transparency, undoubtedly, is a basic value of the legal system. However, the request 
for enhanced transparency might not fit well with the principle of confidentiality 
which is traditionally considered to be one of the cornerstones of international 
arbitration. Most arbitration rules applicable in investor-state arbitration provide that 
arbitration proceedings and awards remain confidential in principle except that the 
disputing parties decide to disclose otherwise.  
The critical question would be whether enhancing transparency is in the interests of 
the treaty parties, especially of the host states. In case the treaty parties believe a 
greater transparency is desirable, they may provide such transparency explicitly in the 
investment treaty to the detriment of the principle of confidentiality. Recently, efforts 
have been made by a few countries, including the United States and Canada, to 
increase transparency and reduce confidentiality through the inclusion of transparency 
provisions in their investment treaties. Not all countries, however, have followed the 
lead of the United States and Canada. 
484
 
The word “transparency” is used to mean different things. The three most 
frequently discussed issues falling under the notion of “transparency” have been  (1) 
the public access to information about disputes, including awards and the submissions 
of the disputing parties; (2) the opening of arbitral hearings to the public; and (3) the 
ability of third parties to participate as amicus curiae in the disputes. 
485
  
As to the access to awards, most arbitration rules leave the issue of disclosure or 
confidentiality to the discretion of the disputing parties. Normally, the award would 
not be published without the consent of the disputing parties. The very existence of an 
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investment dispute may be kept confidential if both disputing parties so wish. That is 
why the actual numbers of investment arbitration cases are unknown to the public 
since not a few investment disputes remain confidential and undisclosed. Among the 
arbitration rules currently in force, ICSID Arbitration Rules has the highest level of 
transparency. After its amendment in 2006, Article 48(4) of the new ICSID 
Arbitration Rules included a provision stipulating that the ICSID “shall” promptly 
include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal. Following 
this amendment, the ICSID has a duty, but not the discretion, to publish “excerpts of 
the legal reasoning of the Tribunal” even if the parties disagree.  
With respect to oral hearings in investor-state arbitration, they are usually held in 
private. As a matter of principle, arbitration proceedings are not public. The 
attendance of other persons is subject to the consent of the disputing parties. Article 
32(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides that in the absence of either party’s 
objection and after consultation with the Secretary-General, the Tribunal may allow 
other persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and 
experts during their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or 
part of the hearings. Therefore, if either disputing party objects, other persons shall 
not be allowed to attend the arbitral proceedings.  
Another often discussed issue of transparency is the possibility of amicus curiae 
submissions. An amicus curiae, literally a friend of the court, refers to a person or 
entity that is not a disputing party but have an interest in the case proceedings. The 
Canadian and United States Model BITs include provisions authorizing arbitral 
tribunals to accept and consider submissions from amicus curiae. Article 37(2) of the 
2  6 ICSID Arbitration Rules, while making explicit a tribunals’ authority to permit 
amicus curiae submissions after consulting both disputing parties, also requires that 
such submissions must not cause disruption to the proceedings or result in an undue 
burden or unfair prejudice for either party.  
It is worth noting that the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration came into force on 1 April 2014. The UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency was adopted in the belief that greater transparency is needed to “take 
account of the public interest involved in such arbitrations” and to contribute to “a fair 
and efficient settlement of international investment disputes.” Article 3 of the Rules 
on Transparency provides that, subject to exceptions, the following documents shall 
be made available to the public: the notice of arbitration, the response to the notice of 
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arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of defense and any further written 
statements or written submissions by any disputing party; any written submissions by 
the non-disputing Party (or Parties) to the treaty and by third persons, transcripts of 
hearings; and orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal.
 486
 In addition, the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency also provides for open oral hearings and the 
ability of third parties to make submissions as amicus curiae.  
However, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency has its limits in application. For 
instance, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency will apply only to investor-State 
arbitration initiated under an international investment treaty concluded on or after 1 
April 2014. Arbitration initiated under those investment treaties concluded before 1 
April 2014 is excluded from its applicability. More importantly, where there is a 
conflict between the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and the governing 
investment treaty, the provisions of the investment treaty shall prevail. Therefore, 
States still have the final say over the application or non-application of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency. It remains to be seen to what extent the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency would be accepted by state parties to the 
investment treaties.  
Indeed, there may be strong arguments in favor of greater transparency in 
investor-state arbitration. Still, there are cases where the publication of arbitral 
documents, public hearings and third party participation might not be in the interests 
of the state respondents. Transparency comes at a cost. To illustrate, during the 
pendency of an ongoing arbitration case, public disclosure of arbitral materials 
submitted to the tribunal and public discussion of the case may bring a risk of further 
aggravation and exacerbation of the dispute. Public discussion of an ongoing 
arbitration case, for example condemning the regulatory measures of the respondent 
state, may exert great public pressure against the state. Public pressure may in turn be 
used by investors from a powerful home state to develop negotiating leverage for 
settlement discussions. Besides, public access to information and arbitral proceedings 
can produce very real costs for the arbitration and successful resolution of an 
investor-state dispute. These costs include, among other things, the distraction and 
interference that inevitably results from public statements, press releases, and similar 
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actions. 
487
 The procedural integrity of the arbitral process can thus be disrupted. 
Even after the award is rendered, publication of all arbitral documents is not 
necessarily favorable to state respondents. As discussed above, foreign investors have 
a better chance of success in investor-state arbitration and arbitral tribunals tend to 
invoke prior awards as de facto precedents. Thus, if the host state fails in a case, 
keeping the award undisclosed would prevent other investors and later tribunals from 
citing the award as a justification to their arguments. It would be so especially when 
the award adopts an expansive interpretation of investment treaty provisions. 
Therefore, a rigid adherence to transparency might not benefit the treaty parties. The 
treaty parties need to strike a balance between transparency and confidentiality in 
investment arbitration.  
5.3.3 Building an appeal mechanism is not workable 
Building an appeal mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investor-state 
tribunals is considered to be a preferred option to promote consistency and coherence 
for the settlement of investment disputes between foreign investors and host states. 
488
 Back in 2002, the United States proposed a negotiating objective of providing for 
an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of 
investment provisions. No significant effort, however, has been made to achieve the 
objective. In 2004, the Secretariat of the ICSID released a discussion paper suggesting 
pursuing the creation of an ICSID Appeals Facility. 
489
 Such proposal was 
subsequently withdrawn because most member states considered that it would be 
premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID mechanism at this stage. As of now, 
the call for the possible introduction of an appeal mechanism in international 
investment arbitration has been particularly attributed to academic discussion. It is 
argued in this dissertation that building an appeal mechanism is not workable.  
First and foremost, the current regime of fragmented investment treaties is not well 
suited to a centralized appellate mechanism. The establishment of an appellate body 
heavily relies upon a multilateral convention that consists of as many member states 
as possible. Notably, the vast majority of standing international dispute settlement 
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bodies, such as the ICJ and the WTO Appellate Body, are founded upon a multilateral 
convention with many contracting states. By contrast, in the international investment 
sphere, there are currently around 3200 international investment treaties in force, 
which differ in the formulation of rules of investment protection. Efforts to establish 
multilateral investment treaties have turned out to be a failure, such as the failed 
initiative for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment under the auspices of the OECD 
and the failure on the part of developed countries in the WTO to set the agenda on 
investment issues. It is exactly the failure of proposed multilateral investment treaties 
and lack of established rules that leads to the proliferation of various bilateral 
investment treaties.  
Indeed, the ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty which has been ratified by 
151 state parties as of May 2015. However, the ICSID Convention is only an 
institutional treaty regulating the procedure for the international settlement of 
investment disputes. The accession to the ICSID Convention does not replace the 
need for specific consent by the disputing parties to the investment arbitration. 
Besides, the convention does not provide substantive rules to the treatment of 
international investment. The host state’s consent to the arbitration and its substantial 
commitments to protect foreign investment still have to be found in various bilateral 
investment treaties. The rules to be applied in each arbitration case could be 
completely different since the applicable investment treaties may differ. Therefore, a 
proposed appellate body in the ICSID context would inevitably encounter the difficult 
legal issue of fragmented sources of law. It would be a great challenge for the 
proposed appellate body to attempt to coordinate with over 3000 investment treaties 
that are bilateral and disorganized in nature. From a technical point of view, the 
introduction of an appellate body in the ICSID context would necessitate amendment 
of the ICSID Convention. It is extremely difficult to amend the ICSID Convention 
since a majority of two-thirds of its 151 members is required.  
It thus seems that, other than a single multilateral appellate body in the ICSID 
context, various BIT-specific bilateral appellate bodies could be more feasible. The 
establishment of various appellate bodies for each bilateral investment treaty has the 
advantage of simplicity and practicality. Different appeal mechanisms could be set up 
under each bilateral investment treaty concerned. However, such option seems costly 
and runs counter to the objectives of coherence and consistency because there would 
be various appellate bodies which are independent of each other.  
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The second reason why an appeal mechanism is not suitable is that the need for it 
has not been compellingly established. The primary objective of the introduction of an 
appeal mechanism is to promote consistency and coherence in the decisions of the 
investment tribunals. Nevertheless, as discussed above, significant inconsistencies 
have not been a general feature of the jurisprudence of investment arbitration. 
Notwithstanding the absence of any binding precedential effect of prior awards, the 
use of prior awards or decisions has already become the “common practice” of 
investment tribunals to find support. As a matter of fact, previous decisions are 
usually cited and discussed in the name of “case law”. Certainly, not every arbitral 
decision is completely consistent with every other decision, nor do tribunals always 
refuse to depart from precedents. Notwithstanding, tribunals will often seek to 
substitute open dissent with alternative interpretative strategies that uphold the unity 
of international investment law using various strategies and techniques. Thus, the 
need for an appellate body to promote consistency and coherence has not been firmly 
established.  
Lastly, the establishment of an appeal mechanism could possibly further weaken 
the control of the treaty parties over arbitration outputs. The improper exercise of the 
appellate review over the awards could bring a further shock to the regime of 
investor-state arbitration. With their dispute settlement function, investment tribunals 
undertake an important role in safeguarding and enforcing the treaty rights of foreign 
investors and in constraining host states in their treatment of foreign investors. In 
establishing jurisdiction and scrutinizing the conformity of state measures with treaty 
obligations, tribunals have shown their willingness to find for the investors and 
against the states. After the establishment of an appellate body, the power of judicial 
review over state measures involving foreign investment would be ultimately 
exercised by the appellate body. Imagine the possibility that the appellate body 
considered its role as a constitutional court in international investment disputes 
between foreign investors and host states with extensive and compulsory jurisdiction, 
and that the appellate body adjudicated in favor of investment protection. The treaty 
parties could thus possibly lose their control over the meaning of investment treaty 
provisions in their competition with the appellate body. It is basically why the appeal 
mechanism as “the cure” to the investment arbitration could be “far worse than the 
disease”. 490 
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5.4 Improving ex ante and ex post controls by contracting states 
5.4.1 Ex post control: making full use of subsequent joint interpretation to bind 
tribunals 
In accordance with paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Article 31 in the Vienna Convention, 
together with the context, “any subsequent agreement” between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions and “any subsequent 
practice” in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation shall be taken into account.
 
Yet in arbitral practice, 
investment tribunals have rarely taken into account subsequent agreement or 
subsequent practice between the parties regarding the interpretation of the investment 
treaty. It was argued that the subsequent interpretation of treaty parties was 
self-interested and could improperly narrow the rights of foreign investors already 
created by investment treaties. State interpretations might thus amount to unlawful 
and impermissible attempt to amend the treaty in the view of tribunals.
491
 
It follows that the subsequent agreement and practice of treaty parties, as a 
significant tool for the treaty parties to be involved in the interpretation of the 
investment treaty, has been undervalued and underutilized in investor-state arbitration. 
This dissertation advocates a greater involvement of States in the interpretive process. 
As the drafters and masters of their investment treaties, States can more actively assert 
their interpretive authority to restrict the discretion of tribunals towards a predictable 
and desirable interpretation of treaty provisions. Specifically, treaty parties may be 
expected to make explicit the hierarchy and the retrospective effect of subsequent 
agreement or practice regarding the interpretation of treaty provisions.  
Concerning the hierarchy of subsequent interpretation of treaty parties, there may 
be two patterns of formulation. The first pattern would be affirming the binding effect 
of subsequent interpretation and preventing tribunals from reviewing the correctness 
of such interpretation. For example, Article 30(3) of the 2012 US Model BIT 
stipulates that “a joint decision of the Parties, each acting through its representative 
designated for purposes of this Article, declaring their interpretation of a provision of 
this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a 
tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision.” It means that as long as the treaty 
parties “declare their interpretation” of a treaty provision, a tribunal is obliged to 
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follow the interpretation. And the tribunal has no authority to scrutinize whether the 
interpretation actually amounts to an amendment to the treaty or not. Therefore, any 
subsequent interpretation of a treaty provision would be authentic and binding on a 
tribunal adjudicating investment disputes. The second pattern affirms the binding 
effect of subsequent interpretation but meanwhile requires that subsequent 
interpretation cannot be used to illegitimately amend the treaty. Article 14(2) of the 
2007 Norwegian Model BIT, for instance, confirms that an interpretation of a treaty 
provision by the Joint Committee that is composed by the treaty parties shall be 
binding on a Tribunal. At the same time, in its Article 23(4), it is required that the 
Joint Committee’ competence of issuing interpretation shall not be used to undermine 
the amendment provisions of the treaty. It thus seems that the tribunal will have the 
authority to review the legitimacy of the treaty parties’ interpretation. Therefore, the 
first pattern of formulation would leave more interpretive choices to the treaty parties 
than the latter one.  
Another critical issue that needs to be clarified is whether the treaty parties’ 
subsequent interpretation of treaty provisions has a binding force on the tribunal 
adjudicating an ongoing investment arbitration case. Debate exists about the 
retrospective effect of subsequent interpretation on an ongoing case. The treaty parties 
may perceive it as inherent result. In the view of foreign investors, however, allowing 
the treaty parties to issue interpretations to influence an ongoing case to the detriment 
of investors “is incompatible with principles of fair procedure and is hence 
undesirable.” 492 It is argued that the treaty parties’ interpretation is self-serving and 
could improperly narrow the rights of foreign investors already created by investment 
treaties. It is exactly why some tribunals refuse to abide by the treaty parties’ 
subsequent interpretation of investment treaty provisions.  
Therefore, it would be the safest and surest means for treaty parties to explicitly 
provide in their investment treaties that subsequent interpretation has binding force on 
a tribunal dealing with an ongoing case. Alternatively or accumulatively, treaty 
parties may require the tribunal to request a joint interpretation of any treaty provision 
that is in issue in a dispute before its rendering of the award. To illustrate, Article 40 
of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement requires that “the tribunal shall, 
on its own account or at the request of a disputing party, request a joint interpretation 
of any provision of this Agreement that is in issue in a dispute.” Furthermore, “a joint 
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decision of the Member States, declaring their interpretation of a provision of this 
Agreement shall be binding on a tribunal and any decision or award issued by a 
tribunal must be consistent with that joint decision.” A similar wording can be found 
in Article 155 of the China-New Zealand FTA. In case the Member States fail to issue 
such a decision in 6  days, “the tribunal shall decide the issue on its own account.” By 
contrast, Article 23(4) of the Norwegian Model BIT provides that “the Joint 
Committee should refrain from adopting interpretations of provisions already 
submitted to a Tribunal in a dispute between a Party and an Investor of the other 
Party.” It seems the Norwegian Model BIT intends to prevent the possibility of 
adopting joint interpretation of any treaty provision that is in issue in an ongoing case. 
Nevertheless, it does not exclude the binding effect of the treaty parties’ joint 
interpretation on a future case. Even after the award has been rendered, the treaty 
parties can still evaluate the tribunal’s interpretations in the award. If needed, treaty 
parties may issue their authentic interpretation in order to restrict the interpretive 
discretion for future tribunals.
493
 
A joint interpretation may be authoritative irrespective of its legal form as long as it 
clearly establishes the consent of all the parties as to the interpretation of the treaty. 
Any subsequent agreement or accepted practice regarding the interpretation of the 
investment treaty requires a common understanding of the parties in order to qualify 
as authoritative interpretation. A state cannot issue a subsequent agreement on 
interpretation alone, but it may constitute the first step towards a joint interpretation 
between the parties. Where a state, mostly a respondent state, makes submissions 
about the interpretation of an investment treaty provision and it is supported by the 
other non-disputing treaty parties, they may constitute evidence of an agreement on 
interpretation and thus qualify as a subsequent practice in the sense of the Vienna 
Convention. From a practical point of view, a joint interpretation in a written form 
would be clearer and more likely to be accepted by tribunals. In any event, unilateral 
interpretative assertion of one treaty party cannot be deemed to be a subsequent 
agreement or a subsequent practice since one treaty party cannot unilaterally give 
authentic interpretation. 
Indeed, failure to reach a joint agreement on interpretation between the treaty 
parties will typically translate into an expansion of the tribunal’s zone of discretion. 
The fact, that most investment treaties have been concluded between capital-exporting 
                                                             
493 UNCTAD, Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can Do, UNCTAD IIA Issues Note, 2011, p. 15. 
Chapter 5: Competition and Interaction between States and Tribunals with respect to the Creeping 
Jurisdiction 
201 
 
states and capital-importing states and that most of the investor-state arbitration cases 
have been brought by investors from capital-exporting states against capital-importing 
states, may reduce the possibility of reaching an agreement or accepted practice on the 
interpretation of a treaty provision. The treaty parties may have distinct understanding 
regarding the vague terms of investment treaty provisions since they lack enough 
commonality of interest. Therefore, in arbitral practice, unilateral interpretation of one 
state party (normally the respondent state) is frequent while joint interpretation of all 
state parties is extremely rare. Yet this phenomenon is likely to change along with the 
development of international capital movement. A significant portion of foreign direct 
investment flows from developing states to developed states today. It makes some 
states, such as China and the United States, hard to categorize as primarily a 
capital-importing state or capital-exporting state. On the contrary, they may have 
important interests as both capital importers and capital exporters. Besides, the 
number of investment treaties concluded between developing states and between 
developed states is increasing. There are also more and more developed states 
appearing as respondents in investor-state arbitration cases. As might be expected, the 
possibility of reaching common interpretive agreements and practices could be 
increased following a greater convergence of interests among the treaty parties. 
494
 
5.4.2 Ex ante control: increasing the preciseness of treaty commitments 
The greater the impreciseness of the rules to be applied, the greater the scope of 
discretion will be left to judicial bodies delegated to interpret them. The same applies 
to the drafting of an international investment treaty. Treaty rules are more likely to be 
flexible and incomplete in their language than domestic rules due to the absence of a 
centralized international legislative body. 
495
 The more incomplete a treaty is, the 
bigger the tribunals’ mandate or temptation to fill gaps and clarify ambiguities 
becomes.
 496
 Indeed, most investment treaties are phrased in vague and elastic terms 
regarding foreign investors’ substantive treatment and procedural access to 
investor-state arbitration. Such vagueness leaves ample space for tribunals’ creative 
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interpretation and provides textual support for the jurisdictional expansion of 
investment tribunals. 
497
 From the treaty parties’ perspective, it is thus necessary to 
draft investment treaty rules with greater preciseness rather than greater vagueness in 
order to increase the stability and predictability of their treaty commitments. By 
increasing the preciseness of their treaty commitments ex ante, treaty parties can 
enlarge their control over the meaning of treaty terms and thereby narrow the breadth 
of interpretive authority delegated to arbitral tribunals. 
498
 In doing so, treaty parties 
may reduce the possibility of being subject to investor-state arbitration and of being 
compelled to assume compensation liability towards foreign investors due to their 
regulatory measures on foreign investment.  
Before entering into a detailed discussion, however, it is necessary to note that there 
are several important limitations for the treaty parties to increase the preciseness of 
their treaty commitments. A perfectly precise treaty is desirable but not attainable 
since the negotiators and drafters of a treaty cannot foresee at the time of negotiating 
and drafting all of the legal issues that might arise in a later dispute. A legal term is 
inevitably subject to a certain degree of linguistic ambiguity. As long as a third-party 
adjudicator is delegated to settle the dispute and is thus authorized, explicitly or 
implicitly, to interpret and apply the treaty, the treaty would be subject to the 
adjudicator’s own interpretation. Considering the delegation of dispute settlement 
powers to arbitral tribunals in most investment treaties, treaty parties cannot expect to 
exercise complete control over tribunals regarding the interpretation of their 
investment treaties.
 499
 Besides, a better drafting of an investment treaty requires 
collective action. The negotiating costs involved in the contracting and re-contracting 
process of treaty provisions may substantially hinder the conclusion of a precisely 
drafted treaty. Even so, a greater degree of preciseness in the formulation of 
investment treaties can be expected if the treaty parties desire to constrain the 
interpretive discretion of arbitral tribunals.  
Firstly, the definitions of “investment” and “investor” need to be clarified in more 
specific terms. If treaty parties do not define “investment” and “investor” with 
sufficient detail and clarity, they run the risk of being “surprised” by investor-state 
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tribunals over the scope of assets and investors that are protected under the treaty. 
Therefore, it is important that states define investment and investor in their treaties in 
a manner that reflects their intentions rather than leaving tribunals with ample 
interpretive discretion under the treaty. 
The definition of “investment” sets out the kinds of assets that qualify as 
investment for the purpose of the investment treaty. Most current investment treaties 
adopt the broad asset-based approach in defining investment, covering “every kind of 
asset” or “any kind of asset”. A non-exhaustive list of assets constituting investment is 
usually coupled with. Such definition is open-ended and has been broadly interpreted 
in arbitral practice.  
While maintaining the asset-based approach, treaty parties may use the following 
methods separately or cumulatively to narrow the scope of covered investment. (1) 
Qualifying the definition of investment by introducing certain objective criteria. The 
2 12 US Model BIT, for example, provides that “investment” means every asset that 
an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that “has the characteristics of an 
investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other 
resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.” In clarifying 
such characteristics, the US Model BIT further explains that “other forms of debt, 
such as claims to payment that are immediately due and result from the sale of goods 
or services, are less likely to have such characteristics.” (2) Excluding specific types 
of assets such as certain commercial contracts and certain loans and debt securities 
from the scope of covered investment. To illustrate, Article 1 of the China-Colombia 
BIT stipulates that “investment does not include  i. public debt operations; ii. claims 
to money arising solely from: a. Commercial contracts for the sale of goods and 
services by a national or legal entity in the territory of a Contracting Party to a 
national or a legal entity in the territory of the other Contracting Party; or b. Credits 
granted in relation with a commercial transaction.” Likewise, Article 1(1) of the 
China-Uzbekistan BIT clearly provides that: an investment does not mean (a) claims 
to money that arise solely from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services 
by a national or enterprise in the territory of the State of the other Contracting Party; 
(b) claims to money that arise from marriage or inheritance and have no 
characteristics of investment. In addition, bonds, debentures and loans with original 
maturity less than 3 years shall not be deemed as investments under this Agreement. 
(3) Limiting covered investment to those made in accordance with the host state law. 
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Considering that arbitral tribunals tend to deny the potential effect of the host state 
law in limiting the definition of investment under investment treaties, treaty parties 
may need to explicitly clarify that the compliance with the host state law requirement 
refers to both the validity and the definition of the investment. Non-compliance with 
this requirement would preclude an investor’s protection by the treaty and its access 
to investor-state arbitration. Assets that are not invested in accordance with the laws 
of the host state will not be considered as covered investment.  
In the case of the definition of “investors”, the critical issue is the nationality link 
between an investor and a treaty party. Defining whether an investor is protected by 
an investment treaty is basically a question of defining that investor’s nationality. 
Most investment treaties use the place of incorporation as the criterion to determine a 
company’s nationality. Notwithstanding its clarity and simplicity of application, the 
incorporation test does not guarantee a substantial business connection between a 
company and its place of incorporation.
 
Any company incorporated in the contracting 
state may satisfy the nationality requirement and can be recognized as covered 
investor in an investment treaty regardless of whether the company is controlled by 
foreign nationals and/or whether the company has substantial business activities in the 
contracting state. The prevalence of the incorporation test in most investment treaties 
thus leaves the door open for investors to benefit from any target investment treaty by 
structuring their investments through their special purpose vehicles or shell companies 
incorporated in one of the contracting states.
 500
  
To deal with undesirable treaty shopping of investors, the contracting states may 
use the control test to narrow the scope of covered investors. Article 72(h) of the 
Japan-Singapore FTA, for instance, requires a covered enterprise of the other Party to 
be duly constituted or otherwise organized under applicable law of the other Party but 
simultaneously excludes “an enterprise owned or controlled by persons of non-Parties 
and not engaging in substantive business operations in the territory of the other Party.” 
This article expressly excludes enterprises owned or controlled by third state nationals 
and thus provides a rather limited definition of investor. There is thus no room for a 
shell company controlled by nationals of non-contracting states to take advantage of 
the benefits of the Japan-Singapore FTA.  
However, this definition does not exclude enterprises of the other Party owned or 
controlled by nationals of the host state. In other words, a domestic investor may still 
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seek the treaty protection against its home state through a shell company in the other 
contracting state in the form of round-trip investment. For example, a Singaporean 
investor may establish a shell company in Japan and in turn make round-trip 
investment in Singapore. And the shell company of such Singaporean investor has 
legal standing to bring arbitration claims against Singapore to evade the domestic 
jurisdiction of Singapore according to Article 72(h) of the Japan-Singapore FTA. 
Therefore, it is highly suggested to expressly exclude enterprises owned or controlled 
by nationals of non-contracting states or of the host state in the treaty definition of 
investors. A good sample of such a limited definition can be formulated as follows: 
enterprise of a Party means an enterprise duly constituted or otherwise organized 
under the law of a Party and engaging in substantial business activities there, except 
an enterprise owned or controlled by nationals of non-Parties or of the other Party. 
It is notable, however, that contracting states may be hesitant to adopt the control 
test to exclude the legitimacy of treaty shopping entirely based on the considerations 
of policy and comprehensive interests. Many developing countries, on the one hand, 
usually have to accept the wider definitions of investor and investment to attract 
foreign investment. Developed countries, on the other hand, tend to reinforce the 
protection of their nationals investing abroad and to enhance their attractiveness as a 
business hub to treaty shoppers through the broad definitions of investor and 
investment. The Netherlands, for instance, uses the broad definitions of investor and 
investment in most of its BITs. This makes the Netherlands a favorable “base camp” 
for intermediate holding and financial companies to conduct treaty shopping.  
According to the statistics, the arbitration proceedings instituted by the Dutch 
investors account for about 10% of the total investment arbitration cases. And the 
majority of the Dutch investors that have sought arbitration through a Dutch 
investment treaty are so-called shell companies controlled by shareholders outside the 
Netherlands, with no employees or any substantial activities in the Netherlands.
 501
 
In case the definitions of investment and investor are difficult to recalibrate as 
suggested above, the inclusion of a denial of benefits clause could be a more flexible 
choice for the contracting states to limit the scope of protected investors. A denial of 
benefits clause is designed to deny treaty protection to shell companies. Considering 
that arbitral tribunals have imposed limits on the host state’s invocation of denial of 
benefits clauses, it seems necessary for the contracting states to clarify the application 
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requirements for denial of benefits clauses. The following are several alternative 
options available for the contracting states to negotiate investment treaties: (1) 
avoiding a discretionary formulation of denial of benefits clause (“a Party may deny 
the benefits” or “a Party reserves a right to deny the advantages”) and using a denial 
of benefits clause with automatic and mandatory effect (“benefits shall be denied”); (2) 
denying treaty benefits to an investor of the other Party controlled by nationals of a 
non-Party or of the denying Party
502
; (3) defining the concepts of substantial business 
activities and control; (4) issuing a general declaration or incorporating a statutory 
provision to make its intent of denial of benefits clear; and (5) allowing the host state 
to deny treaty benefits to treaty shoppers at any time. For example, the China-Canada 
BIT in its denial of benefits clause stipulates that a Contracting Party may, “at any 
time including after the institution of arbitration proceedings”, deny the treaty benefits 
to those enterprises having no economic connection with the other Contracting Party 
where it is incorporated.
 503
 The tribunal would have to accept the invocation of a 
denial of benefits clause by the host state under this treaty even after the investor 
institutes an arbitration proceeding.  
Secondly, the scope of investor-state arbitration provisions (ISAPs) needs to be 
further elaborated. The scope of ISAPs can be specifically determined in different 
places in the investment treaty and may take various forms. They may include the 
scope of covered “investment disputes”, conditions precedent to arbitration, the MFN 
clause, the umbrella clause and the fork-in-the-road clause.  
The scope of covered “investment disputes” determines the range of investment 
disputes that can be brought to investor-state arbitration. To reduce the risk of being 
sued by foreign investors, it is suggested that the contracting states shall avoid using 
the broad terms of “all disputes” or “any dispute” “arising out of”, “with respect to” 
“concerning” or “related to” an investment. These formulations may be sufficiently 
expansive to include disputes not involving an alleged violation of the investment 
treaty, such as disputes involving violations of customary international law, 
investment contracts and possibly even the domestic law of the host State.
 504
  
                                                             
502 The 2010 China Model BIT prepared by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce also authorizes a treaty party to 
deny treaty benefits to an investor of the other Party controlled by nationals of a non-Party or of the denying 
Party. For further detail, see Wen Xiantao, Comments on the Draft of China’s Model BIT (II), Journal of 
International Economic Law, Vol.19, No. 1, 2012, p. 150. (in Chinese)  
503 The China-Canada BIT was signed on 9 September 2012 and came into force on 1 October 2014, available at: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/china-text-chine.asp
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Therefore, it is necessary for the contracting states to clearly specify the type of 
disputes that can be brought by foreign investors against them in investment 
arbitration. There are several options available for the contracting states to limit the 
scope of arbitrable investment disputes. (1) Disputes on an alleged breach of any 
treaty provision. Compared with the broad term of “all disputes”, this is a more 
circumscribed formulation that restricts a tribunal’s jurisdiction to disputes involving 
violations of the investment treaty’s substantive standards. (2) Disputes on an alleged 
breach of the specified treaty provisions. States may, by means of a positive list, 
specify certain treaty provisions whose violation can be litigated by covered investors 
to an investor-state tribunal. This list can be broad or narrow. A broad version of list 
can be found in Article 20(1) of the Canada Model BIT providing that “an investor of 
a Contracting Party may submit to arbitration under this Part a claim that the other 
Contracting Party has breached an obligation under Articles 2 to 7(2), 9, 10 to 13, 
14(4) or 16.” By contrast, the contracting states may also restrict the investors’ access 
to international arbitration only to a limited dispute, such as disputes over the amount 
of compensation for expropriation. A number of earlier treaties concluded by China 
and the former USSR only allow covered investors to submit disputes over the 
amount of compensation for expropriation to an investor-state tribunal. While 
adopting the narrow list of investment disputes (such as disputes over the amount of 
compensation for expropriation), it is necessary to clarify what the list does not 
include (for example, clarifying that disputes over the amount of compensation for 
expropriation do not include disputes over the existence of expropriation). (3) 
Excluding specific sensitive sectors or measures, such as financial sector, taxation 
matters and health, safety and environmental measures, from the scope of arbitrable 
investment disputes. The Nigeria-Turkey BIT, for instance, expressly excludes the 
disputes related to the property and real rights upon the real estates from the coverage 
of investment disputes. Such disputes “are totally under the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the host Contracting Party and therefore shall not be submitted to jurisdiction of” 
an investment tribunal. Likewise, Article 15(12) of the China-Japan-Korea Investment 
Treaty provides that the investor-state arbitration provision shall not apply to disputes 
relating to intellectual property rights and to prudential measures regarding financial 
services.  
With respect to conditions precedent to arbitration, the intention of contracting 
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parties should be made clear in imposing requirements that a covered investor must 
fulfill before submitting a claim to arbitration. States are free to qualify their consent 
to international arbitration and impose the preconditions to arbitration. Among others, 
preconditions to arbitration mainly include the amicable settlement requirement, a 
certain waiting period and the fork-in-the-road requirement. Careful drafting is 
required in order to make these requirements effective.  
As discussed above, investment tribunals tend to contend that non-fulfillment of 
these requirements does not affect their jurisdiction,
 505
 or may be avoided by 
application of the MFN clause. 
506
 Therefore, specific language needs to be used in 
order to guarantee the binding and mandatory effect of these requirements. To 
illustrate, Article 23 of the China-Canada BIT stipulates that “each Contracting Party 
consents to the submission of a claim to arbitration in accordance with the procedures 
set out in this Agreement. Failure to meet any of the conditions precedent provided for 
in Article 21 shall nullify that consent.” According to this formulation, by making 
their consent to arbitration conditional on the investors’ compliance with the said 
requirements, the contracting states can achieve the intended effect. Failure by the 
investor to comply with any listed requirement would automatically nullify a 
contracting state’s consent to arbitration and thus the tribunal shall dismiss the 
investor’ claims for lack of jurisdiction.  
Besides, not a few investment treaties attempt to minimize the possibility of 
running multiple proceedings by investors through the inclusion of a fork-in-the-road 
clause. A “fork-in-the-road” clause requires investors to make a final and irreversible 
choice between domestic courts and international arbitration. Once an investor starts 
the domestic proceedings, it loses the right to resort to arbitration, and vice versa. 
However, as discussed above, tribunals have set a high threshold for the triggering of 
a fork-in-the-road clause. In order for a fork-in-the-road clause to be triggered, it is 
necessary that not only the parties to the two proceedings be identical but also the 
subject matter. Therefore, investors may easily avoid the triggering of a 
fork-in-the-road clause by simply changing the parties or the labeling of their claims 
in the two proceedings.
507
 It seems that fork-in-the-road clauses are not an effective 
tool for the contracting states to prevent investors from seeking remedy in both 
domestic courts and international arbitration. It is thus suggested that the contracting 
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states may take another approach to prevent duplicative claims. Instead of requiring 
the investor to make a final choice between domestic litigation and international 
arbitration, the contracting states may require the investor to discontinue domestic 
proceedings and waives its right to initiate them before submitting a claim to 
international arbitration. It is referred to as “no-U-turn” provisions. 508 The United 
States and Canada Model BITs follow this approach in requiring an investor, as a 
precondition to international arbitration, to sign a written waiver of any right to 
initiate or continue any other proceeding in any other forum with respect to the same 
measures. For example, Article 26(1) of the Canada Model BIT provides that a 
disputing investor may submit a claim to arbitration only if the investor and the 
enterprise that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly “waive their right to 
initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any 
Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the 
measure of the disputing Party.” The waiver requirement thus prevents the investor, 
and the enterprise it owns or controls, from pursuing duplicative claims 
simultaneously in both local courts and international arbitration.  
With regard to the MFN clause, it is highly recommended that states make their 
intent clear on the applicability or non-applicability of the MFN clause to dispute 
settlement matters. Notably, a number of countries, especially China, have started to 
clarify that the MFN clause does not apply to dispute settlement. It thus can prevent 
future tribunals from using the MFN clause to expand their jurisdiction. Explicit 
clarifications of the MFN clauses can be found in the China-Canada BIT
509
, the 
China-Colombia BIT
510
, the China-Uzbekistan BIT
511
, the China-Tanzania BIT
512
, the 
China-Peru FTA
513
, the China-New Zealand FTA
514
, the China-Chile FTA 
                                                             
508 See UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Negotiators Handbook: APEC/UNCTAD MODULES, 
2013, p. 145.  
509 The China-Canada BIT, Article 5(3): For greater certainty, the “treatment” referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this Article does not encompass the dispute resolution mechanisms, such as those in Part C, in other 
international investment treaties and other trade agreements. 
510 The China-Colombia BIT, Article 3(3): The most favorable treatment to be granted in like circumstances 
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as those contained in Articles 8 and 9 of this Agreement, which are provided for in treaties or international 
investment agreements. 
511 The China-Uzbekistan BIT, Article 4(3): Notwithstanding Paragraph 1, dispute settlement mechanisms 
stipulated in other treaties shall not be referred to investment disputes in the framework of this Agreement. 
512 The China-Tanzania BIT, Article 4(3): Paragraph 1 of this Article does not apply in respect of dispute 
settlement provisions laid down by this Agreement and by other similar international agreement to which one 
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513 The China-Peru FTA, Article 131, note 13: For greater certainty, treatment “with respect to the establishment, 
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Supplementary Agreement on Investments
515
, the China-ASEAN Investment Treaty
516
, 
and the China-Japan-Korea Investment Treaty
517
. The expressions of “for greater 
certainty” or “for the avoidance of doubt” in these treaties seem to imply that the 
non-applicability of the MFN clause to dispute settlement is certainly a proper 
interpretation. The MFN clause would not apply to dispute settlement even in absence 
of such clarification. Notwithstanding, it might not be sufficient enough to prevent 
future tribunals from drawing an adverse inference that previous treaties without a 
similar clarification would allow the applicability of the MFN clause to dispute 
settlement.  
With respect to the umbrella clause, it is important to note that arbitral practice tend 
to support the expansive reading that it can elevate contract claims into treaty claims. 
If states wish to avoid the expansive interpretation tribunals have given to umbrella 
clauses, they shall make their intent clear. One option would be omitting the umbrella 
clause altogether in their investment treaties. For example, the China-Canada BIT and 
the Canada-Peru FTA do not contain the umbrella clause. It would diminish the 
possibility of state exposure to investor-state arbitration due to a breach of a state 
contract between the host state and the foreign investor. Disputes arising out of 
contracts with foreign investors will be adjudicated exclusively in local courts of the 
host state or other forum specified in the contract.  
A second alternative is to exclude the umbrella clause from the scope of the 
investor-state arbitration provision. 
518
 By doing so, the choice of forum specified in 
an investment contract prevails over the investor-state arbitration forum provided in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
dispute settlement mechanisms, such as those in Article 138 (Settlement of Disputes Between Parties) and 
Article 139 (Investor-State Dispute Settlement), that are provided for in international investment treaties or 
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515 The China-Chile FTA Supplementary Agreement on Investments, Article 5, note 7: For greater certainty, 
dispute settlement mechanisms stipulated in other treaties shall not be invoked by investors of either Party. 
516 The China-ASEAN Investment Treaty, Article 5(4): For greater certainty, the obligation in this Article does 
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other than those set out in this Agreement. 
517 The China-Japan-Korea Investment Treaty, Article 4(3): It is understood that the treatment accorded to 
investors of the third Contracting Party or any non-Contracting Party and to their investments as referred to in 
paragraph 1 does not include treatment accorded to investors of the third Contracting Party or any 
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an investment treaty. A foreign investor can only resort to the contractual forum but 
not the treaty forum. For example, Article 28(2)(b) of the Japan-Colombia BIT 
provides that “where the written agreement referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 4 [the 
umbrella clause] stipulates a dispute settlement procedure, such procedure shall 
prevail over this Chapter [the investor-state arbitration mechanism].” Likewise, 
Article 19 of the Greece-Mexico BIT provides that “each Contracting Party shall 
observe any other obligation it may have entered into in writing with regard to a 
specific investment of an investor of the other Contacting Party. The disputes arising 
from such obligations shall be settled only under the terms and conditions of the 
respective contract.”  
States that want to retain the umbrella clause may also precisely reveal their 
intended effect of the clause. If states intend to specify the reach of the umbrella 
clause, for instance the coverage of the “obligations”, this should be expressly stated. 
Article 13(2) of the China-Uzbekistan BIT, for instance, contains an umbrella clause 
providing that “each Contracting Party shall observe any written commitments in the 
form of agreement, treaty or contract it may have entered into with the investors of the 
other Contracting Party as regards to their investments.” In its Article 12, the 
China-Uzbekistan BIT allows a covered investor to submit a claim that the host state 
has breached an obligation under Article 13 [the umbrella clause] to investment 
arbitration. However, a further clarification is provided in its Article 13(3): 
notwithstanding Paragraph 2, “the breach of one Contracting Party of the obligation 
under a commercial contract is not a breach of this Agreement.” Therefore, a covered 
investor may submit disputes concerning a breach of a commercial contract, but not of 
a non-commercial contract, to investment arbitration.  
Thirdly, states may need to include more exception clauses in their investment 
treaties. Exception clauses, also referred to as escape clauses, are the basis on which a 
state may be excused from its obligations in certain circumstances. One of the most 
complicated issues arising from investment treaties and investor-state arbitration is the 
relationship between investment protection and the regulatory function of states. A 
delicate formulation of exception clauses may strike a proper balance between them. 
Exception clauses enable states to adopt certain regulatory measures aimed at 
specified policy objectives (e.g. protection of essential security interests, public health 
and safety, the environment, etc.) that could otherwise be in violation of states’ 
obligations under the investment treaty. Absence of exception clauses may create an 
Chapter 5: Competition and Interaction between States and Tribunals with respect to the Creeping 
Jurisdiction 
212 
 
adverse inference for the contracting states that investment protection is placed above 
these policy objectives. In that case, a state may only invoke rules of customary 
international law, such as state of necessity, as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of a measure that would otherwise not be in conformity with its 
obligations under the investment treaty.
 519
 The conditions for the invocation of 
customary exceptions, however, are strictly defined and are not likely to be 
successfully satisfied in the context of international investment law. By contrast, a 
treaty exception may lower the threshold for its invocation and extend its coverage.  
A first category of treaty exceptions are essential security exceptions safeguarding 
states’ ability to take otherwise treaty-inconsistent measures for the protection of 
essential security. The United States has a consistent practice of including essential 
security exceptions in its BITs. Article 18(2) of the US Model BIT is a typical 
example providing that “nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to preclude a Party 
from applying measures that it considers necessary for the protection of its own 
essential security interests.” The problem is whether the terms “it considers 
necessary” render the essential security exception a self-judging exception. In arbitral 
practice, tribunals have upheld their competence to review state measures despite the 
wide discretion of the state in protecting its essential security under the investment 
treaty.
 520
  
Some treaties go one step further and seek to eliminate the possibility of arbitral 
review too. 
521
 For instance, certain BITs concluded by India expressly provide that 
security exceptions are non-justiciable and thus deprive tribunals of the power to 
review measures that are allegedly taken on national security grounds. An Annex to 
Article 6.12 of the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement provides that “any decision of the disputing Party taken on such security 
considerations shall be non-justiciable in that it shall not be open to any arbitral 
tribunal to review the merits of any such decision, even where the arbitral proceedings 
concern an assessment of any claim for damages and/or compensation, or an 
adjudication of any other issues referred to the tribunal.” 
A second category of treaty exceptions are general exceptions aimed at providing 
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flexibility for the contracting states to protect public health and safety, the 
environment and other policy objectives. A broad or narrow list of specific policy 
objectives may be set out in general exceptions that allow for treaty-inconsistent 
measures. 
522
 A wide variety of policy objectives can be listed: taxation, protection 
of human health, protection of exhaustible natural resources; protection of culture and 
prudential measures for financial services. General exceptions are common practice in 
international trade agreements, but are relatively rare in investment treaties. Recently, 
in view of the increasing concern that investment treaties can hinder environmental, 
health and other policy objectives, some states have begun making investment treaties 
subject to general exceptions. Among others, more and more investment treaties 
include an exception for prudential measures relating to the financial services sector. 
Article 33(3) of the China-Canada BIT, for example, provides that “nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Contracting Party from adopting or 
maintaining reasonable measures for prudential reasons, such as: (a) the protection of 
depositors, financial market participants and investors, policy-holders, 
policy-claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial 
institution; (b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial 
responsibility of financial institutions; and (c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a 
Contracting Party’s financial system.”  
States that consider including exceptions in their investment treaties may still need 
to clarify the question whether measures aimed at protecting these public objectives 
are subject to judicial review by investor-state tribunals. Three options are available. 
One option would be excluding exception measures from the scope of investor-state 
arbitration. The above-mentioned India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement provides that measures taken on security considerations shall 
be non-justiciable and not subject to the jurisdiction of an investor-state tribunal. 
Nevertheless, the complete exclusion from arbitral review is rare for general 
exceptions. One example can be found in Article 15(12) of the China-Japan-Korea 
Investment Treaty, which provides that the investor-state arbitration provision shall 
not apply to disputes relating to prudential measures regarding financial services. A 
second option is subjecting exception measures to investor-state arbitration. For 
example, the China-Colombia BIT includes an exception for prudential measures in 
the financial sector in its Article 13. Meanwhile, Article 9 of the China-Colombia BIT 
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allows a covered investor to submit “any dispute” to investor-state arbitration. 
Disputes relating to the host state’s prudential measures in the financial sector are also 
covered by the term “any dispute” and thus can be submitted to tribunals for review.  
A third compromise alternative would be sharing the decision-making power 
between the treaty parties and investment tribunals regarding the invocation of treaty 
exceptions. Under this approach, a foreign investor may submit a dispute arising out 
of exception measures between the investor and the host state to an investment 
tribunal, but the treaty parties as a whole may also issue a binding decision regarding 
the dispute on the tribunal. For instance, Article 20(2) of the China-Canada BIT 
provides that if the host state invokes a “prudential measures” exception in the 
investor-state arbitration, the investor-state tribunal cannot decide if and to what 
extent that exception is a valid defense. Instead, the tribunal shall seek a report from 
the treaty parties on this issue, who may then reach a joint decision that is binding on 
the investor-state tribunal. If, after 60 days, the treaty parties are unable to reach a 
joint decision on the issue, either treaty party can refer the matter to a state-to-state 
tribunal, whose decision shall then be binding on the investor-state tribunal. 
Compared with the above two options, it seems that this compromise option would 
better balance the investors’ access to international arbitration and the treaty parties’ 
concern for pursuing public objectives under the treaty exceptions.  
5.5 Final choice: exiting from investment treaties or investor-state 
arbitration mechanisms 
The same as concluding a treaty, withdrawing from a treaty is also an inherent right 
of a state. Yet, the right to withdraw from a treaty is subject to the specific conditions 
of the treaty and the customary rules embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.
 523
 In the absence of a treaty rule regarding the issues of termination and 
withdrawal, the Vienna Convention will apply. In its Article 56, the Vienna 
Convention stipulates that “a treaty that contains no provision regarding its 
termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject 
to denunciation or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established that the parties intended to 
admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right of denunciation or 
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withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.” Most investment treaties 
contain provisions regarding their termination or the withdrawal of a party. For those 
treaties containing no such provision, it can be presumed that the nature of investment 
treaties does not preclude the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal.  
A state party to the investment treaty thus has a right of denunciation or withdrawal. 
If a state feels uncomfortable with its content or the way it is applied, it may denounce 
or withdraw from the treaty following the procedure specified in the treaty. 
Occasionally, a state may threat to denounce or withdraw from the treaty in order to 
exert pressure on other treaty parties and to seek amendments to the treaty. In any 
event, exit is the final choice for state parties. States wishing to denounce or withdraw 
from investment treaties have to balance the intended effect of denunciation or 
withdrawal with the potential cost. In taking such actions, they need to weigh its pros 
and cons and its implication for the overall investment climate (and foreign investors’ 
perception of it), their own investors abroad, and their overall development strategies. 
524
 Thus, states may be unwilling to withdraw from an investment treaty, even when 
they object to certain interpretations of investment tribunals, for fear of being 
excluded from the regime’s benefits, such as possible increases in investment flows 
and competitive advantages for their investors.
525
  
Although rare in practice, there are indeed several states deciding to exit from the 
regime of investment treaties and investment arbitration. Three types of exit strategies 
can be observed. A first kind is terminating bilateral investment treaties. Unlike other 
international treaties, BITs usually specify that they shall remain in force for a 
minimum fixed duration, often 10, 15 or even 20 years. The rationale for the fixed 
period of treaty duration is to provide investors with a high level of certainty and 
predictability regarding the international legal framework applicable to their 
investments. It prevents a state party from denouncing the treaty before its expiration. 
Most BITs specify that at the end of the fixed period, each party may terminate the 
treaty, usually with one year’s written notice. If either state party fails to give a written 
notice to terminate a BIT one year before its expiration, the BIT shall continue to be 
in force. While some BITs state that the treaty shall continue to be in force for 
additional fixed periods, others provide that the treaty shall continue to be in force 
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indefinitely. Thanks to these automatic renewal clauses, a number of investment 
treaties that were signed during the 1990s are currently still in force.  
According to an UNCTAD analysis, by the end of 2013, more than 1,300 bilateral 
treaties were at the stage where they could be terminated or renegotiated at any time. 
Furthermore, between 2014 and 2018, at least 350 bilateral treaties will reach the end 
of their initial duration.
 526
 Notwithstanding, only a few states have gone so far as to 
terminate their BITs to completely relieve the treaty parties of their treaty 
commitments. States that have recently terminated their BITs include Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, South Africa and Indonesia. In 2008, Ecuador terminated nine BITs 
with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Romania and Uruguay. In 2008, Venezuela terminated its BIT with the 
Netherlands. In 2011, Bolivia terminated its BIT with the United States. In 2012, 
South Africa terminated its BIT with Belgo-Luxembourg and Spain. In 2013, South 
Africa terminated its BIT with Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. In 2014, 
Indonesia gave its written notice to the Netherlands to terminate its BIT with the 
Netherlands one year before the expiration date and mentioned that it might terminate 
all of its 67 BITs. 
527
  
However, the immediate impact of terminating BITs is highly limited due to the 
existence of survival clauses. BITs typically include the so-called survival clauses or 
sunset clauses, which guarantee that the provisions of the BIT will remain in effect for 
another 5, 10, sometimes 15 or even 20 years after the termination of the treaty. 
Because of survival clauses, investment protection commitments in the BIT, including 
substantial protection commitments and procedural protection commitments, will not 
abruptly cease to exist in the case of treaty termination.
 528
 For instance, Article 15 of 
the China- ermany BIT provides that “with respect to investments made prior to the 
date of termination of this Agreement, the provisions of Article 1 to 14 shall continue 
                                                             
526 UNCTAD, International Investment Policymaking in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities of Treaty 
Renewal, UNCTAD's IIA Issues Note, 2013, pp. 3-4. 
527 The Indonesia-Netherlands BIT will be expired on 1 July 2015. Hogan Lovells, Indonesia terminates its 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the Netherlands from 1 July 2015 and may terminate all of its BITs, 
available at: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2a596886-3ad2-464b-a510-ab3b0cff503b. There 
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v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 February 2014; Planet 
Mining PLC v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/40, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 February 
2014.  
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to be effective for a further period of twenty years from such date of termination.” 
Thus, even though a State may terminate a BIT, it will often still remain bound by its 
investment protection commitments made under the terminated BIT for an additional 
period. The protective effect of the BIT on existing investors is automatically 
prolonged. As a result, even after the termination, the foreign investors can still avail 
themselves of the protection under the BIT, including their right to submit disputes to 
investor-state arbitration.  
A second type of exit is withdrawing from the ICSID Convention. According to 
Article 71 of the ICSID Convention, any Contracting State may denounce this 
Convention by written notice to the depositary of this Convention. The denunciation 
shall take effect six months after receipt of such notice. Thus, the right to withdraw 
from the ICSID Convention is unconditional and could be exercised by a contracting 
state at any time and without giving any reason. 
529
 Due to frequent exposure to 
ICSID arbitration proceedings initiated by foreign investors and a rather high 
percentage of losing, three states chose to denounce the ICSID Convention in order to 
reduce the risk of being sued before ICSID tribunals. For example, Bolivia sent a 
written notice of denunciation of the Convention on 2 May 2007. In accordance with 
Article 71 of the Convention, the denunciation took effect six months after the receipt 
of Bolivia’s notice, i.e., on 3 November 2007. On 6 July 2009, the depositary received 
a written notice of denunciation of the Convention from Ecuador, and the 
denunciation took effect on 7 January 2010. On 24 January 2012, the depositary 
received a written notice of denunciation of the Convention from Venezuela, and the 
denunciation took effect on 25 July 2012. Despite the three states’ denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention, 11 states have ratified the ICSID Convention since 2007. They 
include Canada, Cape Verde, Haiti, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Qatar, Sao Tome 
and Principe, San Marino, Serbia and South Sudan.
 530
 The total number of member 
states of the Convention increases to 151. It seems that the popularity of the ICSID 
Convention is not influenced by several states’ withdrawal from it.  
Moreover, a state’s denunciation of the ICSID Convention may not achieve the 
objectives that the state seeks to pursue. Article 72 of the ICSID Convention provides 
that a state’s notice of denunciation of the ICSID Convention shall not affect rights 
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and obligations under the Convention arising from consent to the ICSID’s jurisdiction 
given before receipt of the notice. The intention of the article was to make it clear that 
if a State had consented to arbitration, the subsequent denunciation of the Convention 
by that State would not relieve it from its obligation to go to arbitration if a dispute 
arose. There is controversy, however, regarding the proper interpretation of the article. 
Some commentators are of the view that Article 72 refers only to “perfected consent”, 
that is mutual consent of the host state and the investor to ICSID arbitration prior to 
the denunciation. 
531
 Under this analysis, if the state’s unilateral consent contained in 
a BIT has not been accepted by the investor before the denunciation of the 
Convention, no investor could later bring a claim before the ICSID tribunal. By 
contrast, others contend that Article 72 refers to the state’s unilateral consent to ICSID 
arbitration. It means that an investor will still be able to accept the state’s unilateral 
consent and submit investment claims to ICSID tribunals even after the state’s 
denunciation of the ICSID Convention takes effect. 
532
 According to this analysis, a 
state’s denunciation of the ICSID Convention would not prevent investors from 
subsequently submitting investment claims against the state to ICSID tribunals on the 
basis the state’s unilateral consent to ICSID arbitration given in its BITs. For instance, 
in April 2010, despite Bolivia’s objection, the case of Pan American v. Bolivia was 
registered and the ICSID tribunal for the case was later constituted. The peculiarity of 
this case is that it was more than two years after Bolivia’s denunciation of the ICSID 
Convention had taken effect in November 2007. It was argued by the claimant that 
Bolivia’s withdrawal from the ICSID Convention shall not affect its unilateral consent 
to ICSID arbitration given in Bolivia’s BITs.  
Therefore, withdrawing from the ICSID Convention might not be a sufficient 
strategy to avoid the possibility of the state being brought before an ICSID tribunal. 
For a state to effectively prevent future ICSID claims, it must not only denounce the 
ICSID Convention but also separately terminate all of its BITs that contain unilateral 
consent to ICSID arbitration. This option, however, faces significant challenges. For 
one thing, a BIT cannot be terminated unless the contracting state gives a written 
notice to terminate the BIT at least one year before its expiration and the termination 
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will take effect after its expiration date. For another, as discussed above, terminating 
BITs cannot immediately relieve the contracting states of their treaty commitments 
due to the prolongation effect of survival clauses. After the termination of a BIT, the 
contracting states will remain bound by their commitments under the BIT for another 
period, often 10 or 15 years.  
It seems that withdrawing from the ICSID Convention and terminating BITs are not 
likely to immediately reduce the risk of being sued by foreign investors before ICSID 
tribunals. Quite the contrary, the number of ICSID arbitration cases against the state 
would dramatically increase after a state denounces the ICSID Convention and 
terminates its BITs. This is because foreign investors may be worried about the state’s 
denunciation of ICSID Convention and BITs, and may submit investment claims 
against the state in response for fear of being excluded from access to ICSID 
arbitration in a later time. This is the case after Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
denounced the ICSID Convention and terminated their BITs. For example, after 
Venezuela denounced the ICSID Convention in January 2012, 12 more cases were 
brought against it before ICSID tribunals as of 31 May 2015. 
533
 Thus, compared 
with denouncing the ICSID Convention and terminating BITs, trying to change it 
from within might be the one strategy with the better likelihood of success.
 534
 
Specifically, states may seek joint interpretations or amendments to existing treaties 
when they feel that the actual application of existing treaties goes beyond their 
expectations of treaty commitments.  
A third alternative would be to amend or remove the investor-state arbitration 
provisions (ISAPs) from the BITs rather than to terminate the BITs altogether. The 
host state’s unilateral consent to investor-state arbitration given in the ISAP under a 
BIT is at the basis of the current expansionary trend of investment arbitration against 
states. In the absence of the ISAP in a BIT, foreign investors would lose powerful 
“teeth” to challenge the contracting states before an international tribunal.  
There are basically three models for the formulation of ISAPs. The “general 
consent” model, being the most common model in modern investment treaties, 
entitles covered investors to submit their investment disputes with the host state 
directly to international arbitration. Under the “limited consent” model, however, the 
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access of covered investors to international arbitration is strictly restricted. A number 
of earlier treaties concluded by developing countries, particularly China and the 
former USSR, still contain narrow ISAPs that restrict investors’ access to international 
arbitration only to those disputes over the amount of compensation for expropriation. 
Finally, the “case-by-case” model, requiring the covered investor to obtain a specific 
consent for international arbitration by the host state, is rarely used in modern 
investment treaties. Therefore, the “case-by-case” formulation of ISAPs can be 
equated with no ISAP since a foreign investor cannot bring claims to investor-state 
arbitration unless the host state gives its specific consent on a case-by-case basis. 
Article 9(2) of the China-Romania BIT, for example, stipulates that “if the dispute 
cannot be settled through negotiations within six months, either party to the dispute 
shall be entitled to submit the dispute either to the competent court of the Contracting 
Party accepting the investment, or to international arbitration (ICSID) for settlement if 
the parties to the dispute so agree.” Although providing the possibility of submitting 
investment claims to ICSID arbitration, the China-Romania BIT requires a specific 
consent to arbitration from both the host state and the foreign investor. In reducing the 
possibility of being sued by foreign investors, the treaty parties may seek to modify 
broad ISAPs with general consent into narrow ISAPs with limited consent or even 
into case-by-case ISAPs with no prior consent.  
The non-inclusion of ISAPs in investment treaties has recently become a preferred 
policy for several countries. The Australian government, for example, in 2011, 
decided to discontinue the practice of including ISAPs in investment treaties. In its 
trade policy statement, the Australian government noted that it had “sought the 
inclusion of investor-state dispute resolution procedures in trade agreements with 
developing countries at the behest of Australian businesses” in the past, but 
nevertheless decided to discontinue this practice considering that it “would confer 
greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those available to domestic businesses” 
and “would constrain the ability of Australian governments to make laws on social, 
environmental and economic matters.” 535  The Australia-Japan FTA and the 
Australia-Malaysia FTA, for example, do not contain an ISAP in their investment 
chapters. 
536
 Under these treaties, a covered investor will have to seek local remedies 
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before local courts or tribunals of the host state regarding its investment dispute with 
the host state. In case the investor cannot get meaningful relief after exhaustion of 
local remedies, the investor may seek diplomatic protection from its home state.  
The policy shift of the Australian government revealed its doubt towards ISAPs. In 
part, Australia’s policy was motivated by the Philip Morris case in which a 
transnational tobacco company challenged Australia’s legislation requiring the plain 
packaging of cigarettes before an investor-state tribunal based on the Australia-Hong 
Kong BIT. 
537
 Excluding ISAPs from investment treaties would prevent future 
investors from challenging Australia’s public measures on social, environmental and 
health matters before investment tribunals.  
Interestingly, after a change of government in 2013, the current Abbott government 
retracted considerably from the former  illard government’s strict position. The 
current Australian government has indicated that it will consider the inclusion of 
investor-state dispute settlement on a case-by-case basis.
 538
 In its recent FTA with 
Korea, the Australia government agreed to the inclusion of ISAP in the investment 
chapter. 
539
 Notably, the investment chapter of the Australia-Korea FTA largely 
resembles the 2012 United States Model BIT regarding the formulation of the ISAP. 
Besides, the Australia-Korea FTA also includes several carve-outs to allow state 
parties some freedom to regulate in the public interest. For example, the FTA 
provides that non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and 
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, 
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations except in rare 
circumstances. The determination of whether an action by a Party constitutes an 
indirect expropriation, however, remains subject to the jurisdiction of an investor-state 
tribunal.  
It can be said that Australia’s policy shift does not indicate a general trend of 
abandoning ISAPs. Although subject to much debate, ISAPs remain included in most 
investment treaties in force and in treaties under negotiation. Exit from the regime of 
investor-state arbitration is the last choice for contracting states. While being effective 
in reducing the risk of being brought before an international tribunal, the absence of 
the ISAP in an investment treaty could possibly impact the host state’s attractiveness 
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to foreign investors and diminish the protection of its investors abroad. Besides, one 
of the original intentions of the establishment of investor-state arbitration mechanism 
was to be the “depoliticization” of investment disputes, i.e., the removal of disputes 
from the political and diplomatic arena to a judicial forum.
540
 By giving foreign 
investors direct access to international arbitration, the host state can be effectively 
shielded from the abuse of diplomatic protection by powerful home states. 
Abandoning ISAPs would also mean a return to state-to-state dispute settlement, 
which will re-politicize the settlement of investment disputes between the host state 
and foreign investors. In any event, for a contracting state, a comprehensive 
evaluation of its interests in importing and exporting investment with its counter-party 
is vital in deciding whether to remove or amend ISAPs in its investment treaties.  
5.6 The practice of China and its shifting position 
China, one of the most important economies in the world, plays an active role in 
concluding investment treaties consistent with its post 1978 open door policy. China 
has been building up an extensive network of BITs since it concluded its first BIT 
with Sweden in 1982. To date, China has signed 130 BITs
541
 and 11 FTAs containing 
investment chapters
542
, of which 105 BITs
543
 and 9 FTAs have come into force. In 
addition, China has basically completed text negotiation on a proposed BIT with the 
United States, seemingly including the investor-state arbitration provision.
 544
 Among 
the treaties in force, 69 BITs restrict investors’ access to international arbitration only 
to those disputes over the amount of compensation for expropriation
545
 and 3 BITs do 
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not confer access to international arbitration upon investors.
546
  
It has been noted that China has experienced a policy shift in its attitude towards 
the jurisdictional scope of investor-state arbitration leading to different generations of 
Chinese investment treaties.
547
 1997 is considered to be a watershed year when China 
signed the first BIT of “new generation” with South Africa entitling investors to 
submit any dispute with the host state “in connection with an investment” to 
international arbitration.
548
 Regarding the categorization of different generations of 
Chinese BITs, most commentators (e.g., Gallagher and Shan) are of the view that 
China has experienced three generations of BITs. It is argued that the first generation, 
which concluded approximately in the 1980s, contained narrow ISAPs stipulating that 
disputes concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation could be submitted 
to an ad hoc international tribunal. The second generation, from roughly 1990 to 1997, 
equally contained narrow ISAPs but also began to allow for the submission of 
disputes to ICSID tribunals since China signed the ICSID Convention on 9 February 
1990 and ratified it on 7 January 1993. The third generation started from 1998 when 
China accepted the inclusion of broad ISAPs granting access of any investment 
dispute to investor-state arbitration, including ICSID arbitration and non-ICSID 
arbitration. 
549
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However, this dissertation does not concur with such categorization. A different 
classification of three generations is proposed. As a matter of fact, there is no 
substantial difference between Chinese BITs concluded in the 1980s and those in the 
1990 since they were equally conservative in investors’ access to international 
arbitration. Under BITs concluded before 1997, investors generally may only submit 
disputes concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation to investment 
tribunals, either non-ICSID tribunals or ICSID tribunals. Thus, all BITs containing 
narrow ISAPs concluded before 1997 can be classified as the first generation BITs. 
Besides, BITs containing no ISAP also belong to the first generation.  
The second generation, manifesting as broad ISAPs allowing the submission of any 
dispute in connection with an investment to international arbitration, started from the 
China-South Africa BIT concluded in 1997 and basically ended in 2007. The third 
generation, from 2007 onwards, is marked by the re-introduction of several 
limitations in formulating the language of broad ISAPs. Among other things, the third 
generation BITs do not allow the submission of “any dispute in connection with an 
investment” to international arbitration which might be wide enough to cover both 
treaty breach claims and breach of contract claims, breach of domestic law claims and 
even breach of customary international law claims.
 550 
Typically, the third generation 
BITs would only allow the covered investors to submit disputes concerning treaty 
breaches under the applicable BIT to investment tribunals. For example, Article 9 of 
the China-Cuba BIT modified in 2007 stipulates that the investor may submit “the 
disputes that arise between one of the Contracting Parties and an investor of the other 
Contracting Party (Parties in dispute), arising from an alleged breach by that 
Contracting Party of an obligation established in Articles 2 to 7 hereof and that the 
investor has suffered loss or damage due to that breach or as a result of it” to 
international arbitration.  
Numerically, the first generation BITs with narrow ISAPs accounts for the majority 
of Chinese BITs, as shown in Appendixes II and III. 27 BITs with “unlimited” broad 
ISAPs, as shown in Appendix I, can be classified as the second generation BITs. The 
third generation BITs with “limited” broad ISAPs, including the BITs with Cuba, 
Mexico, Columbia, Canada, Uzbekistan, Korea, Japan-Korea, and Tanzania and the 
FTAs with the ASEAN, New Zealand, Chile, Peru, and Australia, represent a growing 
portion of Chinese BITs. If calculated in terms of the number of countries involved, 
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the third generation BITs involve 21 countries since the ASEAN has 10 member states. 
It should be noted that although each generation of Chinese BITs corresponds to 
various periods, a BIT concluded in a given period might not display the generation 
feature of that period.
551
  
Therefore, the generation evolvement of Chinese BITs practice indicates that China 
has shown incremental progress towards higher standards of treaty protection for 
foreign investors. Chinese BITs have become more liberal in granting foreign 
investors direct access to international arbitration. From the first generation to the 
second generation, the investors’ access to international arbitration is dramatically 
expanded. For example, the old China-Germany BIT concluded in 1983 was a first 
generation BIT providing investors with access of disputes involving the amount of 
compensation for expropriation to international arbitration. Twenty years later, it was 
renegotiated in the form of a new BIT to permit the submission of any investment 
dispute to international arbitration. Even though the third generation has begun to take 
shape in recent years by re-introducing limiting language to broad ISAPs, investors 
may still generally submit disputes involving any treaty breach to international 
arbitration under the third generation BITs. Against this background, it is said that 
China’s investment treaties to a large extent have been “Americanized”. 552  
China’s policy shift from a conservative and skeptical attitude to an increasingly 
open attitude towards investor-state arbitration is closely related to its changing scale 
of inward FDI and outward FDI. The scale of Chinese inward FDI and outward FDI 
has increased at a striking speed. FDI inflow in China was only US $3,487 million in 
1990. In 2013, FDI inflow amounted to US $123,911 million.
 
As illustrated below in 
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, unlike FDI inflow into China, which became significant as 
early as the 1990s, FDI outflow from China was relatively insignificant until the early 
2000s. 
553
 The statistics indicate that a change of role for China in international 
investment has taken place. With the transformation from being a mere 
capital-importer to being a capital-exporter too, China now has important interests as 
both capital importers and capital exporters. It can be mainly attributed to the change 
in China’s investment policy priorities from attracting inward FDI to promoting 
                                                             
551 For example, the China-Bahrain BIT was concluded in 1999, but it belongs to the first generation since it 
contains a narrow ISAP granting access of disputes concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation 
to international arbitration.  
552 Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiation and the Future of Investment Treaties Regime: A Grand Bargain 
with Multilateral Implications, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 12, No. 02, 2009, pp. 457-506. 
553  Unless otherwise noted, all statistics in this section are sourced from websites of the UNCTAD 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (http://www.fdi.gov.cn/). 
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outward FDI. With rapid economic growth, including a sharp increase in FDI inflow, 
trade surplus, and forex reserve, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China started to consider seriously and implement the ‘ oing Abroad’ strategy aiming 
at exploring international trade and investment markets in 1998. 
554
 The ‘ oing 
Abroad’ strategy was later formally established as an important national economic 
strategy. This change in policy priorities, coupled with the growth of FDI outflows, 
has led the Chinese government to reconsider its approach to investment treaties. In 
line with its ‘ oing Abroad’ strategy, China adopted a new investment treaty approach 
providing Chinese investors with strong substantial and procedural investment 
protection.
 555
 It thus resulted in higher levels of legal protection for foreign investors 
in China and Chinese investors abroad, including investors’ direct access to 
international arbitration.  
 
 
Another fact that should be noted is that, in concluding BITs with different 
counterparties, China may propose distinct protection standards for foreign 
investment after a weighing of its capital exporting interests and capital importing 
interests. Broad ISAPs may be included in the BIT with a state in which China has 
significant capital importing interests. Around three quarters of the second and third 
generation BITs and FTAs with broad ISAPs have been concluded with developing 
                                                             
554 Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, pp. 31-43. 
555 Axel Berger, The Politics of China’s Investment Treaty-Making Program, in T. Broude, A. Porges & M. 
Busch (eds.), The Politics of International Economic Law, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 162-185. 
Chapter 5: Competition and Interaction between States and Tribunals with respect to the Creeping 
Jurisdiction 
227 
 
countries. In fact, broad ISAPs have been included first and foremost in BITs signed 
with developing countries, such as Barbados (1998), Iran (2000), Myanmar (2001), 
Cyprus (2001), Trinidad and Tobago (2002), and Guyana (2003). With this 
experience, the renegotiations of first generation BITs with European countries, such 
as Germany (2003), Sweden (2004), Finland (2004), Portugal (2005), Spain (2005), 
Belgium-Luxembourg (2005), France (2007), and Switzerland (2009), might be 
regarded as a mere consequence of this change.  
 
 
Notwithstanding China’s open attitude to investor-state arbitration under its second 
generation and third generation BITs and FTAs, the first generation BITs (including 
69 BITs with narrow ISAPs and 3 BITs with no ISAP) are still in force. Many Chinese 
overseas investments remain covered by the first generation BITs. The question is 
whether and to what extent the first generation Chinese BITs restricting access to 
international arbitration can be used by investors to sue the host state before 
international tribunals. It seems that foreign investors could not submit disputes other 
than the disputing amount of compensation for expropriation to international 
arbitration under most Chinese BITs at first glance. A further discussion, however, 
may show that the restrictive ISAPs are not as clear as it seems. Bearing in mind that 
different treaties vary in wording and that each treaty must be interpreted on the basis 
of its specific text, the following will discuss the possible interpretations of ISAPs in 
Chinese first generation BITs and examine how international tribunals have dealt with 
such provisions.  
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A typical example of the first generation arbitration provision can be found in 
Article 8(3) of the China-Peru BIT, which was the disputing subject in the case of Tza 
Yap Shum v. Peru.
556
 It stipulates that:  
If a dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation cannot 
be settled within six months after resort to negotiations as specified in 
Paragraph 1 of this Article, it may be submitted at the request of either party 
to the international arbitration of the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), established by the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, signed in Washington D.C., on March 18, 1965. Any disputes 
concerning other matters between an investor of either Contracting Party and 
the other Contracting Party may be submitted to the Center if the parties to 
the disputes so agree. The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply if the 
investor concerned has resorted to the procedure specified in Paragraph 2 of 
this Article. (emphasis added) 
This provision provides for international arbitration of “a dispute involving the 
amount of compensation for expropriation”. Any disputes concerning other matters 
have to be settled in the domestic courts of the host state unless both the host state and 
the investor otherwise agree for the submission of disputes to international arbitration. 
A majority of Chinese first generation BITs contain a similar provision with variations 
in wording. The term “involving” is widely used in most provisions, whereas some 
provisions use “concerning”, “relating to” or “tied up with” instead. And the term “for 
expropriation” is sometimes substituted with the formulation of “resulting from 
expropriation”. In Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, the tribunal asserted “the broadest 
interpretation” of such narrow ISAP in contending that the term “involving” was 
sufficient enough to confer the jurisdiction to adjudicate whether an expropriation 
actually exists in the first place.
557
 This approach, if followed by future tribunals, will 
make the old generation ISAPs more powerful since most of them contain the word 
“involving” or a similar wording.  
It is also notable that several old BITs formulated terms differently, so that an 
international arbitration tribunal shall “review the amount of compensation” upon the 
request of the investor without inserting the prepositions like “concerning”, 
                                                             
556 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, 19 
June 2009. It is the first published arbitration case under a Chinese investment treaty.  
557 See supra notes 160-169 and accompanying text.  
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“involving” or “relating to”. Articles 4(4) and 4(5) of the China-Austria BIT, for 
instance, read as follows: 
The investor is entitled to request the competent authority of the Contracting 
Party taking expropriatory measures to review the legality of the 
expropriation.  
The investor is entitled to request the competent authority of the Contracting 
Party taking the expropriatory measures or an international arbitration 
tribunal to review the amount of compensation for the expropriation. 
(emphasis added) 
A similar wording can be found in Ad Article 2 of the Protocol in the 
China-Norway BIT, Article 10 of the China-Pakistan BIT and Article 10(1) of the 
China-Poland BIT. The absence of the term “involving” may prevent future tribunals 
from establishing jurisdiction over the existence and legality of the expropriation 
under these BITs.  
The China-Argentina BIT, however, is a notable exception in that it provides 
respective arbitration provisions for China and Argentina. Its Article 8(2) stipulates 
that “a dispute involving the amount of compensation for expropriation” may be 
submitted to international arbitration in respect of China, while “any dispute 
concerning an investment” may be submitted to international arbitration in respect of 
Argentina.  
Besides the possible expansive interpretation of “disputes involving the amount of 
compensation for expropriation” by future tribunals, most Chinese first generation 
BITs are also subject to expansive interpretation in respect of other jurisdiction 
provisions as explained in Chapter 3. It is apparent that MFN clauses and the 
definitions of “investor” and “investment” in Chinese BITs are critical in any future 
investor-state arbitration. Despite that several third generation Chinese BITs and FTAs 
have clarified the non-applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement matters, 
most Chinese BITs nevertheless do not provide any guidance. 
558
 Against the 
background of the expansionary trend in establishing jurisdiction by investment 
tribunals, MFN clauses in the first generation BITs could be invoked to borrow an 
“unlimited” broad ISAP from a third-party treaty, such as one of the second 
generation Chinese BITs granting access to international arbitration for “any dispute 
concerning an investment”. Investors thus would be able to submit all disputes in 
                                                             
558 See supra notes 509-517 and accompanying text.  
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addition to expropriation claims to international arbitration without having to seek 
local remedies in the host state. Indeed, not a few commentators have observed the 
high possibility that investors bound by the first generation Chinese BITs might 
enhance their protection by invoking MFN clauses in their basic treaties to import the 
broader ISAPs contained in the second generation BITs. 
559
  
In case that neither the expansive reading of narrow ISAPs nor the invocation of 
MFN clauses to avoid the limitations of such narrow ISAPs is supported by future 
tribunals, investors may still take advantage of broad ISAPs contained in other 
investment treaties. It can be achieved by structuring its investment through special 
purpose vehicles or shell companies incorporated in a third state that has a favorable 
BIT with the target host state. For example, if a UK investor invests directly in China, 
he may have to seek treaty protection under the China-UK BIT, which is a first 
generation BIT only permitting access to international arbitration for a dispute 
concerning an amount of compensation. However, if the UK investor structures its 
investment in China through an intermediate company incorporated in the 
Netherlands, then he may take advantage of the broad ISAP contained in the 
China-Netherlands BIT, which allows “any legal dispute concerning an investment” 
to be submitted at the request of the investor to international arbitration.  
As a result, although limited in the scope of arbitration, the first generation Chinese 
BITs is actually powerful and may provide greater protection for investors than 
previously anticipated. It will be of particular interest not only to foreign investors 
making investments into China, but also to Chinese investors making investments 
abroad.
560
 For foreign investors making investments into China, the safest approach 
is to arrange their investments through intermediate companies which can take 
advantage of the second or the third generation Chinese BITs and FTAs, such as the 
China-Netherlands BIT and the China-Germany BIT. In the same vein, Chinese 
investors making investments abroad may also structure their investments in countries 
like the Netherlands and Germany which have an extensive network of BITs around 
the world. These countries are famous as “treaty heavens” due to the large number of 
                                                             
559 See, e.g., Aaron M. Chandler, BITs, MFN Treatment and the PRC  The Impact of China’s Ever-Evolving 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice, International Lawyer, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2009, pp. 1301-1310; Stephan 
Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: the New Generation Investment Treaties of the People's Republic of 
China, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 15, 2007, pp. 100-103; Gordon Smith, 
Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaties: Restrictions on International Arbitration, Arbitration, Vol. 76, 2010, p. 
68. 
560 Stanimir Alexandrov, Wider Prospects for ICSID Arbitration under China’s BITs, The Asia-Pacific Arbitration 
Review, 2010, p. 18. 
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their BITs and the high standard of investment protection in their BITs.  
In addition, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the Hong Kong SAR) 
may function as a “springboard” for investors to seek treaty protection and to bring 
investment claims before international tribunals. The Hong Kong SAR, as a special 
administrative region with a high degree of autonomy in China, has concluded 17 
BITs with other countries. 
561
 The Hong Kong BITs provide for a high standard of 
substantive protection and procedural protection allowing the submission of any 
investment dispute to an ad hoc international tribunal. 
562
 Therefore, if Chinese 
investors intend to make investments in countries that have the first generation BITs 
with China (such as Australia, Austria, Denmark, Italy, Kuwait, Thailand, and United 
Kingdom), they may arrange their investments through intermediate companies 
incorporated in the Hong Kong SAR to take advantage of the Hong Kong BITs. For 
example, the China-Australia BIT only allows the submission of disputes relating to 
the amount of compensation for expropriation to international arbitration, while the 
Hong Kong-Australia BIT permits investors to submit any dispute concerning an 
investment to international arbitration.
563
  
It is interesting to note that the Hong Kong BITs have already been used by 
investors to challenge the investment measures of the host state. In Morris v. Australia, 
the claimant Philip Morris Asia, a Hong Kong subsidiary of a United States tobacco 
company, launched an investment claim against Australia under the Hong 
Kong-Australia BIT. The claimant sought to challenge Australia’s Tobacco Plain 
                                                             
561 See the Hong Kong BITs with the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgo-Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand and United Kingdom, available at: http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/laws/table2ti.html. With respect to the 
nature and characteristics of Hong Kong BITs and the external autonomy of the Hong Kong SAR in 
concluding international treaties, see generally Zeng Huaqun, Initiative and Implications of Hong Kong’s 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol.11, 2010, pp. 669-696; Xu Shu & Li 
Haoran, On the Theory and Practice of the Participation of HKSAR in International Treaties, Journal of 
Gansu Political Science and Law Institute, No. 6, 2012, 114-122. 
562 For instance, Article 9(2) of the Hong Kong-Japan stipulates that “any dispute between an investor of one 
Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the former in the area of the 
latter, which has not been settled amicably, may, after a period of six months from written notification of the 
claim by either of the parties to the dispute, be submitted to such procedures for settlement as may be agreed 
between the parties to the dispute. If no such procedures have been agreed within that six months period, the 
dispute shall at the request of the investor concerned be submitted to arbitration under the Arbitration Rules 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law as then in force.” 
563 Article 10 of the Hong Kong-Australia BIT provides that “a dispute between an investor of one Contracting 
Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the former in the area of the latter which 
has not been settled amicably, shall, after a period of three months from written notification of the claim, be 
submitted to such procedures for settlement as may be agreed between the parties to the dispute. If no such 
procedures have been agreed within that three month period, the parties to the dispute shall be bound to 
submit it to arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law as then in force.” 
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Packaging Act 2011 requiring all tobacco products to be manufactured and sold in 
Australia in plain packaging. In the view of the claimant, the Tobacco Plain Packaging 
Act violated its investment in the form of trademark rights by depriving its investment 
of the real value and treating it in an unfair and inequitable way. 
564
 The reason why 
the case was initiated by the Hong Kong subsidiary but not the United States parent 
company is because the United States-Australia FTA does not contain an ISAP 
granting investors’ access to international arbitration. The Morris case has provoked 
widespread concern about the undue constraint of investor-state arbitration 
mechanism on States’ ability to protect public health in Australia and resulted in the 
policy shift of the Australian government towards ISAPs.  
Recently, investment arbitration cases initiated under Chinese investment treaties 
have begun to increase. There are currently 7 known cases brought under Chinese 
BITs, of which 5 cases are brought by Chinese investors against foreign states and 2 
cases are brought by foreign investors against China. Tza Yap Shum v. Peru is the first 
case brought by a Chinese investor against a foreign state under a Chinese BIT. In 
2007, the claimant, a Hong Kong SAR resident with Chinese nationality, initiated 
arbitration claims against Peru on the basis of the China-Peru BIT, arguing that 
Peruvian tax measures constituted violations of the China-Peru BIT. The tribunal 
asserted “the broadest interpretation” of the narrow ISAP in holding that it had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate whether an expropriation had taken place. 
565
 The tribunal 
subsequently found that Peruvian tax measures constituted an indirect expropriation 
and awarded compensation. 
566
 
 
Table 5.1 List of Chinese BITs Involved in Investor-State Arbitration Cases 
Chinese BIT ISAP Claimant Respondent 
Subject of 
Dispute 
Status of 
Proceeding 
China-Peru BIT Narrow Tza Yap Shum Peru 
Fish flour 
production 
enterprise 
Decision on 
Jurisdiction 
rendered on 
19 June 2009 
(Peru failed); 
Award 
                                                             
564 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice 
of Arbitration, 21 November 2011. 
565 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, 19 
June 2009.  
566 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Award, 7 July 2011. 
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rendered on 7 
July 2011 
(Peru failed) 
China-Mongoli
a BIT 
Narrow 
China 
Heilongjiang 
International 
Economic & 
Technical 
Cooperative 
Corp., etc 
Mongolia Mining Pending 
China-Belgium-
Luxembourg 
BIT (1986); 
China-Belgium-
Luxembourg 
BIT (2009); 
Narrow 
(1986 
BIT); 
Broad 
(2009 
BIT) 
Ping An Life 
Insurance 
Company of 
China, etc 
Belgium 
Banking and 
financial 
services 
Award 
rendered on 
30 April 2015 
(Belgium 
won) 
China-Laos BIT Narrow 
Sanum 
Investments 
Ltd. 
Laos 
Gaming 
business 
Award on 
Jurisdiction 
rendered on 
13 December 
2013 (Laos 
failed); 
Deed of 
Settlement 
reached on 15 
June 2014 
China-Yemen 
BIT 
Narrow 
Beijing Urban 
Construction 
Group Co. 
Ltd. 
Yemen 
Construction 
of an airport 
terminal 
Pending 
China-Malaysia 
BIT 
Narrow Ekran Berhad China 
Arts and 
cultural 
facilities 
Discontinued 
following a 
settlement 
agreement 
China-Korea 
BIT 
Broad 
Ansung 
Housing Co., 
Ltd. 
China 
Property 
development 
project 
Pending 
 
In 2010, three Chinese companies brought arbitration claims against Mongolia on 
the basis of the China-Mongolia BIT, arguing that Mongolia’s cancellation of a 
mining license constituted an expropriation of their investment. The case is still 
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pending. 
567
 On 7 September 2 12, Ping An, China’s second-biggest insurer, filed a 
request for arbitration against Belgium on the basis of the new 
China-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT dated June 6, 2005, which came into force on 
December 1, 2009 (the 2009 BIT). Ping An was the largest shareholder of the 
Belgium bank Fortis when the 2008 financial crisis erupted. Ping An challenged the 
rescue measures taken by the Belgian State in contending that they constituted 
violations of the 2009 BIT. Interestingly, the tribunal held that it lacked jurisdiction 
ratione temporis to adjudicate on the claims under the 2009 BIT, and suggested 
instead that Ping An might submit its claims under the old 
China-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT dated June 4, 1984, which came into force on 
October 5, 1986 (the 1986 BIT). The Ping An case involved two BITs, the 1986 BIT 
and the 2009 BIT. The 2009 BIT substituted and replaced the 1986 BIT on December 
1, 2009 (the entry into force of the 2009 BIT). Both disputing parties agreed that the 
dispute had arisen before December 1, 2009. Ping An, however, argued that it could 
submit the dispute under the 2009 BIT on the basis of Article 10 of the 2009 BIT 
providing that “the present Agreement shall apply to all investments made by 
investors of either Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, 
whether made before or after the entry into force of this Agreement, but shall not 
apply to any dispute or any claim concerning an investment which was already under 
judicial or arbitral process before its entry into force. Such disputes and claims shall 
continue to be settled according to the provisions of the Agreement of 1984 
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.” Another reason why Ping An chose the 
2009 BIT was that the 2    BIT allowed the submission of “a legal dispute” to 
arbitration while the 1 86 BIT only allowed the submission of “a dispute which arises 
from an amount of compensation for expropriation, nationalization or other similar 
measures” to arbitration. Nevertheless, in the view of the tribunal, Ping An had 
already notified Belgium the dispute under the 1986 BIT before the entry into force of 
the 2009 BIT (December 1, 2009) and thus it could not be covered by Article 10 of 
the 2009 BIT. 
568
 It seems that future investors that intend to claim under Chinese 
BITs have to be cautious with the transition arrangement of successive BITs.  
On 14 August 2012, Sanum Investments, a company incorporated in the Macau 
                                                             
567 China Heilongjiang International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp., Qinhuangdaoshi Qinlong 
International Industrial, and Beijing Shougang Mining Investment v. Republic of Mongolia, UNCITRAL Case, 
pending as of May 2015. 
568 Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, 
Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29, Award, 30 April 2015, paras. 203-233. 
Chapter 5: Competition and Interaction between States and Tribunals with respect to the Creeping 
Jurisdiction 
235 
 
SAR of China, filed a request for arbitration against Laos on the basis of the 
China-Laos BIT, arguing that Laos was in breach of the China-Laos BIT. Following 
the decision in Tza Yap Shum v. Peru, the tribunal equally adopted a broad 
interpretation of the terms “a dispute involving the amount of compensation for 
expropriation” and determined that it had jurisdiction to decide whether an 
expropriation had actually occurred and subsequently the amount of compensation for 
the expropriation. 
569
 Notably, after its failure on jurisdiction, Laos reached a 
settlement agreement with the claimants agreeing to withdraw any claim by either 
party against the other party. 
570
 On 3 December 2014, Beijing Urban Construction 
Group (a Chinese company) filed a request for arbitration against Yemen on the basis 
of the China-Yemen BIT. It is reported that the dispute relates to construction of a 
Yemen airport terminal, and the claimant alleges that Yemen indirectly expropriated 
its investment for the construction of the airport terminal. The case is still pending. 
571
 
By contrast, there are only 2 cases brought by foreign investors against China so far. 
It is possibly why the Chinese government does not show its cautious stance towards 
investment arbitration like Argentina which has been exposed to more than 50 
arbitration cases brought by foreign investors. On 24 May 2011, a Malaysian investor 
instituted arbitration claims against China on the basis of the China-Malaysia BIT. 
However, soon after, China reached an agreement with the claimant to suspend the 
arbitration proceedings and finally they agreed on a settlement of the dispute and 
discontinued the arbitration proceedings. 
572
 On 4 November 2014, a Korean 
company filed a request for arbitration against China on the basis of the new 
China-Korea BIT dated 7 September 2007. It is reported that the dispute involves a 
property development project in Jiangsu Province of China. The case is still pending. 
573
  
Notwithstanding the restrictive arbitration provisions in most Chinese BITs, there 
are reasons to believe that the submission of disputes to investor-state arbitration 
                                                             
569 Sanum Investments Ltd. v. The Laos Democratic People’s Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Award on Jurisdiction, 
13 December 2013.  
570 Sanum Investments Ltd. v. The Laos Democratic People’s Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Deed of Settlement, 
15 June 2014.  
571 Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/30, pending as of 
May 2015. 
572 Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15, suspended pursuant to the parties' 
agreement on 22 July 2011 and discontinued pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(1) on 16 May 2013. 
573 Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People's Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25, pending as of May 
2015. 
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under Chinese BITs is not a question of “whether” but “when, how and to what 
extent”. With the rapid rise of both inward and outward investment, it is merely “a 
matter of time”574 before foreign investors and Chinese investors bring investor-state 
arbitration claims under Chinese investment treaties. Since Chinese BITs and FTAs 
have become more open and liberal to investor-state arbitration, investors would face 
fewer obstacles in submitting claims to international arbitration. Although some 
Chinese scholars seem to be concerned about the risk of being sued by foreign 
investors under the second and third generation Chinese BITs and FTAs, 
575
 the 
relevant governmental departments of China in charge of drafting and concluding 
BITs appear to be willing to further liberalize the treaty regime of investment 
protection. It is held that protecting overseas investment interests has become “the 
new task” of China’s BITs. Broad access to investor-state arbitration is considered to 
be an “important legal guarantee” to Chinese investors making investment abroad. 
Since Chinese outward investment is comparatively concentrated in developing 
countries, the “starting point” for negotiating BITs should be shifted from merely 
focusing on the host state interests to focusing on the protection of overseas 
investment while respecting basic interests of the host state. 
576
  
Given that China has fully embraced the mechanism of investor-state arbitration in 
the last few years and considering its rapidly increasing outward investment (in 
particular in the areas of infrastructure and natural resources), it would be more 
realistic to expect China to carry on with the liberal trend rather than reverting to a 
more conservative approach.
 577
 China would not shift its current open policy to 
investor-state arbitration. 
578
 It seems rather unlikely that China would oppose the 
jurisdictional expansion of investment tribunals so long as it adheres to the “ oing 
Abroad” policy paving the way for Chinese investment abroad.  
                                                             
574  Zhuang-Hui Wu, International Arbitration for Chinese-Foreign Disputes: Emerging Choices in 2012, 
International Law News, Vol.41, No. 2, 2012, p. 8. 
575 Chen An (ed.), New Developments in International Investment Law and New Practice of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties in China, Fudan University Press, 2007, p. 359. (in Chinese) 
576 Li Ling, China’s BIT Practice and its Challenges, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.17, No. 4, 
2010, pp. 119-120 (in Chinese). The author was the former Director of the Department of Treaty and Law of 
China’s Ministry of Commerce. In practice, Chinese BITs are normally initiated and drafted by the 
Department of Treaty and Law of China’s Ministry of Commerce. Investment treaties in China are required to 
be submitted to the State Council for approval. However, investment treaties are not subject to formal 
ratification by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.  
577 Norah Gallagher & Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 43.  
578 Li Ling, China’s BIT Practice and its Challenges, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol.17, No. 4, 
2010, p. 117 (in Chinese). The author mentioned that the Chinese government would avoid policy shift which 
had happened in some other countries.  
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Notably, in September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping started the initiative to 
jointly build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road 
(“the Belt and Road”). Investment cooperation, such as speeding up investment 
facilitation, removing investment barriers and pushing negotiations forward on BITs 
to “protect the lawful rights and interest of investors”, is considered to be “a major 
task” in building the Belt and Road. China encourages “Chinese enterprises to 
participate in infrastructure construction in other countries along the Belt and Road, 
and make industrial investments there.” 579 Therefore, closer investment cooperation, 
such as greater access to investor-state arbitration and higher standard of investment 
treatment, between China and countries along the Belt and Road can be expected in 
the near future. From another perspective, the increasing submissions of disputes to 
investor-state arbitration under Chinese BITs with countries along the Belt and Road 
can also be expected.  
 
                                                             
579 See the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Commerce of China, Vision and Proposed Actions Outlined on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, March 2015, available at: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml. Countries along the Belt and Road mainly 
include Asian countries and Central and Eastern European countries, but also extend to African countries.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
After a comprehensive examination of the practice of investment treaty tribunals on 
jurisdictional issues, this dissertation finds that investment treaty tribunals generally 
adopt an expansive approach towards jurisdiction and that the expansion of 
jurisdiction is still ongoing. There are multiple ways investment treaty tribunals can 
break through jurisdictional boundaries. These ways correlate with each other and 
work in harmony. They include expansive interpretations of “covered investors”, 
“covered investment” and “investment disputes”, weakening of preconditions to 
jurisdiction, expansive application of most-favored-nation clauses and “umbrella 
clauses”, restrictive application of “fork-in-the-road clauses”, flexible interpretation of 
the temporal scope of investment treaties, relaxing the burden of proof for investors, 
and frequent use of obiter dictum.  
The creeping jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals is an inevitable result 
attributed to internal and external causes. Aggressive pushing by investors, the 
ambiguity of investment treaty provisions, intense competition in attracting foreign 
investment among host states, and under-estimation of arbitration risks by host states 
are external driving forces. And the inherent capability and inclination of investment 
treaty tribunals in interpreting ISAPs expansively are institutional foundations to 
achieve the creeping jurisdiction. It can manifest in three aspects. Firstly, although 
being ad hoc dispute settlement bodies, investment treaty tribunals have the 
competence to decide their own jurisdiction and enjoy a high level of interpretive 
authority. Secondly, the established techniques of legal reasoning may enhance the 
credibility of the creeping jurisdiction. The flexible application of treaty interpretation 
rules and the de facto precedent effect are two frequent techniques employed by 
investment treaty tribunals. Thirdly, arbitrators with pro-investor inclinations strongly 
support the expansion of jurisdiction in deciding investor-state disputes. Arbitrators’ 
personal background, close relationship with investors, and commercial legal thinking 
will strongly influence their value preferences for arbitration outcomes.  
The expansion of jurisdiction in investor-state arbitration enhances the capabilities 
of the arbitration system and understandably comes at the price of limiting the 
discretion of treaty parties. Nevertheless, the continuation of the investment 
arbitration system depends on finding the right balance between providing incentives 
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for investor claimants to bring cases and giving comfort to state respondents 
considering whether to remain within the system. In considering the claims of 
investors, investment tribunals need to consider whether their rulings would go far 
beyond the tolerance limit of respondent states (host states). It is suggested that the 
acceptability of treaty parties for the jurisdictional creep by tribunals is likely to 
change with factors such as the vagueness of investment treaty norms, the caseload of 
investment arbitration, the quality of their legal reasoning, the effect of prior arbitral 
decisions, the composition of tribunal members and their preferences. In addition, the 
finality and worldwide enforceability of investment arbitral awards also exerts 
considerable pressure on state respondents to comply with them. It seems that a 
progressive rather than a radical expansion of jurisdiction is more likely to be 
tolerated by treaty parties. 
On one side, investment treaty tribunals have the capability and inclination to 
expand their jurisdiction. On the other, treaty parties also have the capability to 
control the depth and breadth of the creeping jurisdiction of investment treaty 
tribunals. For a radical expansion of jurisdiction that goes far beyond the acceptability 
of contracting states, states may minimize its adverse impacts by selecting arbitrators 
prudently, initiating state-to-state arbitration proceedings, requesting annulment of the 
award and resisting enforcement of the award. Seeking to revise arbitration rules to 
strengthen the involvement of non-disputing states in investor-state arbitration, 
improving ex ante and ex post controls by treaty parties over investment treaty 
provisions, and even exiting from international investment treaties and investor-state 
arbitration mechanisms may also remind tribunals to respect the common intentions 
of treaty parties. It is worth noting that whether and how to control the creeping 
jurisdiction of tribunals depends on policy priorities and interests weighed among 
contracting states. However, the capability of contracting states to control the creeping 
jurisdiction of tribunals would be restricted when these counter measures fail to 
function. The negotiating costs involved in the contracting and re-contracting process 
of investment treaties and the costs of exit from investment treaty regime may 
substantially prevent contracting states from taking action against the jurisdictional 
expansion by investment tribunals.  
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Appendix I: List of Chinese BITs with Broad ISAPs 
Continent Counterparty 
Signature 
Date 
Effective 
Date 
Covered Investment 
Disputes under ISAPs 
Europe 
(12) 
Sweden 1982-3-29 1982-3-29 No ISAP 
 
Sweden 
(Protocol) 
2004-9-27 2004-9-27 
Article 6: any dispute 
concerning investments 
 Germany 1983-10-7 1985-3-18 
Ad Article 4: the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 
Germany 
(Re-signature) 
2003-12-1 2005-11-11 
Article 9: any dispute 
concerning investments 
 France 1984-5-30 1985-3-19 
Article 9: a dispute arising 
from disagreement on the 
amount of compensation 
payments 
 
France 
(Re-signature) 
2007-11-26 2010-8-20 
Article 7: any dispute 
concerning investments 
 
Belgium and 
Luxembourg 
1984-6-4 1986-10-5 
Article 10: a dispute which 
arises from an amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation, 
nationalization or other 
similar measures 
 
Belgium and 
Luxembourg 
(Re-signature) 
2005-6-6 2009-12-1 Article 8: a legal dispute 
 Finland 1984-9-4 1986-1-26 
Ad Article 2: disagreement 
on the amount of 
compensation  for 
expropriated assets 
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Finland 
(Re-signature) 
2004-11-15 2006-11-15 
Article 8: any dispute 
arising out of an investment 
 Netherlands 1985-6-17 1987-2-1 
Article 9: disputes 
concerning the amount of 
compensation to be paid 
when measures of 
expropriation, 
nationalisation or other 
similar measures have been 
taken 
 
Netherlands 
(Re-signature) 
2001-11-26 2004-8-1 
Article 10: disputes 
concerning an investment 
 Switzerland 1986-11-12 1987-3-18 
Article 12: a dispute on the 
matter of compensation 
mentioned in Article 7 of 
this Agreement 
[Deprivation and 
Compensation] 
 
Switzerland 
(Re-signature) 
2009-1-27 2010-4-13 
Article 11: disputes with 
respect to investments 
 Russia 2006-11-9 2009-5-1 
Article 9: any dispute 
related to an investment 
 Portugal 1992-2-3 1992-12-1 
Article 8: a dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 
Portugal 
(Re-signature) 
2005-12-9 2008-7-26 
Article 9: any dispute 
concerning investments 
 Spain 1992-2-6 1993-5-1 
Article 9: a dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 
Spain 
(Re-signature) 
2005-11-24 2008-7-1 
Article 9: any dispute in 
connection with an 
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investment 
 Malta 2009-2-22 2009-4-1 
Article 9: any investment 
disputes 
 Cyprus 2001-1-17 2002-4-29 
Article 9: any legal dispute 
in connection with an 
investment 
Asia (7) Uzbekistan 1992-3-13 1994-4-12 
Article 9: any dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 
Uzbekistan 
(Re-signature) 
2011-4-19 2011-9-1 
Article 12: any legal 
dispute in connection with 
an investment 
 Korea 1992-9-30 1992-12-4 
Article 9: a dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation referred to in 
the provisions of paragraph 
3 of Article 5  
 
Korea 
(Re-signature) 
2007-9-7 2007-12-1 
Article 9: a dispute that has 
incurred loss or damage by 
reason of, or arising out of, 
an alleged breach of this 
Agreement with respect to 
an investment 
 
Japan and 
Korea
1
 
2012-5-13 2014-5-17  
Article 15: a dispute 
between a Contracting 
Party and an investor of 
another Contracting Party 
that has incurred loss or 
damage by reason of, or 
arising out of, an alleged 
breach of any obligation of 
                                                             
1 The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Treaty is classified as a BIT here in a broad sense. The text of the 
China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Treaty is available at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/0513_01.html. 
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the former Contracting 
Party under this Agreement 
with respect to the investor 
or its investments 
Note: investment disputes 
with respect to the 
obligations of a Contracting 
Party under subparagraph 
1(b) of Article 9 
[intellectual property rights] 
and the measures of a 
Contracting Party that fall 
within the scope of Article 
20 [prudential measures] 
are excluded.  
 Iran 2000-6-22 2005-7-1 
Article 12: any dispute with 
respect to an investment 
 Myanmar 2001-12-12 2002-5-21 
Article 9: any legal dispute 
in connection with an 
investment 
 North Korea 2005-3-22 2005-10-1 
Article 9: any legal dispute 
in connection with an 
investment 
 India 2006-11-21 2007-8-1 
Article 9: any dispute in 
relation to an investment 
Africa (7) South Africa 1997-12-30 1998-4-1 
Article 9: any dispute in 
connection with an 
investment 
 Nigeria 2001-8-27 2010-2-18 
Article 9: any dispute in 
connection with an 
investment 
 Tunisia 2004-6-21 2006-7-1 
Article 9: any dispute 
related to an investment 
 Equatorial 2005-10-20 2006-11-15 Article 9: any dispute in 
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Guinea connection with an 
investment 
 Madagascar 2005-11-21 2007-7-1 
Article 10: any legal 
dispute 
 Mali 2009-2-12 2009-7-16 
Article 9: investment 
disputes 
 Tanzania 2013-3-24 2014-4-17 
Article 13: a dispute in 
which an investor of one 
Contracting Party claims 
that the other Contracting 
Party has breached an 
obligation under Article 2 
through 9, or Paragraph 2 
of Article 14 
Americas 
(7) 
Cuba 1995-4-24 1996-8-1 
Article 9: the dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 
Cuba 
(Re-signature) 
2007-4-20 2008-12-1 
Article 9: the disputes 
arising from an alleged 
breach by that Contracting 
Party of an obligation 
established in Articles 2 to 
7 hereof and that the 
investor has suffered loss or 
damage due to that breach 
or as a result of it 
 Barbados 1998-7-20 1999-10-1 
Article 9: any dispute 
concerning an investment 
 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
2002-7-22 2004-12-7 
Article 10: a dispute 
between a Contracting 
Party and an investor of the 
other Contracting Party, 
concerning an obligation of 
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the former under this 
Agreement in relation to an 
investment of the latter 
 Guyana 2003-3-27 2004-10-26 
Article 9: a dispute between 
a Contracting Party and an 
investor of the other 
Contracting Party, 
concerning an obligation of 
the former under this 
Agreement in relation to an 
investment of the latter 
 Mexico 2008-7-11 2009-6-6 
Article 13: a claim that the 
other Contracting Party has 
breached an obligation set 
forth in Chapter II, and that 
the investor has incurred 
loss or damage by reason 
of, or arising out of, that 
breach 
 Columbia 2008-11-11 2012-6-26 
Article 9: any dispute in 
connection with an 
investment 
 Canada 2012-9-9 2014-10-1 
Article 20: a claim that the 
other Contracting Party has 
breached an obligation:  
(a) under Articles 2 to 7(2), 
9, 10 to 13, 14(4) or 16, 
if the breach is with 
respect to investors or 
covered investments of 
investors to which 
sub-paragraph (b) does 
not apply, or  
(b) under Article 10 or 12 if 
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the breach is with 
respect to investors of a 
Contracting Party in 
financial institutions in 
the other Contracting 
Party’s territory or 
covered investments of 
such investors in 
financial institutions in 
the other Contracting 
Party’s territory, 
and that the investor or a 
covered investment of the 
investor has incurred loss or 
damage by reason of, or 
arising out of, that breach. 
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Appendix II: List of Chinese BITs with Narrow ISAPs 
Continent Counterparty 
Signature 
Date 
Effective 
Date 
Covered Investment 
Disputes under ISAPs 
Europe 
(21) 
Norway 1984-11-21 1985-7-10 
Ad Article 2: the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 Italy 1985-1-28 1987-8-28 
Ad Article 5: a dispute over 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Denmark 1985-4-29 1985-4-29 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
resulting from expropriation 
 Austria 1985-9-12 1986-10-11 
Article 4: the amount of 
compensation for the 
expropriation 
 England 1986-5-15 1986-5-15 
Article 7: a dispute 
concerning an amount of 
compensation 
 Poland 1988-6-7 1989-1-8 
Article 10: the amount of 
compensation for the 
expropriated investment 
assets 
 Bulgaria 1989-6-27 1994-8-21 
Article 9: any dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 
Bulgaria 
(Protocol) 
2007-6-26 2007-11-10 No change 
 Hungary 1991-5-29 1993-4-1 
Article 10: any dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
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Czech and 
Slovak 
1991-12-4 1992-12-1 
Article 9: any dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation and other 
disputes agreed upon by 
parties 
 
Slovak 
Protocol 
2005-12-7 2007-5-25 No change 
 Greece 1992-6-25 1993-12-21 
Article 10: disputes 
concerning the amount of 
compensation referred to in 
Article 4;  
any other dispute by mutual 
consent 
 Ukraine 1992-10-31 1993-5-29 
Article 10: any dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 Moldova 1992-11-6 1995-3-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Belarus 1993-1-11 1995-1-14 
Article 8: a dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 Albania 1993-2-13 1995-9-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Croatia 1993-6-7 1994-7-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Estonia 1993-9-2 1994-6-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
Appendix II: List of Chineses BITs with Narrow ISAPs 
249 
 
 Slovenia 1993-9-13 1995-1-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Lithuania 1993-11-8 1994-6-1 
Article 8: the dispute relating 
to the amount of 
compensation and other 
disputes agreed upon by 
parties 
 Iceland 1994-3-31 1997-3-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation;  
any dispute concerning other 
matters by mutual agreement 
 
Yugoslavia 
(now Serbia) 
1995-12-18 1996-9-12 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Macedonia 1997-6-9 1997-11-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
Asia (28) Singapore 1985-11-21 1986-2-7 
Article 13: a dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation resulting from 
expropriation, 
nationalization, or other 
measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalization 
or expropriation 
 Kuwait 1985-11-23 1986-12-24 
Article 8: the dispute relating 
to the amount of 
compensation and any other 
dispute agreed upon by both 
parties 
 Sri Lanka 1986-3-13 1987-3-25 
Article 13: a dispute 
involving the amount of 
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compensation resulting from 
expropriation 
 Japan 1988-8-27 1989-5-14 
Article 11: a dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation referred to in 
the provisions of paragraph 3 
of Article 5;  
any dispute concerning other 
matters by mutual agreement 
 Malaysia 1988-11-21 1990-3-31 
Article 7: the dispute relating 
to the amount of 
compensation and any other 
dispute agreed upon by both 
parties 
 Pakistan 1989-2-12 1990-9-30 
Article 10: the amount of 
compensation for the 
expropriated investment 
assets 
 Turkey 1990-11-13 1994-8-19 
Article 7: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
resulting from an 
expropriation or 
nationalization referred to in 
Article 3;  
other disputes in accordance 
with the laws and 
regulations of the 
Contracting Party that is a 
party to the dispute 
 Mongolia 1991-8-25 1993-11-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Kyrgyzstan 1992-5-14 1995-9-8 
Article 8: any dispute 
involving the amount of 
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compensation for 
expropriation 
 Armenia 1992-7-4 1995-3-18 
Article 10: any dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 Philippines 1992-7-20 1995-9-8 
Article 10: a dispute on the 
matter of compensation 
mentioned in Article 4 of this 
Agreement and other matters 
related thereto;  
any other dispute on the 
matter of this Agreement 
agreed by the two parties to 
the dispute for submission to 
international arbitration 
 Kazakhstan 1992-8-10 1994-8-13 
Article 9: any dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 Vietnam 1992-12-2 1993-9-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Laos 1993-1-31 1993-6-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Tajikistan 1993-3-9 1994-1-20 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Georgia 1993-6-3 1995-3-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
1993-7-1 1994-9-28 
Article 9: the dispute relating 
to the amount of 
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compensation and any other 
dispute agreed upon by both 
parties 
 Azerbaijan 1994-3-8 1995-4-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Indonesia 1994-11-18 1995-4-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Oman 1995-3-18 1995-8-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Israel 1995-4-10 2009-1-13 
Article 8: any legal dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation in the case of 
expropriation 
 Saudi Arabia 1996-2-29 1997-5-1 
Article 8: the dispute on the 
amount of compensation 
resulting from 
nationalization and 
expropriation 
 Lebanon 1996-6-13 1997-7-10 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
 Cambodia 1996-7-19 2000-2-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Syria 1996-12-9 2001-11-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Yemen 1998-2-16 2002-4-10 
Article 10: the dispute 
relating to the amount of 
compensation;  
any other dispute agreed 
upon by both parties 
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 Qatar 1999-4-9 2000-4-1 
Article 9: the legal dispute is 
tied up with the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 Bahrain 1999-6-17 2000-4-27 
Article 9: the dispute on the 
amount of compensation 
resulting from 
nationalization and 
expropriation 
Pacific 
(3) 
Australia 1988-7-11 1988-7-11 
Article 12: the dispute 
relating to the amount of 
compensation payable under 
Article VIII 
 New Zealand 1988-11-22 1989-3-25 
Article 13: a dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation resulting from 
expropriation referred to in 
Article 6 
 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1991-4-12 1993-2-12 
Article 8: a dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation referred to in 
the provisions of paragraph 
(c) of Article 5;  
any dispute concerning other 
matters by agreement 
Africa 
(10) 
Ghana 1989-10-12 1990-11-22 
Article 10: any  dispute 
concerning the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation 
 Egypt 1994-4-21 1996-4-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Morocco 1995-3-27 1999-11-27 
Article 10: the dispute 
concerning the amount of 
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compensation for 
expropriation;  
any other dispute agreed 
upon by both parties 
 Mauritius 1996-5-4 1997-6-8 
Article 13: a dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation resulting from 
any measure referred to in 
paragraph (1) of Article 6 
 Zimbabwe 1996-5-21 1998-3-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Algeria 1996-10-17 2003-1-28 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Gabon 1997-5-9 2009-2-16 
Article 10: any dispute with 
respect to the amount of 
compensation in the case of 
expropriation;  
other disputes under mutual 
consent of both Contracting 
Parties 
 Sudan 1997-5-30 1998-7-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Cape Verde 1998-4-21 2001-10-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Ethiopia 1998-5-11 2000-5-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
Americas 
(7) 
Bolivia 1992-5-8 1996-9-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
Appendix II: List of Chineses BITs with Narrow ISAPs 
255 
 
 Argentina 1992-11-5 1994-8-1 
Article 8:  
in respect of China: a dispute 
involving the amount of 
compensation for 
expropriation;  
any dispute concerning other 
matters by mutual agreement 
of the parties to the dispute 
in respect of Argentina: any 
dispute concerning an 
investment 
 Uruguay 1993-12-2 1997-12-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation;  
any disputes concerning 
other matters may be 
submitted to an ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal if the parties 
to the dispute so agree 
 Ecuador 1994-3-21 1997-7-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
 Chile
1
 1994-3-23 1995-8-1 
Article 9: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation;  
any dispute concerning other 
matters between an investor 
of either Contracting Party 
and the other Contracting 
Party may be submitted by 
mutual agreement to ad hoc 
                                                             
1 The China-Chile BIT was terminated and replaced by the China-Chile FTA Supplementary Agreement on 
Investments. Nevertheless, according to the latter China-Chile FTA Supplementary Agreement on Investments, 
the China-Chile BIT “shall continue to apply to any investment (as defined in the BIT) which was made before 
the entry into force of this Agreement with respect to any act, fact that took place or situation that ceased to exist 
or any dispute or any claim which originated before the entry into force of this Agreement.” 
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arbitral tribunal 
 Peru 1994-6-9 1995-2-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation; 
any disputes concerning 
other matters between an 
investor of either 
Contracting Party and the 
other Contracting Party may 
be submitted to the Center if 
the parties to the disputes so 
agree 
 Jamaica 1994-10-26 1996-4-1 
Article 8: a dispute involving 
the amount of compensation 
for expropriation 
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Appendix III: List of Chinese BITs with No ISAP 
Continent Counterparty 
Signature 
Date 
Effective 
Date 
Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism 
Asia (3) Thailand 1985-3-12 1985-12-13 
Investor-State: local remedies 
in the host state 
State-State: Article  , “If a 
dispute between the 
Contracting Parties 
concerning the interpretation 
or application of this 
Agreement cannot thus be 
settled within six months, it 
shall, at the request of either 
Contracting Party, be 
submitted to an arbitral 
tribunal.” 
 Turkmenistan 1992-11-21 1994-6-6 
Investor-State: local remedies 
in the host state 
State-State: Article 7, “If a 
dispute between the 
Contracting Parties 
concerning the interpretation 
or application of this 
Agreement cannot thus be 
settled within six months, it 
shall, upon the request of 
either Contracting Party, be 
submitted to an hoc arbitral 
tribunal.” 
 Romania 1994-7-12 1995-9-1 
Investor-State: Article 9(2), 
“If the dispute cannot be 
settled through negotiations 
within six months, either 
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party to the dispute shall be 
entitled to submit the dispute 
either to the competent court 
of the Contracting Party 
accepting the investment, or 
to international arbitration 
(ICSID) for settlement if the 
parties to the dispute so 
agree.” (Note  the host state’s 
consent to ICSID arbitration 
will be given on a 
case-by-case basis according 
to this article. It thus can be 
equated with no ISAP.) 
State-State: Article 8, “If a 
dispute between the 
Contracting Parties 
concerning the interpretation 
or application of this 
Agreement cannot thus be 
settled within six months, it 
shall, upon the request of 
either Contracting Party, be 
submitted to an hoc arbitral 
tribunal.” 
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Continent Counterparty 
Signature 
Date 
Effective 
Date 
Covered Investment Disputes 
under ISAPs 
Asia (4) ASEAN
1
 2009-8-15 2010-2-15 
Article 14: investment disputes 
between a Party and an investor 
of another Party concerning an 
alleged breach of an obligation 
of the former Party under 
Article 4 (National Treatment), 
Article 5 
(Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment), Article 7 
(Treatment of Investment), 
Article 8 (Expropriation), 
Article 9(Compensation for 
Losses) and Article 10 
(Transfers and Repatriation of 
Profits), which causes loss or 
damage to the investor in 
relation to its investment with 
respect to the management, 
conduct, operation, or sale or 
other disposition of an 
investment 
 Pakistan 2006-11-18 2007-7-1 
Article 14: any legal dispute in 
connection with an investment 
 Singapore 2008-10-23 2009-1-1 
Article 84: the provisions of the 
China-ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Treaty shall, mutatis 
mutandis, be incorporated into 
                                                             
1  The China-ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Treaty is the last one of the China-ASEAN free trade 
agreements. The China-ASEAN Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation was 
concluded on 4 November 2002 and came into force on 1 July 2003. 
Appendix IV: List of Chineses FTAs 
260 
 
and form an integral part of this 
Agreement 
 Korea 2015-6-1  
Article 12.12: a dispute 
between a Party and an investor 
of the other Party that has 
incurred loss or damage by 
reason of, or arising out of, an 
alleged breach of any 
obligation of the former Party 
under this Chapter with respect 
to the investor or its covered 
investments in the territory of 
the former Party 
Pacific 
(2) 
New 
Zealand 
2008-4-7 2008-10-1 
Article 153: any legal dispute 
arising under this Chapter 
between an investor of one 
Party and the other Party, 
directly concerning an 
investment by that investor in 
the territory of that other Party 
 Australia 2015-6-17  
Article 9.12: a claim (i) that the 
respondent has breached an 
obligation in Article 9.3; and  
(ii) that the claimant has 
incurred loss or damage by 
reason of, or arising out of, that 
breach 
Article 9.11.4: Measures of a 
Party that are 
non-discriminatory and for the 
legitimate public welfare 
objectives of public health, 
safety, the environment, public 
morals or public order shall not 
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be the subject of a claim under 
this Section. 
Americas 
(3) 
Peru 2009-4-28 2010-3-1 
Article 139: any dispute 
between an investor of one 
Party and the other Party in 
connection with an investment 
in the territory of the other 
Party 
 Costa Rica 2010-4-8 2011-8-1 No investment commitments 
 Chile
1
 2012-9-9 2014-4-4 
Article 14: a claim that: (a) the 
respondent has breached an 
obligation under Section B 
(Investment); and (b) the 
claimant has incurred loss or 
damage by reason of, or arising 
out of, that breach.  
Article 23: except as provided 
in this Article, nothing in this 
Agreement shall apply to 
taxation measures.  
Europe 
(2) 
Iceland 2013-4-15 2014-7-1 No investment commitments 
 Switzerland 2013-7-6 2014-7-1 No investment commitments 
 
                                                             
1 The Supplementary Agreement on Investments of the China-Chile FTA is one of the China-Chile free trade 
agreements. The China-Chile FTA was concluded on 18 November 2005 and came into force on 1 October 
2006. 
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